Firft, That there is no one thing, whether fimple idea, fubftance, mode, or relation, or name of either of them, which is not capable of almost an infinite number of confiderations, in reference to other things; and therefore this makes no small part of mens thoughts and words; v. g. one fingle man may at once be concerned in, and fuitain all thefe following relations, and many more, viz. father, brother, fon, grandfather grandfon, father-inlaw, fon-in-law, hufband, friend, enemy, fubject, general, judge, patron, client, profeffor, European, Englifhman, iflander, fervant, mafter, poffeffor, captain, fuperior, inferior, bigger, lefs, older, younger, contemporary, like, unlike, &c. to an almoft infinite number; he being capable of as many relations, as there can be occafions of comparing him to other things, in any manner of agreement, difagreement, or refpect whatfoever. For, as I faid, relation is a way of comparing or confidering two things together, and giving one or both of them fome appellation from that comparifon, and fometimes giving even the relation itself a name.

§ 8. The Ideas of Relations clearer often than of the Subjects related.

SECONDLY, This farther may be confidered concerning relation, that though it be not contained in the real exiftence of things, but fomething extraneous and fuperinduced; yet the ideas which relative words ftand for, are often clearer and more diftinct than those substances to which they do belong. The notion we have of a father or brother is a great deal clearer and more diftinct than that we have of a man; or, if you will, paternity is a thing whereof it is easier to have a clear idea than of humanity: And I can much eafier conceive what a friend is, than what God; because the knowledge of one action, or one fimple idea, is oftentimes fufficient to give me the notion of a relation; but to the knowing of any fubftantial being, an accurate collection of fundry ideas is neceffary. A man, if he compares two things together, can hardly be fuppofed not to know what it is wherein he compares them: fo that, when he compares any things together, he cannot but have a

very clear idea of that relation. The ideas then of relations are capable at least of being more perfect and diftinct in our minds than those of fubflances; because it is commonly hard to know all the fimple ideas which are really in any fubftance, but for the most part eafy enough to know the fimple ideas that make up any relation I think on, or have a name for; v. g. comparing two men, in reference to one common parent, it is very eafy to frame the ideas of brothers, without having yet the perfect idea of a man; or fignificant relative words, as well as others, ftanding only for ideas, and those being all either fimple, or made up of fingle ones, it fuffices for the knowing the precife idea the relative term ftands for, to have a clear conception of that which is the foundation of the relation, which may be done without having a perfect and clear idea of the thing it is attributed to. Thus having the notion that one laid the egg out of which the other was hatched, I have a clear idea of the relation of dam and chick, between the two caffiowaries in St. James's Park, though perhaps I have but a very obfcure and imperfect idea of those birds themfelves.

§ 9. Relations all terminate in fimple Ideas. THIRDLY, Though there be a great number of confiderations, wherein things may be compared one with another, and fo a multitude of relations, yet they all terminate in, and are concerned about thofe fimple ideas, either of fenfation or reflection, which I think to be the whole materials of all our knowledge. To clear this, I shall fhow it in the most confiderable relations that we have any notion of, and in fome that seem to be the most remote from fenfe or reflection; which yet will appear to have their ideas from thence, and leave it paft doubt, that the notions we have of them are but certain fimple ideas, and fo originally derived from fenfe or reflection.

10. Terms leading the Mind beyond the Subject denominated, are relative.

FOURTHLY, That relation, being the confidering of one thing with another, which is extrinsical to it, it is evi

dent that all words that neceffarily lead the mind to any other ideas than are fuppofed really to exift in that thing, to which the word is applied, are relative words, v. g. a man black, merry, thoughtful, thirsty, angry, extended; these, and the like, are all abfolute, becaufe they neither fignify nor intimate any thing, but what does, or is fuppofed really to exift in the man thus denominated; but father, brother, king, husband, blacker, merrier, &c. are words, which, together with the thing they denominate, imply also fomething elfe feparate and exterior to the exiftence of that thing.

§ 11. Conclufion.

