from the ideas fignified by thofe names. Juft thus it is with our ideas, which are as it were the pictures of things. No one of these mental draughts, however the parts are put together, can be called confufed (for they are plainly difcernible as they are) till it be ranked under fome ordinary name, to which it cannot be difcerned to belong, any more than it does to fome other name of an allowed different fignification.

9. Thirdly, or are mutable and undetermined. THIRDLY, A third defect that frequently gives the name of confused to our ideas, is, when any one of them is uncertain and undetermined. Thus we may obferve men, who not forbearing to ufe the ordinary words of their language, till they have learned their precife fignification, change the idea they make this or that term stand for, almost as often as they use it: He that does this out of uncertainty of what he fhould leave out, or put into his idea of church or idolatry, every time he thinks of either, and holds not steady to any one precife combination of ideas that makes it up, is faid to have a confufed idea of idolatry or the church; though this be ftill for the fame reafon that the former, viz. because a mutable idea (if we will allow it to be one idea) cannot belong to one name rather than another, and fo lofes the diftinction that distinct names are defigned for.

f 10. Confufion without reference to Names, hardly conceivable.

By what has been faid, we may obferve how much names, as fuppofed fteady figns of things, and by their difference to stand for and keep things diftinct that in themselves are different, are the occafion of denominating ideas diftinct or confufed, by a fecret and unobferved reference the mind makes of its ideas to fuch names. This perhaps will be fuller understood, after what I lay of words, in the third book, has been read and confidered: But without taking notice of fuch a reference of ideas, to diftinct names as the figns of diftinct things, it will be hard to fay what a confufed idea is; and therefore when a man defigns, by any name, a fort of things, or any one particular thing, diftinct from all others, the

Book II. complex idea he annexes to that name, is the more diftinct, the more particular the ideas are, and the greater and more determinate the number and order of them is,. whereof it is made up; for the more it has of thefe, the more has it ftill of the perceivable differences, whereby it is kept separate and diftinct from all ideas belonging to other names, even thofe that approach nearest to it, and thereby all confufion with them is avoided.

$11. Confufion concerns always two Ideas. CONFUSION, making it a difficulty to separate two things that should be feparated, concerns always two ideas; and those most, which most approach one another: Whenever therefore, we fufpect any idea to be confufed, we muft examine what other it is in danger to be confounded with, or which it cannot easily be feparated from ; and that will always be found an idea belonging to another name, and fo fhould be a different thing; from which yet it is not fufficiently diftinct, being either the fame with it, or making a part of it, or at least as properly called by that name, as the other it is ranked under; and fo keeps not that difference from that other idea which the different names import.

12. Caufes of Confufion.

THIS, I think, is the confufion proper to ideas, which ftill carries with it a fecret reference to names: At leaft if there be any other confufion of ideas, this is that which meft of all diforders mens thoughts and difcourfes, ideas as ranked under names, being those that for the most part men reafon of within themfelves, and always those which they commune about with others; and therefore where there are fuppofed two different ideas marked by two different names, which are not as diftinguifhable as the founds that fland for them, there never fails to be confufion: And where any ideas are diftinct, as the ideas of thofe two founds they are marked by, there can be between them no confufion. The way to prevent it, is to collect and unite into our complex idea, as precifely as is poflible, all thofe ingredients whereby it is differenced from others; and to them fo united in a determinate number and order, ap

ply steadily the fame name;' but this neither accommodating mens eafe or vanity, or ferving any defign but that of naked truth, which is not always the thing aimed at, fuch exactnefs is rather to be wifhed than hoped for. And fince the loofe application of names to undetermined, variable, and almoft no ideas, ferve both to cover our own ignorance, as well as to perplex and confound others, which goes for learning and fuperiority in knowledge, it is no wonder that moft men fhould ufe it themselves, whilft they complain of it in others. Though, I think, no fmall part of the confufion to be found in the notions of men, might by care and ingenuity be avoided, yet I am far from concluding it every where wilful. Some ideas are fo complex, and made up of fo many parts, that the memory does not easily retain the very fame precife combination of fimple ideas under one name; much lefs are we able conftantly to divine for what precife complex idea fuch a name stands in another man's ufe of it. From the first of thefe follows confufion in a man's own reafonings and opinions within himself; from the latter, frequent confufion in difcourfing and arguing with others. But having more at large treated of words, their defects and abufes in the following book, I fhall here fay no more of it.

