5. Hatred.

On the contrary, the thought of the pain, which any thing prefent or abfent is apt to produce in us, is what we call hatred. Were it my bufinets here to inquire any farther than into the bare ideas of our paffions, as they depend on different modifications of pleafure and pain, I thould remark, that our love and hatred of inanimate infenfible beings, is commonly founded on that pleafure and pain which we receive from their ufe and application any way to our fenfes, though with their destruction; but hatred or love, to beings, capable of happiness or mifery, is often the uneafinefs or delight which we find in ourselves, arifing from a confideration of their very being or happinefs. Thus the being and welfare of a man's children or friends, producing conftant delight in him, he is faid conftantly to love them. But it fuffices to note, that our ideas of love and hatred are but the difpofitions of the mind, in refpect of pleasure and pain in general, however caufed

in us.

$6. Defire.

THE uneafiness a man finds in himself upon the abfence of any thing whofe prefent enjoyment carries the idea of delight with it, is that we call defire; which is greater or lefs, as that uneafinefs is more or lefs vehement. Where, by the by, it may perhaps be of fome ufe to remark, that the chief, if not only fpur to human industry and action, is uneafinefs: For whatever good is propofed, if its abfence carries no difpleafure nor pain with it, if a man be eafy and content without it, there is no defire of it, nor endeavour after it; there is no more but a bare velleity, the term used to fignify the lowest degree of defire, and that which is next to none at all, when there is fo little uneafinefs in the abfence of any thing, that it carries a man no farther than fome faint withes for it, without any more effectual or vigorous ule of the means to attain it. Defire alfo is ftopped or abated by the opinion of the impor bility or unattainablenefs of the good propofed, as far

as, the uneafinefs is cured or allayed by that confideration. This might carry our thoughts farther, were it feafonable in this place.

87. Joy

For is a delight of the mind, from the confideration. of the prefent or affured approaching poffeffion of a good; and we are then poffefed of any good, when we have it so in our power, that we can use it when we pleafe. Thus a man almoft ftarved has joy at the arrival of relief, even before he has the pleafure of uling it And a father, in whom the very wellbeing of his children caufes delight, is always, as long as his children are in fuch a ftate, in the poffeffion of that good; for he needs but to reflect on it, to have that pleasure.

8.

§ 8.

Sorrow.

SORROW' is uneafinefs in the mind, upon the thought of a good loft which might have been enjoyed longer, or the fenfe of a prefent evil.

§ 9. Hope.

HOPE is that pleasure in the mind, which every one finds in himself, upon the thought of a profitable future enjoyment of a thing, which is apt to delight him. $10. Fear.

FEAR is an uneafinefs of the mind, upon the thought of future evil likely to befal us.

$11. Despair.

DESPAIR is the thought of the unattainableness of any good which works differently in mens minds, fometimes producing uneafinefs or pain, fometimes reft and indolency.

12. Anger.

ANGER is uneafinefs or difcompofure of the mind, upon the receipt of any injury, with a prefent purpose of revenge.

§ 13. Envy.

ENVY is an uneafinefs of mind, caufed by the confideration of a good we defire, obtained by one we think fhould not have had it before us.

$14. What Paffions all Men have.

THESE two laft, envy and anger, not being caufed by pain and pleafure fimply in themselves, but having in them fome mixed confiderations of ourfelves and others, are not therefore to be found in all men, because those other parts of valuing their merits, or intending revenge, is wanting in them; but all the reft terminated purely in pain and pleasure, are, I think, to be found in all men. For we love, defire, rejoice, and hope, only in refpect of pleasure; we hate, fear, and grieve, only in refpect of pain ultimately: In fine, all these paffions are moved by things, only as they appear to be the causes of pleasure and pain, or to have pleasure or pain fome way or other annexed to them. Thus we extend our hatred usually to the fubject (at least if a sensible or voluntary agent) which has produced pain in us, because the fear it leaves is a conftant pain; but we do not so constantly love what has done us good, because pleasure operates not fo ftrongly on us as pain, and because we are not fo ready to have hope it will do fo again. But this by the by.

