$30. Idea of Bedy and Spirit compared. So that, in fhort, the idea we have of fpirit, compared with the idea we have of body, ftands thus: The fubstance of spirit is unknown to us; and fo is the subftance of body equally unknown to us. Two primary qualities or properties of body, viz. folid coherent parts and impulfe, we have diftinct clear ideas of: fo likewife we know, and have diftinct clear ideas of two primary qualities or properties of fpirit, viz. thinking, and a power of action; i. e. a power of beginning or stopping feveral thoughts or motions. We have alfo the ideas of feveral qualities inherent in bodies, and have the clear diftinct ideas of them; which qualities are but the various modifications of the extenfion of cohering folid parts, and their motion. We have likewife the ideas of the feveral modes of thinking, viz. believing, doubting, intending, fearing, hoping; all which are but the feveral modes of thinking. We have alfo the ideas of willing, and moving the body confequent to it, and with the body itself too; for, as has been fhown, fpirit is capable of motion.

$31. The Notion of Spirit involves no more difficulty in it than that of Body.

LASTLY, If this notion of immaterial fpirit may have perhaps fome difficulties in it, not eafy to be explained," we have therefore no more reason to deny or doubt the existence of fuch fpirits, than we have to deny or doubt the existence of body; because the notion of body is cumbered with fome difficulties very hard, and perhaps impoffible to be explained or understood by us. For I would fain have inftanced any thing in our notion of fpirit more perplexed, or nearer a contradiction, than the very notion of body includes in it; the divifibility, in infinitum, of any finite extenfion, involving us, whether we grant or deny it, in confequences impoffible to be explicated, or made in our apprehenfions confiftent; confequences that carry greater difficulty, and more apparent abfurdity, than any thing can follow from the notion of an immaterial knowing fubftance.

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$32. We know nothing beyond fumple Ideas. WHICH We are not at all to wonder at, fince we, ing but fome few fuperficial ideas of things, difcovered to us only by the fenfes from without, or by the mind, reflecting on what it experiments in itself within, have no knowledge beyond that, much lefs of the internal conftitution, and true nature of things, being deftitute of faculties to attain it. And therefore, experimenting and difcovering in ourselves knowledge, and the power of voluntary motion, as certainly as we experiment, or difcover in things without us, the cohesion and feparation of folid parts, which is the extenfion and motion of bodies; we have as much reafon to be fatisfied with our notion of immaterial spirit, as with our notion of body, and the exiflence of the one as well as the other. For it being no more a contradiction, that thinking fhould exist feparate and independent from folidity, than it is à contradiction that folidity fhould exift, feparate and independent from thinking, they being both but fimple ideas, independent one from another; and having as clear and diftinct ideas in us of thinking as of folidity, I know not why we may not as well allow a thinking thing without folidity, i. e. immaterial, to exift, as a folid thing without thinking, i. e. matter, to exift; efpecially fince it is not harder, to conceive how thinking should exist without matter, than how matter fhould think. For whenfoever we would proceed beyond thefe fimple ideas we have from fenfation and reflection, and dive farther into the nature of things, we fall presently into darkness and obfcurity, perplexedness and difficulties, and can difcover nothing farther but our own blindness and ignorance. But whichever of these complex ideas be clearest, that of body or immaterial fpirit, this is evident, that the fimple ideas that make them up, are no other than what we have received from fenfation or reflection; and fo is it of all our other ideas of subftances, even of God himself.

33. Idea of God.

FOR if we examine the idea we have of the incomprehenfible Supreme Being, we shall find, that we come by

31 it the fame way; and that the complex ideas we have both of God and feparate fpirits, are made up of the fimple ideas we receive from reflection; v. g. having from what we experiment in ourselves got the ideas of existence and duration; of knowledge and power, of pleasure and happinefs, and of feveral other qualities and powers, which it is better to have than to be with out; when we would frame an idea the most suitable we can to the Supreme Being, we enlarge every one of thefe with our idea of infinity, and fo putting them together, make our complex idea of God; for that the mind has fuch a power of enlarging fome of its ideas, received from fenfation and reflection, has been already fhown.

