reafoning, though in them it is not so easily observed, nor fo carefully practifed. In thofe parts of knowledge where it is thought demonftration has nothing to do, men reafon as it were in the lump; and if, upon a fummary and confufed view, or upon a partial confideration, they can raise the appearance of a prebability, they ufually reft content, efpecially if it be in a difpute, where every little fraw is laid hold on, and every thing that can but be drawn in any way to give colour to the argument is advanced with oftentation. But that mind is not in a posture to find the truth, that does not diftin&ly take all the parts afunder, and, omitting what is not all to the point, draw a conclafion from the refult of all the particulars which any way influence it. There is another no less useful habit to be got by an application to mathematical demonftrations, and that is of ufing the mind to a long train of confequences. But having mentioned that already, I fhall not again here repeat it.

As to men whofe fortunes and time is narrower, what may fuffice them is not of that vaft extent as may be imagined, and fo comes not within the objection.

Nobody is under an obligation to know every thing. Knowledge and fcience in general is the bufinefs only of those who are at eafe and leifure: Thofe who have particular callings ought to understand them; and it is no unreafonable propofal, nor impoffible to be compaffed, that they fhould think and reafon right about what is their daily employment. This one cannot think them incapable of, without levelling them with the brutes, and charging them with a stupidity below the rank of rational creatures.

§ 8. Religion.

BESIDES his particular calling for the fupport of this life, every one has a concern in a future life, which he is bound to look after. This engages his thoughts in religion; and here it mightily lies upon him to understand and reafon right. Men therefore cannot be excufed from understanding the words, and framing e general notions relating to religion right. The

one day of seven, befides other days of reft, allows in the Chriftian world time enough for this (had they no other idle hours), if they would but make use of thefe vacancies from their daily labour, and apply themselves to an improvement of knowledge, with as much diligence as they often do to a great many other things that are ufelefs, and had but thofe that would enter them, according to their feveral capacities, in a right way to this knowledge. The original make of their minds is like that of other men, and they would be found not to want understanding fit to receive the knowledge of religion, if they were a little encouraged and helped in it as they should be; for there are inftances of very mean people, who have raised their minds to a great fenfe and understanding of religion; and though thefe have not been fo frequent as could be wished, yet they are enough to clear that condition of life from a neceffity of grofs ignorance, and to fhow that more might be brought to be rational creatures and Chriftians (for they can hardly be thought really to be so, who, wearing the name, know not so much as the very principles of that religion), if due care were taken of them: For, if I mistake not, the peafantry lately in France (a rank of people under a much heavier preffure of want and poverty than the day-labourers in England) of the reformed religion, understood it much better, and could fay more for it, than those of a higher condition among us.

But if it shall be concluded, that the meaner fort of people must give themselves up to a brutish ftupidity in the things of their nearest concernment, which I fee no reason for, this excufes not those of a freer fortune and education, if they neglect their understandings, and take no care to employ them as they ought, and fet them right in the knowledge of thofe things, for which principally they were given them. At least thofe whole plentiful fortunes allow them the opportunities and helps of improvements, are not fo few, but that it might be hoped great advancements might be made in knowledge of all kinds, especially in that

of the greatest concern and largeft views, if men would make a right use of their faculties, and study their own understandings.

$9. Ideas.

OUTWARD Corporeal objects, that conftantly importune our fenfes, and captivate our appetites, fail not to fill our heads with lively and lafting ideas of that kind. Here the mind needs not be fet upon getting greater ftore; they offer themselves faft enough, and are ufually entertained in fach plenty, and lodged fo carefully, that the mind wants room or attention for others that it has more ufe and need of. To fit the understanding therefore, for fuch reasoning as I have been above fpeaking of, care should be taken to fill it with moral and more abstract ideas; for these not of. fering themselves to the fenfes, but being to be framed to the understanding, people are generally so neglect. ful of a faculty they are apt to think wants nothing, that I fear moft mens minds are more unfurnished with fuch ideas than is imagined. They often use the words, and how can they be fufpected to want the ideas & What I have faid in the third book of my Effay, will excufe me from any other anfwer to this queftion. But to convince people of what moment it is to their understandings to be furnished with such abstract ideas steady and settled in them, give me leave to afk, how any one shall be able to know whether he be obliged to be juft, if he has not established ideas in his mind of obligation and of justice, fince knowledge confifts in nothing but the perceived agreement or difagreement of thofe ideas and fo of all others the like, which concern our lives and manners. And if men do find a difficulty to see the agreement or difagreement of two angles which lie before their eyes, unalterable in a diagram, how utterly impoffible will it be to perceive it in ideas that have no other sensible objects to reprefent them to the mind but founds, with which they have no manner of conformity, and therefore had need to be clearly fettled in the mind themselves, if we would make any clear judgment