13. Complex Ideas may be diftinct in one part, and confufed in another.

OUR complex ideas being made up of collections, and fo variety of fimple ones, may accordingly be very clear and diftinct in one part, and very obfcure and confused in another. In a man who fpeaks of a chiliaedron, or a body of a thoufand fides, the idea of the figure may be very confufed, though that of the number be very diftinet; so that he being able to difcourfe and demonftrate concerning that part of his complex idea which depends upon the number of a thousand, he is apt to think he has a diftinct idea of a chiliaedron; though it be plain he has no precife idea of its figure, fo as to diftinguifh it by that, from one that has but 999 fides; the

not obferving whereof, caufes no fmall error in mens thoughts, and confufion in their difcourfes.

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§14. This, if not heeded, caufes Confufion in our Arguings. He that thinks he has a diftinct idea of the figure of a chilicedron, let him for trial-fake take another parcel of the fame uniform matter viz. gold or wax, of an equal bulk, and make it into a figure of 999 fides; he will, I doubt not, be able to diftinguifh these two ideas one from another, by the number of fides, and reafon and argue diftinctly about them, whilft he keeps his thoughts and reafoning to that part only of thefe ideas, which is contained in their numbers, as, that the fides of the one could be divided into two equal numbers, and of the other not, &c. But when he goes about to diftinguith them by their figure, he will there be presently at a loss, and not able, I think, to frame in his mind two ideas, one of them diftinct from the other, by the bare figure of these two pieces of gold, as he could, if the fame parcels of gold were made one into a cube, the other a figure of five fides; in which incomplete ideas, we are very apt to impofe on ourfelves, and wrangle with o thers, efpecially where they have particular and familiar names: For being fatisfied in that part of the idea which we have clear, and the name which is familiar to us being applied to the whole, containing that part alfo which is imperfect and obfcure, we are apt to ule it for that confused part, and draw deductions from it, in the obfcure part of its fignification, as confidently as we do from the other.

15. Inftance in Eternity. HAVING frequently in our mouths the name eternity, we are apt to think we have a pofitive comprehenfive idea of it, which is as much as to fay, that there is no part of that duration which is not clearly contained in our idea: It is true, that he that thinks fo may have a clear idea of durati. n; he may also have a very clear idea of a very great length of duration; he may alfo have a clear idea of the comparifon of that great one with still a greater; but it not being poffible for him to include in his idea of any duration, let it be as great as it will, the

whole extent together of a duration where he fuppofes no end, that part of his idea, which is ftill beyond the bounds of that large duration he reprefents to his own thoughts, is very obfcure and undetermined. And hence it is that in difputes and reafonings concerning eternity, or any other infinite, we are apt to blunder, and involve ourselves in mauifelt abfurdities.

10, Divifuility of Matter,

IN matter we have no clear ideas of the fmallness of parts much beyond the fmalleft that occur to any of our fenfes; and therefore when we talk of the divifibility of matter in infinitum, though we have clear ideas of divifion and divifibility, and have alfo clear ideas of parts made out of a whole by divifion; yet we have but very obfcure and confufed ideas of corpufcles, or minute bodies fo to be divided, when by former divifions they are reduced to a fmalinefs much exceeding the perception of any of our fenfes; and fo all that we have clear and diftinct ideas of, is of what divifion in general or abftractly is, and the relation of totum and pars: But of the bulk of the body, to be thus infinitely divided after certain progreffions, I think, we have no clear nor diftinct idea at all: For I afk any one, whether taking the smallest atom of duft he ever faw, he has any diftinct idea (bating ftill the number which concerns not extenfion) betwixt the 100,000, and the 1,000,000 part of it; or if he thinks he can refine his ideas to that degree, without losing fight of them, let him add ten cyphers to each of thofe numbers. Such a degree of fmallaefs is not unreafonable to be fuppofed, fince a divifion carried on fo far, brings it no nearer the end of infinite divifion, than the first divifion into two halves does. I must confess, for my part, I have no clear diftinct ideas of the diffe rent bulk or extension of these bodies, having but a very obfcure one of either of them; fo that I think, when we talk of divifion of bodies in infinitum, our idea of their diftinct bulks, which is the fubject and foundation of divifion, comes, after a little progreffion, to be confounded, and almoft loft in obfcurity: For that idea, which is to represent only bignefs, muit be very obfcure