§15. Pleafure and Pain, what.

By pleafure and pain, delight and uneafinefs, 1 muft all along be understood (as I have above intimated) to mean not only bodily pain and pleasure, but whatfoever delight or uneasiness is felt by us, whether arifing from any grateful or unacceptable fenfation or reflection.

$ 16.

Ir is farther to be confidered, that in reference to the passions, the removal or leffening of a pain is confidered, and operates as a pleafure; and the lofs or diminishing of a pleasure, as a pain.

17. Shame.

THE paffions, too, have most of them in moft perfons operations on the body, and caufe various changes in it, which, not being always fenfible, do not make a neceffary part of the idea of each paffion; for, fhame, which is an uneafinefs of the mind upon the thought of having done fomething which is indecent, or will

leffen the valued cfteem which others have for us, has not always blushing accompanying it.

18. These Inftances do fhow how our Ideas of the Paffions are got from Senfation and Reflection.

I WOULD not be mistaken here, as if I meant this as a. difcourfe of the paffions, they are many more than those. I have here named: And thofe I have taken notice of would each of them require a much larger and more accurate difcourfe. I have only mentioned thefe here as fo many inftances of modes of pleasure and pain refulting in our minds from various confiderations of good and evil, I might perhaps have inftanced in other modes of pleasure and pain more fimple than thefe, as the pain of hunger and thirst, and the pleasure of eating and drinking to remove them; the pain of tender eyes, and the pleasure of mufic; pain from captious uninftructive wrangling, and the pleasure of rational converfation with a friend, or of well-directed ftudy in the fearch and discovery of truth. But the paffions being of much more concernment to us, I rather made choice to inftance in them, and fhow how the ideas. we have of them are derived from fenfation and re-. flection.

1

CHAP. XXI.

OF POWER.

1 This Idea how got.

THE HE mind being every day informed, by the fenfes, of the alteration of thofe fimple ideas it obferves in things without, and taking notice how one comes to an end, and ceafes to be, and another begins to exist which was not before; reflecting alfo on what paffes within itself, and obferving a constant change of its ideas, fometimes by the impreffion of outward objects on the fenfes, and fometimes by the determination of its on choice, and concluding, from what it has fo conftantly obferved to have been, that the like changes

will for the future be made in the fame things by like agents, and by the like ways; confiders in one thing the poffibility of having any of its fimple ideas changed, and in another the poffibility of making that change; and fo comes by that idea which we call power. Thus we fay, fire has a power to melt gold, i. e. to deftroy the confiftency of its infenfible parts, and confequently its hardness, and make it fluid; and gold has a poruer to be melted: That the fun has a power to blanch wax, and wax a power to be blanched by the fun, whereby the yellownefs is deftroyed, and whitenefs made to exift in its room. In which, and the like cafes, the power we confider is in reference to the change of perceivable ideas; for we cannot obferve any alteration to be made in, or operation upon any thing, but by the obfervable change of its fenfible ideas; nor conceive any alteration to be made, but by conceiving a change of fome of its ideas.

§ 2. Power active and paffive.

POWER, thus confidered, is twofold, viz. as able to make, or able to receive any change: The one may be called active, and the other paffive power. Whether matter be not wholly deftitute of active power, as its author GOD is truly above all paffive porver; and whether the intermediate ftate of created fpirits be not that alone which is capable of both active and paffive power, may be worth confideration. I fhall not now enter into that inquiry; my prefent business being, not to fearch into the original of power, but how we come by the idea of it. But fince active powers make fo great a part of our complex ideas of natural fubftances (as we fhall fee hereafter), and I mention them as fuch according to common apprehenfion; yet they being not perhaps fo truly active powers, as our hafty thoughts are apt to represent them, I judge it not amifs, by this intimation, to direct our minds to the confidera tion of GOD and fpirits, for the cleareft idea of active powers.

3. Power includes Relation,

I CONFESS power includes in it fome kind of relation (á re