about them! This therefore is one of the first things the mind fhould be employed about in the right conduct of the understanding, without which it is impoffible it should be capable of reafoning right about those matters. But in these, and all other ideas, care muft be taken that they harbour no inconfiftencies, and that they have a real exiftence where real existence is fuppofed, and are not mere chimeras with a fuppofed existence.

10. Prejudice.

EVERY one is forward to complain of the prejudices that mislead other men or parties, as if he were free, and had none of his own. This being objected on all fides, it is agreed, that it is a fault and an hinderance to knowledge. What now is the cure? No other but this, that every man fhould let alone others prejudices, and examine his own. Nobody is convinced of his by the accufation of another; he recriminates by the fame rule, and is clear. The only way to remove this great caufe of ignorance and error out of the world, is for every one impartially to examine himfelf. If others will not deal fairly with their own minds, does that make my errors truths, or ought it to make me in love with them, and willing to impofe on myfelf? If others love cataracts on their eyes, fhould that hinder me from couching mine as foon as I could? Every one declares against blindness, and yet who almolt is not fond of that which dims his fight, and keeps the clear light out of his mind, which fhould lead him into truth and knowledge? Falfe or doubtful pofitions, relied upon as unquestionable maxims, keep thofe in the dark from truth who build on them. Such are ufually the prejudices imbibed from education, party, reverence, fashion, intereft, &c. This is the mote which every one fees in his brother's eye, but never regards the beam in his own; for who is there almost that is ever brought fairly to examine his own principles, and fee whether they are fuch as will bear the trial? But yet this fhould be one of the first things one should fet about, and be fcrupu

lous in, who would rightly conduct his understanding in the fearch of truth and knowledge.

To those who are willing to get rid of this great hinderance of knowledge (for to fuch only I write), to those who would shake off this great and dangerous impoftor prejudice, who dreffes up falfehood in the likeness of truth, and fo dexterously hoodwinks mens minds, as to keep them in the dark, with a belief that they are more in the light than any that do not fee with their eyes; I fhall offer this one mark whereby prejudice may be known: He that is strongly of any opinion, mult fuppofe (unless he be felf-condemned) that his perfuafion is built upon good grounds, and that his affent is no greater than what the evidence of the truth he holds forces him to; and that they are arguments, and not inclination or fancy, that make him fo confident and pofitive in his tenets. Now if, after all his profeffion, he cannot bear any oppofition to his opinion, if he cannot fo much as give a patient hearing, much lefs examine and weigh the arguments on the other fide, does he not plainly confefs it is prejudice governs him? and it is not the evidence of truth, but fome lazy anticipation, fome beloved prefumption that he defires to reft undisturbed in. For if what he holds be, as he gives out, well fenced with evidence, and he fees it to be true, what need he fear to put it to the proof? If his opinion be fettled upon a firm foundation, if the arguments that fupport it, and have obtained his affent, be clear, good, and convincing, why fhould he be thy to have it tried whether they be proof or not? He whofe affent goes beyond his evidence, owes this excefs of his adherence only to prejudice, and does in effect own it, when he refufes to hear what is offered against it; declaring thereby, that it is not evidence he feeks, but the quiet enjoyment of the opinion he is fond of, with a forward condemnation of all that may ftand in oppofition to it, unheard and unexamined; which, what is it but prejudice? Qui æquum ftatuerit parte inauditá alterà etiamfi æquum ftatuerit, baud æquus fuerit. ·

He that