duals; v. g. Suppofing the nominal eflence of gold to be body of fuch a peculiar colour and weight, with malleability and fufibility, the real effence is that conftitution of the parts of matter on which these qualities, and their union, depend; and is also the foundation of its folubility in aq, regia, and other properties accompanying that coniplex idea. Here are effences and properties, but all upon fuppofition of a fort, or general abstract idea, which is confidered as immutable; but there is no individual parcel of matter, to which any of these qualities are fo annexed, as to be effential to it, or infeparable from it. That which is effential belongs to it as a condition, whereby it is of this or that fort; but take away the confideration of its being ranked under the name of fome abstract idea, and then there is nothing neceffary to it, nothing infeparable from it. Indeed, as to the real effences of fubitances, we only fuppofe their being, without precifely knowing what they are: But that which annexes them ftill to the fpecies, is the nominal effence, of which they are the fuppofed foundation and caufe.

§ 7. The nominal Effence bounds the Species. THE next thing to be confidered is, by which of thofe effences it is that fubflances are determined into forts, or fpecies; and that, it is evident, is by the nominal effence; for it is that alone that the name, which is the mark of the fort, fignifies. It is impoffible, therefore, that any thing fhould determine the forts of things, which we rank under general names, but that idea which that name is defigned as a mark for; which is that, as has been fhown, which we call the nominal effence. Why do we fay, this is a horfe, and that a mule; this is an animal, that an herb? How comes any particular thing to be of this or that fort, but because it has that nominal effence, or, which is all one, agrees to that abstract idea that name is annexed to? And I defire any one but to reflect on his own thoughts when he hears or fpeaks any of thofe or other names of fubftances, to know what fort of effences they stand for.

§ 8.

AND that the Species of things to us are nothing but the

ranking them under distinct names, according to the complex ideas in us, and not according to precife, diftinét, real effences in them, is plain from hence, that we find many of the individuals that are ranked into one fort, called by one common name, and fo received as being of one fpecies, have yet qualities depending on their real conftitutions, as far different one from anothér, as from others from which they are accounted to differ fpecifically. This, as it is eafy to be obferved by all who have to do with natural bodies, fo chemifts efpecially, are often, by fad experience, convinced of it, when they, fometimes in vain, feek for the fame qualities in one parcel of fulphur, antimony, or vitriol, which they have found in others; for though they are bodies of the fame fpecies, having the fame nominal effence under the fame name, yet do they often, upon fevere ways of examination, betray qualities fo different one from another, as to fruftrate the expectation and labour of very wary chemists. But if things were diftinguished into fpecies, according to their real effences, it would be as impoffible to find different properties in any two individual fubftances of the fame fpecies, as it is to find different properties in two circles, or two equilateral triangles. That is properly the effence to us, which determines every particular to this or that claffis, or, which is the fame thing, to this or that general name; and what can that be elfe, but that abftract idea to which that name is annexed, and fo has, in truth, a reference, not fo much to the being of particular things, as to their general denominations?

$9. Not the real Effence, which we know not. NOR indeed can que rank and fort things, and confequently (which is the end of forting) denominate them by their real effences, becaufe we know them not. Our faculties carry us no farther towards the knowledge and diftinction of fubftances, than a collection of thofe fenfible ideas which we obferve in them, which, however made with the greatest diligence and exactnefs we are capable of, yet is more remote from the true internal conftitution from which thofe qualities flow, than, as I faid, a countryman's idea is from the inward contrivance

of that famous clock at Strafburg, whereof he only fees the outward figure and motions. There is not fo contemptible a plant or animal, that does not confound the most enlarged understanding. Though the familiar ufe of things about us take off our wonder, yet it cures. not our ignorance. When we come to examine the ftones we tread on, or the iron we daily handle, we prefently find we know not their make, and can give no reafon of the different qualities we find in them. It is evident the internal conftitution, whereon their properties depend, is unknown to us; for, to go no farther than the groffest and most obvious we can imagine amongst them, What is that texture of parts, that real effence, that makes lead and antimony fufible, wood and ftones not? What makes lead and iron malleable, antimony and flones not? And yet how infinitely these come fhort of the fine contrivances and unconceivable real effences of plants or animals, every one knows. The workmanship of the all-wife and powerful God, in the great fabric of the universe, and every part thereof, farther exceeds the capacity and comprehenfion of the moft inquifitive and intelligent man, than the beft contrivance of the most ingenious man doth the conceptions of the most ignorant of rational creatures: Therefore we in vain pretend to range things into forts, and difpose them into certain claffes, under names, by their real effences, that are fo far from our difcovery or comprehenfion. A blind man may as foon fort things by their colours, and he that has loft his fmell as well diftinguish a lily and a rofe by their odours, as by thofe internal conftitutions which he knows not. He that thinks he can distinguish sheep and goats by their real effences that are unknown to him, may be pleased to try his skill in thofe fpecies called caffiowary and querechinchio, and by their internal real effences determine the boundaries of thofe fpecies, without knowing the complex idea of fenfible qualities that each of thofe ftand for, in the countries where thofe animals are to be found.

