one to another) is evident in the names, which in feveral arts have been found out, and applied to several complex ideas of modified actions belonging to their feveral trades, for difpatch fake, in their direction or difcourfes about them; which ideas are not generally framed in the minds of men not converfant about thefe operations. And thence the words that stand for them, by the greatest part of men of the fame language, are not understood; v. g. colfbire, drilling, filtration, cobobation, are words ftanding for certain complex ideas, which being feldom in the minds of any but thofe few whofe particular employments do at every turn fuggeft them to their thoughts, thofe names of them are not generally understood but by fmiths and chemifts, who having framed the complex ideas which thefe words ftand for, and having given names to them, or received them from others upon hearing of these names in communication, readily conceive thofe ideas in their minds; as by cohobation all the fimple ideas of diftilling, and the pouring the liquor diftilled from any thing, back upon the remaining matter, and diftilling it again. Thus we fee that there are great varieties of fimple ideas, as of taftes and fmells, which have no names; and of modes many more, which either not having been generally enough obferved, or elfe not being of any great ufe to be taken notice of in the affairs and converse of men, they have not had names given to them, and fo país not for fpecies. This we shall have occafion hereafter to consider more at large, when we come to speak of words.

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CHAP. XIX.

Automata OF THE MODES OF THINKING.

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Senfation, Remembrance, Contemplation, &cul HEN the mind turns its view inwards upon itfelf, and contemplates its own actions, thinking is the first that occurs. In it the mind obferves a

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great variety of modifications, and from thence receives diftin&t ideas. Thus the perception which actually accompanies, and is annexed to any impreffioti on the body made by an external object, being diftinct from all other modifications of thinking, furnishes the mind with a distinct idea, which we call fenfation; which is, as it were, the actual entrance of any idea into the underftanding by the fenfes. The fame idea, when it again recurs without the operation of the like object on the external fentory, is remembrance; if it be fought after by the mind, and with pain and endeavour found, and brought again in view, it is recollection; if it be held there long under attentive confideration, it is contemplation; when ideas float in our mind, without any reflection or regard of the understanding, it is that which the French call reverie; our language has fcarce a name for it; when the ideas that offer themselves (for, as I have obferved in another place, whilst we are awake, there will always be a train of ideas fucceeding one another in our minds) are taken notice of, and, as it were, registered in the memory, it is attention; when the mind with great earneftnefs, and of choice, fixes its view on any idea, confiders it on all fides, and will not be called off by the ordinary folicitation of other ideas, it is that we call intention or fudy: Sleep, without dreaming, is reft from all thele; and dreaming itfelf, is the having of ideas (whilft the outward fenfes are stopped, fo that they receive not outward objects with their ufual quickness) in the mind, not fuggefted by any external objects, or known.occafion, hor under any choice or conduct of the understanding at all. And. whether that, which we call ecstacy, be not dreaming with the eyes open, I leave to be examined.

§ 2.

THESE are fome few inftances of thofe various modes thinking, which the mind may obferve in itself, and fo have as diftinct ideas of, as it hath of white and red, à fquare or a circle. I do not pretend to enumerate them all, nor to treat at large of this fet of ideas, which are got from reflection; that would be to make a vo

lume. It fuffices to my prefent purpose, to have shown here, by fome few examples, of what fort thefe ideas are, and how the mind comes by them; efpecially fince I fhall have occafion hereafter to treat more at large of reafaning, judging, volition, and, knowledge, which are fome of the molt confiderable operations of the mind, and modes of thinking..

§3. The various Attention of the Mind in Thinking. BUT perhaps it may not be an unpardonable digreffion, nor wholly impertinent to our prefent defign, if we reflect here upon the different state of the mind in thinking, which thofe inftances of attention, reverie and dreaming, &c. before-mentioned, naturally enough fuggeft. That there are ideas, fome or other, always prefent in the mind of a waking man, every one's experience convinces him, though the mind employs itself about them with feveral degrees of attention. Sometimes the mind fixes itself with fo much earneftnefs on the contemplation of fome objects, that it turns their ideas on all fides, remarks their relations and circumftances, and views every part fo nicely, and with fuch intention, that it fhuts out all other thoughts, and takes no notice of the ordinary impreffions made then on the fenfes, which at another feafon would produce very fenfible perceptions; at other times it barely obferves the train of ideas that fucceed in the understanding, without directing and purfuing any of them; and at other times it lets them pafs almoft quite unregarded, as faint fhadows that make no impreffion.

