Book III. ufe of to explain or define any of their names, will never be able to produce in us the idea it ftands for; for words being founds, can produce in us no other fimple ideas than of those very founds, nor excite any in us, but by that voluntary connection which is known to be between them and those fimple ideas which common use has made them figns of. He that thinks otherwife, let him try if any words can give him the taste of a pine apple, and make him have the true idea of the relifh of that celebrated delicious fruit. So far as he is told it has a refemblance with any taftes, whereof he has the ideas already in his memory, imprinted there by fenfible objects, not ftrangers to his palate, fo far may he approach that resemblance in his mind. But this is not giving us that idea by definition, but exciting in us other fimple ideas, by their known names, which will be ftill very different from the true taste of that fruit itself. In light and colours, and all other fimple ideas, it is the fame thing; for the fignification of founds is not natural, but only impofed and arbitrary. And no definition of light or redness is more fitted, or able to produce either of those ideas in us, than the found light or red by itself; for to hope to produce an idea of light or colour by a found, however formed, is to expect that founds fhould be vifible, or colours audible, and to make the ears do the office of all the other fenfes; which is all one as to say, that we might tafte, fmell and fee by the ears; a fort of philofophy worthy only of Sancho Pancha, who had the faculty to fee Dulcinea by hearfay. And therefore he that has not before received into his mind, by the proper inlet, the fimple idea which any word ftands for, can never come to know the fignification of that word by any other words or founds whatfoever put together, according to any rules of definition. The only way is, by applying to his fenfes the proper object, and fo producing that idea in him for which he has learned the name already. A ftudious blind man, who had mightily beat his head about vifible objects, and made use of the explication of his books and friends, to understand thofe names of light and colours which often came, in Names of Simple Ideas 155 § 12. The contrary fhowed in complex Ideas by Inflances THE cafe is quite otherwife in complex ideas; which confifting of feveral fimple ones, it is in the power of words standing for the feveral ideas that make that compofition, to imprint complex ideas in the mind which were never there before, and fo make their names be understood. In fuch collections of ideas, paffing under one name, definition, or the teaching the fignification of one word by feveral others, has place, and may make us underfland the names of things, which never came within the reach of our fenfes, and frame ideas fuitable to thofe in other mens minds, when they use those names, provided that none of the terms of the definition ftand for any fuch fimple ideas, which he to whom the explication is made has never yet had in his thought. Thus the word flatue may be explained to a blind man by other words, when picture cannot; his fenfes having given him the idea of figure, but not of colours, which therefore words cannot excite in him. This gained the prize to the painter against the statuary; each of which contending for the excellency of his art, and the statuary bragging that his was to be preferred, because it reached farther, and even those who had loft their eyes could yet perceive the excellency of it; the painter agreed to refer himself to the judgment of a blind man; who being brought where there was a ftatue made by the one, and a picture drawn by the other, he was firft led to the statue, in which he traced with his hands all the lineaments of the face and body, and with great admiration applauded the skill of the workman. But being led to the picture, and having his hands laid upon it, was told, that now he touched the head, and then the forehead, eyes, nofe, &c. as his G 6. Book III. hand moved over the parts of the picture on the cloth, without finding any the leaft diftinction; whereupon he cried out, that certainly that must needs be a very admirable and divine piece of workmanship, which could represent to them all thofe parts, where he could neither feel nor perceive any thing. $13. HE that fhould use the word rainbow to one who knew all thofe colours, but yet had never feen that phenomenon, would, by enumerating the figure, largenefs, pofition and order of the colours, fo well define that word that it might be perfectly understood; but yet that definition, how exact and perfect foever, would never make a blind man understand it; because several of the fimple ideas that make that complex one, being fuch as he never received by fenfation and experience, no words are able to excite them in his mind. 14. The names of complex Ideas when to be made intelligible