§ 10. Not fubftantial Forms, which we know lefs. THOSE, therefore, who have been taught, that the feveral

fpecies of fubftances had their diftinct internal fubftantial forms, and that it was thofe forms which made the dif-. tinction of fubftances into their true fpecies and genera,; were led yet farther out of the way, by having their minds fet upon fruitless inquiries after fubftantial forms, wholly unintelligible, and whereof we have fcarce fo much as any obfcure or confufed conception in general. 11. That the nominal Effence is that whereby we diftinguifh Species, farther evident from Spirits. THAT our ranking and diftinguishing natural fubftances into fpecies, confifts in the nominal effences the mind makes, and not in the real effences to be found in the things themselves, is farther evident from our ideas of fpirits; for the mind getting, only by reflecting on its own operations, thofe fimple ideas which it attributes to Spirits, it hath, or can have no other notion of fpirit, but by attributing all thofe operations it finds in itfelf, to a fort And even of beings, without confideration of matter. the moit advanced notion we have of God, is but attributing the fame fimple ideas which we have got from reflection on what we find in ourfelves, and which we conceive to have more perfection in them, than would be in their abfence; attributing, I fay, thofe fimple ideas, to him in an unlimited degree. Thus having got, from reflecting on ourselves, the idea of existence, knowledge, power, and pleasure, each of which we find it better to have than to want, and the more we have of each, the better; joining all these together, with infinity to each of them, we have the complex idea of an eternal omnifcient, omnipotent, infinitely wife and happy Being. And though we are told that there are different fpecies of angels, yet we know not how to frame diftinct fpecific ideas of them; not out of any conceit that the exiftence of more fpecies than one of fpirits is impoffible, but because having no more fimple ideas (nor being able to frame more) applicable to fuch beings, but only those few taken from ourfelves, and from the actions of our own minds in thinking, and being delighted, and moving feveral parts of our bodies, we can no otherwife diftinguish in our conceptions the feveral Species of

Spirits, one from another, but by attributing these operations and powers, we find in ourselves, to them in a higher or lower degree; and fo have no very diftinct fpecific ideas of fpirits, except only of GOD, to whom we attribute both duration, and all those other ideas, with infinity; to the other fpirits, with limitation. Nor as I humbly conceive do we, between GOD and them in our ideas, put any difference by any number of fimple ideas, which we have of one, and not of the other, but only that of infinity. All the particular ideas of existence, knowledge, will, power, and motion, &c. being ideas derived from the operations of our minds, we attribute all of them to all forts of Spirits, with the difference only of degrees, to the utmost we can imagine, even infinity, when we would frame, as well as we can, an idea of the firft Being; who yet, it is certain, is infinitely more remote in the real excellency of his nature, from the highest and perfecteft of all created beings, than the greatest man, nay, pureft feraphim, is from the moft contemptible part of matter, and confequently muft infinitely exceed what our narrow understandings can conceive of him.

§ 12. Whereof there are probably numberless Species. Ir is not impoffible to conceive, nor repugnant to rea fon, that there may be many fpecies of Spirits, as much feparated and diverfified one from another, by diftinct properties, whereof we have no ideas, as the fpecies of fenfible things are diftinguifhed one from another by qualities which we know and obferve in them. That there fhould be more fpecies of intelligent creatures above us, than there are of fenfible and material below us, is probable to me from hence, that in all the visible corporeal world, we fee no chalms or gaps. All quite down from us, the defcent is by eafy iteps, and a continued feries of things, that in each remove differ very little one from the other. There are fishes that have wings, that are not strangers to the airy region; and there are fome birds, that are inhabitants of the water, whofe blood is cold as fifhes, and their flesh is fo like in tafte, that the fcrupulous are allowed them on fish days.