traced by the French, pillaged, and insulted. Some persons, reputed to be rich, they attempted by the most brutal usage to torment into a disclosure of secreted treasure. When they evacuated Coimbra, the furious soldiers burnt what they could not carry away with them, in the streets. Not a little of what they did attempt to carry off, they threw away on their march to Leyria. This booty falling into the hands of the peasants, was sometimes more than a compensation to individuals who had been plundered of what belonged to them.

A considerable force of the French made some resistance to Colonel Trent's troops at the bridge of Mondego; but they sur rendered at discretion, on the promise of protection from the insults of the peasants. Of 5000 prisoners that fell into the hands of the Portuguese, 4000 were sent to Oporto. 3500 muskets were found, all of them charged; which may convey an idea of the effective strength of the French left at Coimbra. It is precisely the number that we have seen stated by Massena. The arms were distributed among the peaA great number of cattle was found that had been collected for the subsistence of the French troops. It was extremely difficult to keep the Portuguese, especially the Ordinanza, or armed peasants, from plundering their prisoners. Six or eight of those poor men fell victims to the rage of the peasants. Colonel Trent did every thing in his power to protect the French prisoners. Leaving one of his brigades at Coimbra, he went himself with the prisoners to

sants.

Oporto; for this was absolutely necessary, so much enraged were the Portuguese against the French army, particularly those in the districts between the Mondego and the Vouga.

The longer that the French general lay inactive in the front of the British lines, the more his difficulties increased. The heavy rains falling at that season of the year, rendered it impossible for him to bring up his heavy artillery. From the same cause the Mondego had overflown its banks. He was hemmed in on every side. To attack the allies, posted as they were, would have been madness; to retreat northwards, extremely hazardous, if not altogether impossible. The hardships and sufferings of the army for want of provisions, and the danger of absolute famine, have already been described. In these circumstances he had only a choice of difficulties. To endeavour, by enlarging his quarters, to maintain himself on the right bank of the Tagus, until he should receive both a reinforcement of men, together with a supply of stores and provisions, or to make a desperate attempt to cross the Tagus, and support himself in the Alentejo; which, however, he could not have done for any great length of time, as that province is but a poor country. He made a shew, however, for occupying the attention of the allies by the construction of boats, pontoons, and flying bridges, of intending this; while, at the same time, he moved farther up the river, exchanged Alentqueer for Santarem, which he strengthened by adding art to the advantages which it enjoyed by nature, and

even by laying its environs under water. The French position formed a triangle, of which Santarem and the Fagus were the base; the Zezere one of the legs, and a chain of mountains the other. Bridges were thrown across the Zezere, and a body of troops was stationed at Punhete, which was fortified. In November and December, the cavalry, 9 or 10,000, were dispersed in cantonments along the right of the Tagus, so far as the borders of Upper Beira. Redoubts were constructed at different points on the same side of the river. Thus the circle Massena had to depend on for subsistence was somewhat widened, and he looked forward to the reinforcements and supplies which he expected from Drouet and Gordonne on the one hand, and from Mortier on the other. Drouet's corps, 12,000 strong, with a large convoy, arrived early in December, and, some weeks thereafter, that under Gordonne, nearly equal in number. Towards the end of that month, detachments from the army of Mortier, and that of Soult, to the number of 12 or 14,000, having quitted Andalusia, were on their march on the left of the Tagus, through Estremadura. When Drouet was advancing through the valley of Mondego, Col. Wilson, to avoid an unequal contest, abandoned Coimbra, and retired on Espinhal.

There was now some appearances that seemed to menace a turn of fortune in favour of the French. But Lord Wellington was firm in adhering to his plan, nor ever for a moment doubted of ultimate success. He considered that if the reinforcements sent, or

yet to be sent, should be unable to protect his convoys against the attacks of those numerous bodies of troops that harassed him in flank and rear, and to cover the formation of magazines, they would aggravate the distress arrising from the want of necessaries, instead of alleviating it. The ardour and activity of Lord Wellington were suitable to the importance of the crisis. He was very sparing in his diet, and slept in his clothes. He was up every morning at four o'clock, and at five he rode out and visited his advanced posts. The noble enthusiasm with which he was actuated was infused by sympathy. The whole country was under arms. Every thing at Lisbon was military. The city was garrisoned by marines from the English fleet. The garrison of Lisbon was sent to reinforce the army, which was also augmented by the arrival of 10 or 12,000 men, under the Marquis of Romana. The greater part of the British troops had arrived from Cadiz, and other regiments were arriving from time to time from the Mediterranean, Lisbon, and Gibraltar. The seamen and marines were also landed from the fleet, to assist in working the guns in the batteries. The banks of the Tagus on the right were flanked by our armed boats, and seven sloops were sent up the river. Great fortifications were raised on the south of the Tagus, to cover the river and protect the shipping. The peninsula, formed by a creek or small bay at Moita, near Aldea Gallega, on the Tagus, and the bay of St. Ubes, at Settuval, was cut off from the French by a double line of fortifications,

mounted

mounted with heavy artillery, and manned, partly, by a body of 3000 seamen. So that the enemy could not advance to Almeida opposite to Lisbon; which it was apprehended might be his intention. The corps of General Hill and General Beresford were posted on the south bank of the river; while in front of the grand line of Torres Vedras, Lord Wellington lay with the main body of the British army at Cartaxo. The British fleet lay between, and on whichsoever side an attack might be made, was ready to bring over re.

