of counters, calls one in a certain place a pound, another in another place a billing, and a third in a third place a penny; and fo proceeding, may undoubtedly reckon right, and caft up a great fum, according to his counters fo placed, and ftanding for more or lefs as he pleates, without being one jot the richer, or without even knowing how much a pound, fhilling, or penny is, but only that one is contained in the other twenty times, and contains the other twelve; which a man may alfo do in the fignification of words, by making them, in refpect of one another, more or lefs, or equally comprehenfive.

§ 11. Thirdly, Ufing Words varioufly is trifling with

them.

THOUGH Yet Concerning moft words ufed in difcourfes, efpecially argumentative and controverfial, there is this more to be complained of, which is the worst fort of trifling, and which fets us yet farther from the certainty of knowledge we hope to attain by them, or find in them, viz. that most writers are fo far from inftructing us in the nature and knowledge of things, that they use their words loofely and uncertainly, and do not, by ufing them conftantly and fteadily in the fame fignifications, make plain and clear deductions of words one from another, and make their discourses coherent and clear (how little foever it were inftructive), which were not difficult to do, did they not find it convenient to fhelter their ignorance or obftinacy under the obfcurity and perplexedness of their terms; to which, perhaps, inadvertency and ill cuftom do in many men much contribute.

§ 12. Marks of verbal Propofitions.

To conclude; barely verbal propofitions may be known by these following marks:

1. Predication in abftra&.

FIRST, All propofitions, wherein two abstract terms are affirmed one of another, are barely about the fignification of sounds. For fince no abstract idea can be the fame with any other but itself, when its abftra&t name is affirmed of any other term, it can fignify no

more but this, that it may or ought to be called by that name, or that these two names fignify the fame idea. Thus fhould any one fay that parfimony is fru gality, that gratitude is juftice, that this or that action is or is not temperance, however fpecious thefe and the like propofitions may at first fight feem, yet when we come to prefs them, and examine nicely what they contain, we fhall find that it all amounts to nothing but the fignification of thofe terms.

§ 13. 2. A part of the Definition predicated of any

Term.

SECONDLY, All propofitions wherein a part of the com plex idea which any term ftands for, is predicated of that term, are only verbal, v. g. to say that gold is a metal or heavy. And thus all propofitions, wherein more comprehenfive words, called genera, are affirmed of fubordinate or lefs comprehenfive, called Species, or individuals, are barely verbal..

When, by these two rules, we have examined the propofitions that make up the difcourfes we ordinarily meet with both in and out of books, we fhall, perhaps, find that a greater part of them than is ufually fufpected, are purely about the fignification of words, and contain nothing in them but the ufe and application of these signs.

This, I think, I may lay down for an infallible rule, that wherever the diftinct idea any word ftands for is not known and confidered, and fomething not contained in the idea is not affirmed or denied of it, there our thoughts ftick wholly in founds, and are able to attain no real truth or falfehood. This, perhaps, if well heeded, might fave us a great deal of useless amusement and difpute, and very much shorten our trouble and wandering, in the fearch of real and: true knowledge.

E6

CHAP. IX.

OF OUR KNOWLEDGE OF EXISTENCE.

1. General certain Propofitions concern not Exif

ence.

ITHERTO we have only confidered the effences of things, which being only abstract ideas, and thereby removed in our thoughts from particular exiftence (that being the proper operations of the mind, in abstraction, to confider an idea under no other exiftence but what it has in the understanding), gives us no knowledge of real existence at all. Where, by the way, we may take no ice, that universal propofitions, of whole truth or falsehood we can have certain knowledge, concern not exiflence; and farther, that all particular affirmations or negations, that would not be certain if they were made general, are only concerning existence; they declaring only the accidental union or feparation of ideas in things existing, which in their abflract natures, have no known neeeflary union or repugnancy.

2. A threefold Knowledge of Existence.

Bur leaving the nature of propofitions, and different ways of predication, to be confidered more at large in another place, let us proceed now to inquire concern ing our knowledge of the exiflence of things, and how we come by it. I fay then, that we have the knowTedge of our own exiflence by intuition; of the exitence of God by demonstration; and of other things by fenfation

§3. Our Knowledge of our own Exiflence is intui

tive.

As for our own existence, we perceive it fo plainly, and fo certainly, that it neither needs, nor is capable of any proof; for nothing can be more evident to us than our own existence. I think, I reafon, I feel pleafure and pain; can any of these be more evident to

me than my own exiftence? If I doubt of all other things, that very doubt makes me perceive my own existence, and will not fuffer me to doubt of that; for if I know I feel pain, it is evident I have as certain perception of my own exiftence, as of the existence of the pain I feel; or, if I know I doubt, I have as certain perception of the existence of the thing doubting, as of that thought which I call doubt. Experience then convinces us, that we have an intuitive knowledge of our own exiflence, and an internal infallible perception that we are. In every act of fenfation, reafoning or thinking, we are confcious to ourselves of our own being, and, in this matter, come not fhort of the highest degree of certainty.

CHAP. X.

OF OUR KNOWLEDGE OF THE EXISTENCE OF A GOD.

§ 1. We are capable of knowing certainly that there is

JGH

I

a God

HOUGH God has given us no innate ideas of

Thimfeit, though he has stamped no original

characters on our minds, wherein we may read his being, yet having furnished us with thofe faculties our minds are endowed with, he hath not left himfelf without witnefs, fince we have fenfe, perception and reafon, and cannot want a clear proof of him, as long as we carry ourselves about us; nor can we justly complain of our ignorance in this great point, fince he has fo plentifully provided us with the means to difcover, and know him, fo far as is neceflary to the end of our being, and the great concernment of our happiness. But though this be the most obvious truth that reafon difcovers, and though its evidence be (if I mistake not) equal to mathematical certainty, yet it requires thought and attention, and the mind must apply itself to a regular deduction of it from fome part of our intuitive knowledge, or elfe we fhall

be as uncertain and ignorant of this as of other propofitions, which are in themfelves capable of clear demonftration. To fhow, therefore, that we are capable of knowing, i. e. being certain that there is a God, and how we may come by this certainty, I think we need go no farther than ourfelves, and that undoubt ed knowledge we have of our own existence.

§ 2. Man knows that he himself is.

I THINK it is beyond question, that man har a clear perception of his own being; he knows certainly that he exifts, and that he is fomething. He that can doubt whether he be any thing or no, I speak not to, no more than I would argue with pure nothing, or endeavour to convince non-entity, that it were fɔmething. If any one pretends to be fo fceptical as to deny his own existence (for really to doubt of it is manifeftly impoffible), let him for me enjoy his beloved happinets of being nothing, until hunger or fome other pain convince him of the contrary. This then, I think, I may take for a truth, which every one's certain knowledge affures him of, beyond the liberty of doubting, viz. that he is something that actually exifts.

§3. He knows alfo that nothing cannot produce a Being, therefore fomething eternal.

In the next place, man knows by an intuitive certainty, that bare nothing can no more produce any real be ing, than it can be equal to two right angles. If a man knows not that non-entity, or the abfence of all being, cannot be equal to two right angles, it is impoffible he fhould know any demonftration in Euclid. If, therefore, we know there is fome real being, and that non-entity cannot produce any real being, it is an evident demonstration, that from eternity there has been fomething, fince what was not from eternity had a beginning, and what had a beginning must be produced by fomething else.

§ 4. That eternal Being must be most powerful. NEXT, it is evident, that what had its being and beginning from another, must also have all that which is