by words. SIMPLE ideas as has been fhowed, can only be got by experience, from thofe objects which are proper to produce in us thofe perceptions. When by this means we have our minds ftored with them, and know the names for them, then we are in a condition to define, and by definition to understand the names of complex ideas that are made up of them. But when any term ftands for a fimple idea that a man has never yet had in his mind, it is impoffible by any words to make known its. meaning to him. When any term stands for an idea a man is acquainted with, but is ignorant that that term is the fign of it, there another name, of the fame idea which he has been accustomed to, may make him understand its meaning. But in no cafe whatsoever is any name of any fimple idea capable of a definition. 15. 4. Names of Simple Ideas leaft doubtful. FOURTHLY, But though the names of fimple ideas have not the help of definition to determine their fignification, yet that hinders not but that they are generally lefs doubtful and uncertain, than thofe of mixed modes and fubftances because they standing only for one fimple perception, 157 men for the most part eafily and perfectly agree in their fignification; and there is little room for mistake and wrangling about their meaning. He that knows once that whiteness is the name of that colour he has obferved in fnow or milk, will not be apt to mifapply that word as long as he retains that idea; which when he has quite loft, he is not apt to mistake the meaning of it, but perceives he understands it not. There is neither a multiplicity of fimple ideas to be put together, which makes the doubtfulness in the names of mixed modes, nor a fuppofed, but an unknown real effence, with properties depending thereon, the precife number whereof are alfo unknown, which makes the difficulty in the names of fubftances; but, on the contrary, in fimple ideas, the whole fignification of the name is known at once, and confifts not of parts, whereof more or lefs being put in, the idea may be varied, and fo the fignification of its name be obfcure or uncertain. 16. 5. Simple Ideas have few Afcents in linea pre dicamentali. FIFTHLY, This farther may be obferved concerning fimple ideas, and their names, that they have but few afcents in linea predicamentali (as they call it) from the lowest fpecies to the fummum genus: The reafon whereof is, that the lowest species being but one fimple idea, nothing can be left out of it; that fo the difference being taken away, it may agree with fome other thing in one idea common to them both; which having one name, is the genus of the other two: v. g. There is nothing can be left out of the idea of white and red, to make them agree in one common appearance, and fo have one general name; as rationality being left out of the complex idea of man, makes it agree with brute, in the more general idea and name of animal. And therefore when to avoid unpleasant enumerations, men would comprehend both white and red, and feveral other fuch fimple ideas, under one general name, they have been fain to do it by a word, which denotes only the way they get into the mind; for when white, red and yellow are all comprehended under the genus or name colour, it fignifies Book III. no more but fuch ideas as are produced in the mind only by the fight, and have entrance only through the eyes. And when they would frame yet a more general term, to comprehend both colours and founds, and the like fimple ideas, they do it by a word that fignifies all fuch as come into the mind only by one sense; and fo the general term quality, in its ordinary acceptation, comprehends colours, founds, taftes, fmells and tangible qualities, with diftinction from extenfion, number, motion, pleasure and pain, which make impresfions on the mind, and introduce their ideas by more fenfes than one. § 17. 6. Names of fimple Ideas ftand for Ideas not at all arbitrary. SIXTHLY, The names of fimple ideas, fubftances, and mixed modes, have also this difference, that those of mixed modes ftand for ideas perfectly arbitrary; thofe of fubftances are not perfectly fo, but refer to a pattern, though with fome latitude; and thofe of fimple ideas are perfectly taken from the existence of things, and are not arbitrary at all. Which what difference it makes in the fignifications of their names, we shall fee in the following chapters. The names of fimple modes differ little from those of fimple ideas. § 1. They ftand for abstract Ideas, as other general Names. HE names of mixed modes being general, they TH ftand, as has been shown, for forts or fpecies of things, each of which has its peculiar effence. The effences of these fpecies alfo, as has been showed, are no-. thing but the abstract ideas in the mind, to which the name is annexed. Thus far the names and effences of mixed modes have nothing but what is common to them with other ideas, but if we take a little nearer fur |