inforcements from the other. The number of troops that could be brought into action, within not many hours, has been variously stated. They seem, as far as we have been able to judge, in point of numbers, to have been pretty nearly equal; that is, on each side from 80 to 90,000. What advantage of numbers there was, probably lay on the side of the allies. Such nearly were the relative positions and force of the French and the allied army of Portugal at the close of 1810.

СНАР.

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CORPS, under the orders of Mortier, alias the Duke of Treviso, was sent about the beginning, or near the middle of March, against Badajoz. A fruitless at tack having been made on that city, the French established themselves in Merida, Zafra, and Santa Maria. The siege of Badajoz was abandoned for a time, from the recessity of forwarding the siege of Cadiz by suppressing the insurrections in Grenada and Murcia: yet still demonstrations were made on Badajoz. There was a good deal of skirmishing. The reconnoitring parties of the French sometimes advanced almost to the glacis of Badajoz. This was in the nature of a false attack, intended no doubt to occupy the army of Estramadura, while the real invasion of Portugal was to be carried on by the route of Ciudad Rodrigo and Almeida. When the troops under Romana were drawn from Badajoz and Campo Major, and some other points, in Estramadura, to join Lord WelVOL. LII.

lington, they were replaced by Portuguese, united with some English; of whom a great proportion was officers. The siege of Cadiz, in like manner, as above observed, went on but slowly. The main efforts of the French were naturally pointed against the allied army under Lord Wellington. If Marshal Massena should be able to drive the English into the sea, he would be enabled to send out such detachments as could easily reduce Badajoz, perhaps Cadiz.

After the sad reverses of fortune suffered by the Spaniards towards the close of 1809, when they were convinced, by multiplied experience, that their armies were altogether unfit to contend with the French in pitched battles, they had again recourse to that desultory warfare, which had been so wisely recommended by the Junta of Seville at the beginning of the revolution, and which had been carried on for some time with so much success. The Junta of Badajoz issued

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issued a spirited and energetic address to the Spanish nation, rouzing them to a defiance of the invaders, even in the midst of their triumphs; and gave orders for raising the greatest possible number of detached corps. It particularly named three, of 150 men each; the third part cavalry. It likewise ordered smaller ones to be raised in proportion to the po'pulation of the parishes, or other districts, into which the province of Estramadura was divided, subordinate to the three principal ones. The order of the Junta specified also the weapons to be used. These were only two, the musket, and the cuchillo, or side knife the musket for attacking the enemy's convoys and detachments by ambush and surprize; and the cuchillo for attacks by night and in the streets. Similar orders were immediately issued by the Junta of Gallicia, and of Asturias. But even without the intervention of any public authorities throughout all Spain, even in most of the provinces overrun, and partly occupied by the French, Old Castille, Leon, Navarre, Arragon, Catalonia, Valencia, Murcia, and Grenada, parties were formed to fall suddenly on the French and their partizans, to arrest their convoys, carry off their advanced guards, watch and harass their patroles, surprize stragglers, make an attack when they had the advantage of numbers, and lie in ambush when their safety de

pended on flight. They were again to re-organize themselves, re-appear, to stand, and to multiply themselves by the rapidity of their marches, and their acquaintance with all the roads and defiles. Among the most renowned chiefs or leaders of the Guerillas, so the parties of armed Spaniards were called, were Longa, in Gallicia and Asturias Mina, in the north of Castille; Santochildes, in Leon; Don Juan Sanchez, near Salamancha; Baron Deroles, in Arragon; and l'Empecinado,* in the vicinity of Madrid.

The French troops, after the retreat of Lord Wellington, and the total defeat of the main Spanish army under General Ariesaga, were dispersed in different and distant stations, for procuring subsistence, and keeping the territories they had overrun in subjection. The allied army presented a formidable force on the frontier of Spain. The French, in the prosecution of their grand design, the reduction of Cadiz and Lisbon, were obliged to concentrate their forces. This operated as a diversion in favour of the Guerillas. Many places occupied before by the French, fell into the hands of the Guerillas. Among these were Oviedo and Gijon, in Asturias. When the French divisions were drawn together for opposing the united armies of Lord Wellington and General Cuesta, the Guerillas, taking advantage of their absence, scoured the country