OF THE

CONDUCT OF THE UNDERSTANDING.

Quid tam temerarium tamque indignum fapientis gravitate atque conftantia, quam aut falfum fentire, aut quod non fatis explorate perceptum fit et cognitum fine ulla dubitatione defendere? Cic. de Natura Deorum, lib. 1.

Introduction.

HE last resort a man has recourfe to in the conTHE duct of himself, is his understanding; for though. we diftinguith the faculties of the mind, and give the fupreme command to the will, as to an agent, yet the truth is, the man, which is the agent, determines himself to this or that voluntary action, upon fome precedent knowledge, or appearance of knowledge, in the underftanding. No man ever fets himself about any thing but upon fome view or other, which ferves him for a reafon for what he does: and whatfoever faculties he employs, the understanding, with fuch light as it has, well or ill informed, conftantly leads; and by that light, true or faife, all his operative powers are directed. The will itfelf, how abfolute and uncontroulable foever it may be thought, never fails in its obedience to the dictates of the understanding. Temples have their facred images, and we fee what influence they have always had over a great part of mankind; but in truth, the ideas and images in mens minds are the invifible powers that conftantly govern them, and to thefe they all univerfally pay a ready fubmiffion. It is therefore of the highest concernment, that great care fhould be taken of the understanding, to conduct it right in the fearch of knowledge, and in the judgments it makes,

K6

The logic now in ufe has fo long poffeffed the chair, as the only art taught in the schools for the direction of the mind in the study of the arts and fciences, that it would perhaps be thought an affectation of novelty to fuf pect that rules that have ferved the learned world thefe two or three thousand years, and which, without any com plaint of defects, the learned have rested in, are not fufficient to guide the understanding; and I fhould not doubt but this attempt would be cenfured as vanity or prefumption, did not the great Lord Verulam's autho rity justify it; who, not fervilely thinking learning could not be advanced beyond what it was, becaufe for many ages it had not been, did not reft in the lazy approba tion and applaufe of what was, because it was, but enlarged his mind to what might be. In his preface to his Novum Organumconcerning logic, he pronounces thus: Qui fummas dialecticæ partes tribuerunt, atque inde fidiffima fcientiis præfidia comparari putarunt, veriffime et optime viderunt intellectum humanum fibi permiffum merito fufpec tum effe debere. Verum infirmior omnino eft malo medicina z nee ipfa mali expers. Siquidem dialectica, que recepta eft, licet ad civilia et artes, quæ in fermone et opinione pofite funt, rectiffime adhibeatur; natura tamen fubtilitatem langs intervallo non attingit, et prenfando quod non capit, ad ern rores potius ftabiliendos et quafi figendos, quam ad viam veritati aperiendam valuit.

"They, fays he, who attributed fo much to logic, "perceived very well and truly, that it was not fafe to "truft the understanding to itself, without the guard ❝of any rules. But the remedy reached not the evil, "but became a part of it: For the logic which took

place, though it might do well enough in civil af"fairs, and the arts which confifted in talk and opi• "nion, yet comes very far fhort of fubtilty in the real "performances of nature; and catching at what it can. "not reach, has ferved to confirm and establifh errors, " rather than to open a way to truth." And therefore a little after he fays, "That it is abfolutely neceffary "that a better and perfecter ufe and employment of the "mind and understanding should be introduced." Ne~

ceffario requiritur ut melier et perfectior mentis et intellectus humani ufus et adoperatio introducatur.

§ 2. Parts. v

THERE is, it is visible, great variety in mens understandings, and their natural conftitutions put fo wide a difference between fome men in this respect, that art and industry would never be able to maiter, and their very natures feem to want a foundation to raise on it that which other men easily attain unto. Amongst men of equal education, there is great inequality of parts; and the woods of America, as well as the fchools of Athens, produce men of feveral abilities in the fame kind. Though this be fo, yet I imagine moft men come very fhort of what they might attain unto in their several degrees, by a neglect of their understandings: A few rules of logic are thought fufficient in this cafe for those who pretend to the highest improvement; whereas, I think there are a great many natural defects in the understanding capable of amendment, which are overlooked and wholly neglected; and it is eafy to perceive that men are guilty of a great many faults in the exercife and improvement of this faculty of the mind, which hinder them in their progrefs, and keep them in ignorance and error all their lives. Some of them I fhall take notice of, and endeavour to point out proper remedies for, in the following difcourfe.

§3. Reafoning.

BESIDES the want of determined ideas, and of fagacity and exercise in finding out and laying in order intermediate ideas, there are three mifcarriages that men are guilty of in reference to their reason, whereby this faculty is hindered in them from that service it might do and was defigned for; and he that reflects upon the actions and difcourfes of mankind, will find their defects in this kind very frequent, and very obfervable.

1. The first is of those who feldom reafon at all, but do and think according to the example of others, whether parents, neighbours, minifters, or who elfe they are pleafed to make choice of to have an implicit faith in, for

the faving of themselves the pains and trouble of think, ing and examining for themfelves.

2. The fecond is of thofe who put paffion in the place of reaton, and being refolved that hall govern their actions and arguments, neither use their own nor hearken to other people's reafon, any farther than it futs their humour, intereft, or party; and thefe, one may obferve, commonly content themfelves with words which have no distinct ideas to them, though, in other inatters that they come with an unbiaffed indifferency to, they want not abilities to talk and hear reafon, where they have no fecret inclination that hinders them from being tractable to it.

3. The third fort is of thofe who readily and fincerely follow reafon, but for want of having that which one may call large, found, round-about fenfe, have not a full view of all that relates to the question, and may be of moment to decide it. We are all thort-fighted, and very often fee but one fide of a matter; our views are not extended to all that has a connection with it. From this defect I think no man is free. We lee but in part, and we know but in part, and therefore it is no wonder we conclude not right from our partial views. This might instruct the proudeft efteemer of his own parts how useful it is to talk and confult with others, even fuch as come short of him in capacity, quicknels and penetration; for fince no one fees all, and we generally have different profpects of the fame thing, according to our different, as I may fay, pofitions to it, it is not incongruous to think, nor beneath any man to try, whe ther another may not have notions of things which have efcaped him, and which his reafon would make ufe of if they came into his mind. The faculty of reafoning feldom or never deceives thofe who truft to it; its coa fequences from what it builds on are evident, and cer tain; but that which it ofteneft, if not only, mifleads us in is, that the principles from which we conclude, the grounds upon which we bottom our reafoning, are but a part, fomething is left out which fhould go into the reckoning to make it just and exact. Here we may