firmed one of another. This we fee in the common use of-language, which permits not any two abjlract words, or names of abstract ideas, to be offirmed one of another. For how near of kin foever they may feam to be, and how certain foever it is, that man is an animal, or rational, or white, yet every one at first hearing perceives the falfe. hood of thefe propofitions, humanity is animality, or ra tionality, or whitenefs; and this is as evident as any of the most allowed maxims. All our affirmations then are only inconcrete, which is the affirming, not one abstract idea to be another, but one abitract idea to be joined to another; which abstract ideas, in fubitances, may be of any fort 5 in all the reft, are little elfe but of relations; and in fubftances the most frequent are of powers: v.g. a man is white, fignifies that the thing that has the effence of a man, has alfo in it the eflence of whiteness, which is nothing but a power to produce the idea of whiteness in one, whofe eyes can discover ordinary objects; or a man is rational, fignifies that the fame thing that hath the effence of a man, hath alfo in it the effence of rationality, i. e. a power of reafoning.

§ 2. They show the difference of our Ideas. THIS diftinction of names fhows us alfo the difference of our ideas; for if we obferve them, we fhall find that our fimple ideas have all abftract, as well as concrete names; the one whereof is (to fpeak the language of grammarians) a fubftantive, the other an adjective; as whitenefs, white; fweetnefs, fweet. The like alfo holds in our ideas of modes and relations; as juftice, jult; equality, equal; only with this difference, that fome of the concrete names of relations amongst men chiefly are fubftantives; as paternitas, pater; whereof it were eafy to render a reafon. But as to our ideas of fubftances, we have very few or no abfra& names at all; for though the schools have introduced animalitas, humanitar, arpovietas, and fome others, yet they hold no proportion with that infinite number of names of fubitances, to which they never were ridiculous enough to attempt the,coining of abstract ones; and thofe few that the fchools forged, and put into the mouths of their fcholars, could

never yet get admittance into common ufe, or obtain the licence of public approbation; which feems to me at leaft to intimate the confeffion of all mankind, that they have no ideas of the real effences of fubftances, fince they have not names for fuch ideas; which no doubt they would have had, had not their confcioufnefs! to themfelves of their ignorance of them, kept them' from fo idle an attempt. And therefore, though they had ideas enough to diftinguith gold from ftone, and metal from wood, yet they but timorously ventured on fuch terms, as aurietas and saxietas, metallietas and lig nietas, or the like names, which fhould pretend to fignify the real effences of thofe fubftances, whereof they knew they had no ideas. And indeed it was only the doctrine of fubftantial forms, and the confidence of mistaken pretenders to a knowledge that they had not, which firft coined, and then introduced animalitas, and buma-" nitas, and the like; which yet went very little farther than their own fchools, and could never get to be current amongst understanding men. Indeed, humanitas was a word familiar amongst the Romans, but in a far different fenfe, and ftood not for the abstract effence of any fubftance, but was the abstract name of a mode," and its concrete humanus, not homo.

F

CHAP. IX.

OF THE IMPERFECTION OF WORDS.

1. Words are used for recording and communicating our Thoughts.

ROM what has been faid in the foregoing chapters, it is eafy to perceive what imperfection there is in language, and how the very nature of words makes it almost unavoidable for many of them to be doubtful and. uncertain in their fignifications. To examine the perfection or imperfection of words, it is neceffary first to confider their use and end; for as they are more or lefs fitted to attain that, fo are they more or lefs perfect. We have in the former part of this difcourfe, often upon. occafion mentioned a double ufe of words.

Fin, One for the recording of our own thoughts.. Secondly, The other for the communicating of our thoughts to others..

§ 2. Any Words will ferve for recording, As to the first of thefe, for the recording our own thoughts: for the help of our own memories, whereby, as it were, we talk to ourselves, any words will ferve the turn; for fince founds are voluntary and indifferent figns of any. ideas, a man may ufe what words he pleafes, to fignify his own ideas to himself; and there will be no imper-.. fection in them, if he conftantly ufe the fame fign for the fame idea, for then he cannot fail of having his meaning, understood, wherein confifts the right ufe and. perfection of language.

$3. Communication by words, Civil or Philofophical. SECONDLY, AS to communication of words, that too has a double ufe.