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§4. Hence it is probable that thinking is the Action not Effence of the Soul.

THIS difference of intention, and remiffion of the mind in thinking, with a great variety of degrees between earneft ftudy, and very near minding nothing at all, every one, I think, has experimented in himself. Trace it a little farther, and you find the mind in fleep retired as it were from the fenfes, and out of the reach of thofe motions made on the organs of fenfe, which at other times produce very vivid and fenfible ideas. I need not for this inftance in thofe who fleep out whole

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ftormy nights, without hearing the thunder, or feeing the lightning, or feeling the fhaking of the house, which are fenfible enough to those who are waking; but in this retirement of the mind from the fenfes, it often retains a yet more loose and incoherent manner of thinking, which we call dreaming, and laft of all, found fleep clofes the scene quite, and puts an end to all appearances. This, I think, almost every one has experience of in himself, and his own obfervation without difficulty leads him thus far. That which I would farther conclude from hence, is, that fince the mind can fenfibly put on, at feveral times, feveral degrees of thinking, and be fometimes even in a waking man fo remifs, as to have thoughts dim and obfcure to that degree, that they are very little removed from none at all, and at laft, in the dark retirements of found fleep, lofes the fight perfectly of all ideas whatsoever; fince, Ifay, this is evidently fo in matter of fact, and conftant experience, I afk whether it be not probable that think ing is the action, and not the effence of the foul? fince the operations of agents will eafily admit of intention and remiffion, but the effences of things are not conceived capable of any fuch variation. But this by the by.

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CHAP. XX.

OF MODES OF PLEASURE AND PAIN.

$1. Pleafure and Pain fimple Ideas.

MONGST the fimple ideas, which we receive both from fenfation and reflection, pain and plear fure are two very confiderable ones: For, as in the bo dy there is fenfation barely in itself, or accompanied with pain or pleasure, fo the thought or perception of the mind is fimply fo, or elfe accompanied alfo with pleasure or pain, delight or trouble, call it how you pleafe. Thefe, like other fimple ideas, cannot be defcribed, nor their names defined; the way of knowing them is, as of the fimple ideas of the fenfes, only by

experience; for to define them by the prefence of good or evil, is no otherwife to make them known to us, than by making us reflect on what we feel in ourselves, upon the several and various operations of good and evil upon our minds, as they are differently applied to or confidered by us.

2. Good and Evil, what.

THINGS then are good or evil, only in reference to pleasure or pain. That we call good, which is apt to caufe or increase pleasure, or diminish pain in us; or elfe to procure or preferve us the poffeffion of any other good, or abfence of any evil; and on the contrary, we name that evil, which is apt to produce or increafe any pain, or diminifh any pleasure in us, or elfe to procure us any evil, or deprive us of any good. By pleasure and pain, I must be understood to mean of body or mind, as they are commonly diftinguished, though in truth they be only different conftitutions of the mind, fometimes occafioned by disorder in the body, fometimes by thoughts of the mind.

§3. Our Paffions moved by Good and Evil. PLEASURE and pain, and that which caufes them, good and evil, are the hinges on which our paffions turn; and if we reflect on ourfelves, and obferve how thefe, under various confiderations, operate in us, what modifications or tempers of mind, what internal fenfations (if I may fo call them) they produce in us, we may thence form to ourselves the ideas of our passions.

$ 4. Love.

THUS any one reflecting upon the thought he has of the delight which any prefent or abfent thing is apt to produce in him, has the idea we call love: For when a man declares in autumn, when he is eating them, or in fpring, when there are none, that he loves grapes, it is no more but that the tafte of grapes delights him; let an alteration of health or conftitution deftroy the delight of their tafte, and then he can be faid to love grapes no longer.