HAVING laid down thefe premifes concerning relation in general, I fhall now proceed to fhow, in fome inftances, how all the ideas we have of relation are made up, as the others are, only of fimple ideas, and that they all, how refined and remote from fenfe foever they feem, terminate at laft in fimple ideas. I fhall begin with the moft comprehenfive relation, wherein all things that do or can exift are concerned, and that is the relation of caufe and effect, the idea whereof, how derived from the two fountains of all our knowledge, fenfation and reflection, I fhall in the next place confider.

CHAP. XXVI.

OF CAUSE AND EFFECT, AND OTHER RELATIONS.

§ 1. Whence their Ideas got.

N the notice that our senses take of the constant vi

veral particular, both qualities and fubftances, begin to exift, and that they receive this their existence from the due application and operation of fome other being. From this obfervation we get our ideas of caufe and effect. That which produces any fimple or complex idea, we denote by the general name caufe, and that which is produced, effect. Thus, finding that in that fubftance which we call wax, fluidity, which is a fimple idea that was not in it before, is conftantly produced by the ap

plication of a certain degree of heat; we call the fimple idea of heat, in relation to fluidity in wax, the cause of it, and fluidity the effect. So alfo, finding that the fubftance wood, which is a certain collection of fimple ideas fo called, by the application of fire is turned into another fubftance called ashes, i. e. another complex idea, confifting of a collection of fimple ideas, quite different from that complex idea which we call wood; we confider fire, in relation to afhes, as caufe, and the afhes as effect: So that, whatever is confidered by us to conduce or operate to the producing any particular fimple idea, or collection of fimple ideas, whether fubftance or mode, which did not before exift, hath thereby in our minds the relation of a caufe, and fo is denominated by us..

§2. Creation, Generation, making Alteration. HAVING thus, from what our fenfes are able to discover in the operations of bodies on one another, got the notion of cafe and effect, viz. that a caufe is that which makes any other thing, either fimple idea, fubftance, or mode, begin to be; and an effect is that which had its beginning from fome other thing; the mind finds no great difficulty to diftinguish the feveral originals of things into two forts:

Firft, When the thing is wholly made new, fo that no part thereof did ever exift before, as when a new particle of matter doth begin to exist in rerum natura, which had before no being, and this we call creation.

Secondly, When a thing is made up of particles, which did all of them before exist, but that very thing fo conftituted of pre-exifting particles, which, confidered altogether, make up fuch a collection of fimple ideas, had not any existence before, as this man, this egg, rofe, or cherry, &c.; and this, when referred to a fubftance, produced in the ordinary courfe of nature by an internal principle, but fet on work, by, and received from. fome external agent or cause, and working by infenfible ways, which we perceive not, we call generation: When the caufe is extrinsical, and the effect produced by a fenfible feparation, or juxta-pofition of difcernible parts,

we call it making; and fuch are all artificial things. When any fimple idea is produced, which was not in that fubject before, we call it alteration. Thus, a man is generated, a picture made, and either of them altered, when any new fenfible quality or fimple idea is produced in either of them, which was not there before; and the things thus made to exift, which were not there before, are effects, and thofe things which operated to the existence, caufes; in which, and all other cafes, we may obferve, that the notion of caufe and effect, has its rife from ideas, received by fenfation or reflection, and that this relation, how comprehenfive foever, terminates at last in them; for to have the idea of caufe and effect, it fuffices to confider any fimple idea or fubftance as beginning to exift by the operation of fome other, without knowing the manner of that operation.

3. Relations of Time.

TIME and place are alfo the foundations of very large relations, and all finite beings at least are concerned in them. But having already fhown, in another place, how we get these ideas, it may fuffice here to intimate, that most of the denominations of things, received from time, are only relations. Thus, when any one fays, that Queen Elizabeth lived fixty-nine, and reigned forty-five years, thefe words import only the relation of that duration to fome other, and mean no more than this, that the duration of her existence was equal to fixty-nine, and the duration of her government to forty-five annual revolutions of the fun, and fo are all words anfwering how long. Again, William the Conqueror invaded England about the year 1070, which means this, that taking the duration from our Saviour's time till now, for one entire great length of time, it fhows at what dif tance this invafion was from the two extremes; and fo do all words of time, anfwering to the question when, which fhow only the distance of any point of time from the period of a longer duration from which we meafure, and to which we thereby confider it as related.