I. Civil.

II. Philofophical.

First, By their civil ufe, I mean fuch a communication of thoughts and ideas by words, as may ferve for the upholding common converfation and commerce, about the ordinary affairs and conveniencies of civil life, in the focieties of men one amongst another.

Secondly, By the philofophical ufe of words, I mean fuch an use of them, as may ferve to convey the precise notions of things, and to exprefs, in general propofitions, certain and undoubted truths, which the mind may reft upon and be fatisfied with, in its fearch after true knowledge. Thefe two ufes are very diftinct; and a great deal lefs exactnefs will ferve in the one than in the other, as we fhall fee in what follows.

§ 4. The imperfection of Words is the Doubtfulness of their Signification.

THE chief end of language in communication being to be underficod, words ferve not for that end, neitherin çivil nor philofophical difcourfe, when any word does not excite, in, the hearer the fame idea which it ftands. for in the mind of the fpeaker. Now fince founds have

no natural connection with our ideas, but have all their fignification from the arbitrary impofition of men, the doubtfulness and uncertainty of their fignification, which is the imperfection we here ate fpeaking of, has its caufe more in the ideas they ftand for, than in any incapacity there is in one found more than in another to fignify any ideas for in that regard they are all equally perfect.

That then which makes doubtfulness and uncertainty in the fignification of fome more than other words, is the difference of ideas they ftand for.

§ 5. Causes of their Imperfection.

WORDS having naturally no fignification, the idea which each ftands for muft be learned and retained by thofe, who would exchange thoughts, and hold intelligible difcourfe with others in any language. But this is hardest to be done, where,

First, The ideas they stand for are very complex, and made up of a great number of ideas put together.

Secondly, Where the ideas they stand for have no certain connection in nature, and fo no settled ftandard, any where in nature exifting, to rectify and adjust them by.

Thirdly, Where the fignification of the word is refer red to a standard, which ftandard is not fo eafy to be known.

Fourthly, Where the fignification of the word, and the real effence of the thing, are not exactly the fame.

Thefe are difficulties that attend the fignification of feveral words that are intelligible: thofe which are not intelligible at all, fuch as names ftanding for any fimple ideas, which another has not organs or faculties to at tain, as the names of colours to a blind man, or founds to a deaf man, need not here be mentioned.'

In all thefe cafes we thall find an imperfection in words, which I fhall more at large explain, in their particular application to our feveral forts of ideas: For if we examine them, we fhall find that the names of mixed modes are moi hable to doubtfulness and imperfection, for the two

first of thefe reafons; and the names of fubflances chiefly for the two latter.

§6. The Names of mixed Modes doubtful. FIRST, the names of mixed modes are many of them liable to great uncertainty and obfcurity in their fignification.

Firf, Because the Ideas they ftand for are fa complex.

I. Because of that great compofition thefe complex ideas are often made up of. To make words ferviceable to the end of communication, it is neceffary (as has been faid) that they excite in the hearer exactly the fame idea they ftand for in the mind of the fpeaker. Without this, men fill one another's heads with noife and founds, but convey not thereby their thoughts, and lay not before one another their ideas, which is the end of difcourfe and language. But when a word ftands for a very complex idea that is compounded and decompounded, it is not eafy for men to form and retain that idea fo exactly, as to make the name in common use ftand for the fame precife idea without any the least variation. Hence it comes to pafs, that mens names of very compound ideas, fuch as for the most part are moral words, have feldom, in two different men, the fame precife fignification; fince one man's complex idea feldom agrees with another's, and often differs from his own, from that which he had yesterday, or will have to

morrow..

7. Secondly, Because they have no Standards.

IL, BECAUSE the names of mixed modes, for the most part, want ftandards in nature, whereby men may rectify and adjust their fignifications; therefore they are very various and doubtful. They are affemblages of ideas put together at the pleasure of the mind, purfuing its own ends of difcourfe, and fuited to its own notions; whereby it defigns not to copy any thing really exifting, but to denominate and rank things, as they come to agree, with thofe archetypes or forms it has made. He that firft brought the word fham, wheedle, or banter in ' ufe, put together, as he thought fit, thofe ideas he made it ftand for: And as it is with any new names of modes,