Augustine says beautifully: "Verius enim cogitatur Deus quam dicitur, et verius est quam cogitatur For God is more truly thought than He is uttered, and exists more truly than He is thought." 20 B) In their capacity as metaphysicians, the Fathers seek to refute Eunomianism partly by a close analysis of the elements that enter into the human conception of God, partly by opposing to it a complete theory of knowledge. In regard to the first point, the Fathers involved in the Eunomian controversy, especially the Cappadocians, prove the impossibility of man's having an intuitive, adequate knowledge of God here below, by an analysis of the logical constituents of the various concepts we are able to form of God. Their argument may be summed up as follows: A careful classification of all these different concepts shows some of them to be affirmative, while others are negative in quality. The affirmative concepts connote some perfection, either concrete (e. g., God is wise), or abstract (e. g., God is wisdom). In the case of the former (affirmative), the human mind forms the concept of a being in which "being wise" inheres after the manner of an accidental form; in the case of the latter (negative) notions, we conceive a form abstracted from its subject, a form, therefore, which does not exist as such. Now, this mode of conception is proper to creatures, but not to God; for God, as Infinite Being, is neither the subject of accidental forms of perfection, nor Himself an abstract form of perfection. He is Substantial Wisdom, which is really identical with every other perfection, though it does not enter into any composition, either physical or metaphysical. On 20 De Trinit., VII, 4, 7.- For further references, cfr. Petavius, De Deo, I, 5 sqq. the other hand, the negative concepts we form of God deny the existence in Him of any imperfection of the kind common to creatures (e. g., God is incorporeal), and hence do not express God's essence such as it is in itself. But a concept which, in order to be a true concept, must first shed all imperfections, cannot possibly claim to be adequate, intuitive, or univocal.2 20a The theory of knowledge elaborated by the Fathers, assumes that all our concepts are derived from sense perception, and concludes that a concept of God drawn from such a source must needs be imperfect. Thus, e. g., Gregory of Nyssa argues: "God's epithets are based upon the things He works in us. . . . But His essence is anterior to its operations, and we derive our knowledge of these operations from the things we perceive by our senses." 21 The great Basil 22 and John of Damascus 23 express themselves in like manner. Several of the Fathers go into the subject more deeply, anticipating as it were the Scholastic axiom: "Cognitum est in cognoscente non ad modum cogniti, sed ad modum cognoscentis," and emphasizing the truth that "the measure (rò μéтρov) of our knowledge of God is immanent in man, who is a synthesis of spirit and matter;" that is to say, the more perfect the power of cognition, the nobler is the resultant act or knowledge. Man, ranking midway between angels and brutes, apprehends the material things below him according to a higher, i. e., the notional, mode of being; but his apprehension of the things that are above him (the angels, God) 20a For the necessary references, see St. Basil, Contra Eunom., lib. I, n. 13 sqq.; Gregory of Nazianzus, Orat. theolog., 2; Gregory of Nyssa, Contra Eunom., lib. XII. Cfr. K. Unterstein, Die natürliche Gotteser kenntnis nach der Lehre der kappadozischen Kirchenväter, Straubing 1903-04. 21 Contr. Eunom., 1. XII. 23 De Fide Orth., I, 4. is cast in a more imperfect mould. Consequently, our idea of God is necessarily imperfect. y) There are on record certain utterances of the Fathers which appear to contradict or at least to weaken the doctrine we have just propounded. But in reality they confirm it. The oft-repeated phrase, We know that God exists, but we do not know His essence,25 does not mean that we can have no knowledge whatever of God, but merely that our knowledge of His essence is imperfect. Nor can the Patristic dictum that we merely know what God is not, but do not know what He is, be cited in support of the Neo-Platonic teaching of a purely negative cognoscibility,20 or of Mr. Herbert Spencer's