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IF I find that I know fome few things, and fome of them, or all, perhaps, imperfectly, I can frame an idea of knowing twice as many, which I can double again, as often as I can add to number; and thus enlarge my idea of knowledge, by extending its comprehenfion to all things exifting, or poffible. The fame also I can do of knowing them more perfectly, i. e. all their qualities, powers, caufes, confequences, and relations, &c. till all be perfectly known that is in them, or can any way relate to them; and thus frame the idea of infinite or boundlefs knowledge. The fame may alfo be done of power, till we come to that we call infinite; and also of the duration of existence, without beginning or end, and fo frame the idea of an eternal Being. The degrees or extent wherein we afcribe existence, power, wisdom, and all other perfections (which we can have any ideas of) to that Sovereign Being which we call God, being all boundlefs and infinite, we frame the best idea of him our minds are capable of: All which is done, I fay, by enlarging thofe fimple ideas we have taken from the operations of our own minds by reflection, or by our fenfes, from exterior things, to that vaftness to which infinity can extend them.

35. Idea of God.

FOR it is infinity, which joined to our ideas of existence, power, knowledge, &c. makes that complex idea, whereby we reprefent to ourfelves the best we can, the Supreme Being. For though, in his own effence (which certainly we do not know, not knowing the real effence of a pebble, or a fly, or of our own felves) God be fimple and uncompounded, yet I think I may fay, we have no other idea of him but a complex one of existence, knowledge, power, happiness, &c. infinite and eternal; which are all distinct ideas, and fome of them being relative, are again compounded of others; all which being, as has been shown, originally got from fenfation and reflection, go to make up the idea or notion we have of God.

36. No Ideas in our complex one of Spirits but those got from Senfation or Reflection.

THIS farther is to be obferved, that there is no idea we attribute to God, bating infinity, which is not alfo a part of our complex idea of other fpirits; because, being capable of no other fimple ideas, belonging to any thing but body, but thofe which by reflection we receive from the operation of our own minds, we can attribute to fpirits no other but what we receive from thence; and all the difference we can put between them in our contemplation of fpirits, is only in the feveral extents and degrees of their knowledge, power, duration, happinefs, &c. For that in our ideas, as well of fpirits as of other things, we are refrained to thofe we receive from fenfation and reflection, is evident from hence, that, in our ideas of fpirits, how much foever advanced in perfection beyond thofe of bodies, even to that of infinite, we cannot yet have any idea of the manner wherein they difcover their thoughts one to another; though we must neceffarily conclude, that feparate fpirits, which are beings that have perfecter knowledge and greater happiness than we, muft needs have alfo a perfecter way of communicating their thoughts than we have, who are fain to make ufe of corporeal. figns and particular founds;

33 which are therefore of moft general ufe, as being the beft and quickest we are capable of. But of immediate communication, having no experiment in ourselves, and confequently no notion of it at all, we have no idea how fpirits, which use not words, can with quickness, or much lefs how fpirits, that have no bodies, can be mafters of their own thoughts, and communicate or conceal them at pleasure, though we cannot but neceffarily fuppofe they have fuch a power.

$37. Recapitulation.

AND thus we have feen what kinds of ideas we have of fubftances of all kinds, wherein they confift, and how we come by them: From whence, I think, it is very evident,

Firft, That all our ideas of the feveral forts of fubftances, are nothing but collections of fimple ideas, with fuppofition of something to which they belong, and in which they fubfift; though of this fuppofed fomething we have no clear diftinct idea at all.

Secondly, That all the fimple ideas, that thus united in one common fubftratum, make up our complex ideas of feveral forts of fubftances, are no other but fuch as we have received from fenfation or reflection: So that even in thofe which we think we are moft intimately acquainted with, and that come neareft the comprehenfion of our most enlarged conceptions, we cannot go beyond. thofe fimple ideas; and even in those which feem most remote from all we have to do with, and do infinitely furpass any thing we can perceive in ourselves by reflection, or difcover by fenfation in other things, we can attain to nothing but thofe fimple ideas, which we originally received from fenfation or reflection; as is evident in the complex ideas we have of angels, and particularly of God himself.

Thirdly, That most of the fimple ideas that make up our complex ideas of fubftances, when truly confidered, are only powers, however we are apt to take them for pofitive qualities, v. g. the greatest part of the idas that make our complex idea of gold, are yellownefs, great weight, ductility, fufibility, and folubility in ag