Philosophy (bless the mark!) of the Unknowable. St. Augustine, e. g., insists: "Si non potestis comprehendere, quid sit Deus, vel hoc comprehendite, quid non sit Deus; multum profeceritis, si non aliud quam est de Deo senseritis — If ye are not able to comprehend what God is, comprehend at least what God is not: you will have made much progress, if you think of God as being not something other than He is." 27 We have his own authority 28 for explaining, that he merely intends to define the sublimity of the divine Essence as surpassing all categories of human thought; that is to say, he merely emphasizes the purely analogical and abstractive character of our knowledge of God. Therefore Gregory Nazianzen admonishes us: "It is not enough to state what [God] is not; but he who would discover the nature of Him Who is (Toυ ovтos), must also define what He is. For he who defines only what 24 Cfr. Gregory of Nyssa, Contra Eunom., lib. I. 25 Cfr. Hilary, In Ps., 129:"Humanae infirmitatis religiosa confessio est, de Deo solum hoc inosse, quod est." 26 Θεὸς βυθὸς ἄγνωστος. 27 Tract. in Ioa., XXIII, n. 9. 28 De Trinit., V, 1. God is not, is like unto a man who would answer the question: How much is twice five? by saying: It is not one, nor two, etc., omitting to tell his questioner that it is ten." 29 c) The dogma here under consideration is supported also by the authority of the great Scholastic theologians, notably St. Thomas Aquinas.3 30 Following in the footsteps of the Fathers, the Schoolmen worked out a theory of knowledge which conforms not only to the psychology of the thinking mind, but likewise to the principles of revealed religion. As the foundation of their system they adopted the philosophy of Aristotle, for the reason that this system at least in its fundamental lines fitted in best with both the nature of the human intellect, and supernatural Revelation. Inasmuch as Sacred Scripture and the Fathers favor the basic principles of the Aristotelian theory of knowledge, this theory can claim our unconditional assent, and we must admit that in its essential features, aside from incidental details, it cannot be false. In making this assertion, we do not, of course, wish to advocate a slavish restoration of the ancient psychology, nor to condemn every effort at originality in stating and developing its principles. Our sole object is to impress upon the reader that not every system of psychology can be fitted into the framework of revealed theology. Thus, e. g., the critical Idealism of Kant, based as it is upon radically false premises, cannot be harmonized with Revelation. It is a mistake to believe that, by 20 Orat. Theol., 2.- See also Article 2, infra. 30 S. Theol., 1a, qu. 12, art. 12. clinging to Scholastic Aristotelianism, the Church puts a brake upon theologians who endeavor to clear up special questions. On the contrary, was not, for instance, the psychology of Albertus Magnus, a heteroclite amalgam of omnigenous philosophical elements, which it required the master mind of an Aquinas to sift and transfuse into a coherent system, by eliminating all extraneous ingredients? 31 31 ARTICLE 2 THE THREEFOLD MODE OF KNOWING GOD HERE ON EARTH I. PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS.—Our previous article will receive confirmation from the detailed exposition, which we now undertake, of the manner in which man acquires such knowledge of God as is vouchsafed him here below. He attains to it in a threefold manner: viâ affirmationis seu causalitatis (éois), viâ negationis (ȧpaípeois), and viâ superlationis seu eminentiae (vπepox). Every one of these methods is exceedingly imperfect. As we do not perceive God in his own form (in specie propria), but in that of some other being (in specie aliena), that is to say, by means of analogous concepts derived (υπεροχή). 31 Cfr. J. Bach, Des Albertus Magnus Verhältnis zu der Erkenntnislehre der Griechen, Lateiner, Araber und Juden, Wien 1881.For a digest of "the traditional theory of knowledge," see Heinrich, Dogm. Theol., III, § 141. Cfr. also M. Schneid, Aristoteles in der Scho lastik, Mainz 1875; A. Otten, Allgemeine Erkenntnislehre des hl. Thomas, Paderborn 1882; De WulfCoffey, History of Medieval Philosophy, pp. 304 sq., London 1909; Id., Scholasticism Old and New, pp. 124 sqq., Dublin 1907. |
