Book III. thefe ufes equally the word gold, when they have occafion to exprefs the idea which they have applied it to; but it is evident, that each can apply it only to his own idea, nor can he make it stand as a sign of such a complex idea as he has not.

§ 4. Words often fecretly referred, First, to the Ideas in ather mens minds.

BUT though words, as they are used by men, can properly and immediately fignify nothing but the ideas that are in the mind of the speaker, yet they in their thoughts give them a fecret reference to two other things.

First, They fuppofe their words to be marks of the ideas in the minds aifo of other men with whom they communicate; for elfe they thould talk in vain, and could not be understood, if the founds they applied to one idea were fuch as by the hearer were applied to another, which is to speak two languages. But in this men ftand not ufually to examine whether the idea they and those they difcourfe with have in their minds, be the fame, but think it enough that they use the word, as they ima gine, in the common acceptation of that language, in which they fuppofe, that the idea they make it a fign of, is precifely the fame to which the understanding men of that country apply that name.

§ 5. Secondly, to the Reality of things.

SECONDLY, Because men would not be thought to talk barely of their own imaginations, but of things as really they are, therefore they often fuppofe their words to fland alfo for the reality of things. But this relating more particularly to fubitances, and their names, as perhaps the former does to fimple ideas and modes, we fhall speak of these two different ways of applying words more at large, when we come to treat of the names of mixed modes, and fubftances in particular; though, give me leave here to fay, that it is a perverting the use of words, and brings unavoidable obfcurity and confufion into their fignification, whenever we make them ftand for any thing but thofe ideas we have in our own minds. $6. Words by ufe readily excite Ideas.

CONCERNING Words alfo, it is farther to be confidered,,

First, That they being immediately the figns of mens ideas, and by that means the inftruments whereby men communicate their conceptions, and exprefs to one another thofe thoughts and imaginations they have within their own breasts, there comes by conftant use to be fuch a conneAion between certain founds, and the ideas they ftand for, that the names heard, almoft as readily excite certain ideas, as if the objects themselves, which are apt to produce them, did actually affect the fenfes; which is manifeftly fo in all obvious fenfible qualities, and in all fubftances that frequently and familiarly occur to us.

$ 7. Words often ufed without Signification. SECONDLY, That though the proper and immediate fignification of words are ideas in the mind of the fpeaker, yet because by familiar ufe from our cradles we come to learn certain articulate founds very perfectly, and have them readily on our tongues, and always at hand in our memories, but yet are not always careful to examine, or fettle their fignifications perfectly; it often happens that men, even when they would apply themfelves to an attentive confideration, do fet their thoughts more on words than things. Nay, because words are many of them learned before the ideas are known for which they ftand, therefore fome, not only children, but men, fpeak feveral words no otherwife than parrots do, only because they have learned them, and have been accuftomed to thofe founds. But fo far as words are of use and fignification, fo far is there a conftant connection between the found and the idea, and a defignation that the one stand for the other; without which application of them they are nothing but fo much infignificant noife.

:

§ 8. Their Signification perfectly arbitrary. WORDS by long and familiar ute, as has been faid, come to excite in men certain ideas fo conftantly and readily, that they are apt to fuppofe a natural connection between them. But that they fignify only mens peculiar ideas, and that by a perfectly arbitrary impofition, is evident, in that they often fail to excite in others (even that use the fame language) the fame ideas we

Book III. take them to be the figns of: and every man has fo inviolable a liberty to make words ftand for what ideas he pleases, that no one hath the power to make others have the fame ideas in their minds that he has, when they use the fame words that he does; and therefore the great Auguftus himself, in the poffeffion, of that power which ruled the world, acknowledged he could not make a new Latin word; which was as much as to fay, that he could not arbitrarily appoint what idea any found should be a fign of, in the mouths and common language of his fubjects. It is true, common ufe by a tacit confent appropriates certain founds to certain ideas in all languages, which fo far limits the fignification of that found, that unless a man applies it to the fame idea, he does not speak properly: and let me add, that unless a man's words excite the fame ideas in the hearer which he makes them ftand for in speaking, he does not fpeak intelligibly. But whatever be the confequence of any man's ufing of words differently, either from their general meaning, or the particular fenfe of the person to whom he addreffes them, this is certain, their fignifi cation, in his ufe of them, is limited to his ideas, and they can be figns of nothing else.

CHAP. III.

OF GENERAL TERMS.

§ 1. The greatest part of Words general. LL things that exift being particulars, it may per

A haps be thought reasonable that words, which

ought to be conformed to things, fhould be fo too; I mean, in their fignification; but yet we find the quite contrary. The far greatest part of words, that make all languages, are general terms; which has not been the effect of neglect or chance, but of reason and neceflity. 92. For every particular thing to have a Name is impof

fible.

FIRST, It is impoffible that every particular thing bould have a diftinct peculiar name. For the fignification and

137 ufe of words, depending on that connection which the mind makes between its ideas, and the sounds it uses as figns of them, it is neceffary, in the application of names to things, that the mind fhould have diftinct ideas of the things, and retain alfo the particular name that belongs to every one, with its peculiar appropriation to that idea. But it is beyond the power of human capacity to frame and retain distinct ideas of all the particular things we meet with ; every bird and beast men faw, every tree and plant that affected the fenfes, could not find a place in the most capacious understanding. If it be looked on as an inftance of a prodigious memory, that fome generals have been able to call every foldier in their army by his proper name, we may easily find a reason, why men have never attempted to give names to each fheep in their flock, or crow that flies over their heads; much less to call every leaf of plants, or grain of fand that came in their way, by a peculiar name.

§3. And ufelefs.

SECONDLY, If it were poffible, it would yet be useless, because it would not ferve to the chief end of language. Men would in vain heap up names of particular things, that would not ferve them to communicate their thoughts. Men learn names and use them in talk with others, only that they may be understood, which is then only done, when by ufe or confent, the found I make by the organs of fpeech, excites in another man's mind, who hears it, the idea I apply it to in mine, when I fpeak it. This cannot be done by names applied to particular things, whereof I alone having the ideas in my mind, the names of them could not be fignificant or intelligible to another, who was not acquainted with all thofe very particular things which had fallen under my notice.

THIRDLY, But yet granting this alfo feafible (which I think is not), yet a diftinct name for every particular thing would not be of any great nfe for the improvement of know"ledge, which though founded in particular things, enlarges-itself by general views, to which things reduced

Book III. into forts under general names are properly fubfervient: Thefe, with the names belonging to them, come with in fome compafs, and do not multiply every moment, beyond what either the mind can contain, or ufe requires; and therefore in thefe, men have for the most part ftopped, but yet not fo as to hinder themfelves from diftinguithing particular things, by appropriated names, where convenience demands it; and therefore in their own fpecies, which they have moft to do with, and wherein they have often occafion to mention particular perfons, they make use of proper names, and their diftinct individuals have diftinct denominations.

$5. What things have proper Names..

BESIDES perfons, countries, alfo cities, rivers, mountains, and other the like diftinctions of place, have ufually found peculiar names, and that for the fame reafon, they being fuch as men have often an occafion to mark particularly, and as it were set before others in their dif courfes with them; and I doubt not, but if we had reafon to mention particular horfes, as often as we have to mention particular men, we fhould have proper names for the one as familiar as for the other, and Bucephalus would be a word as much in ufe as Alexander, therefore we fee that amongst jockeys, horses have their proper names to be known and diftinguished by, as commonly as their fervants, becaufe, amongst them, there is often occafion to mention this or that particular horse, when he is out of fight.

6. How general Words are made.

And

THE next thing to be confidered, is, How general words come to be made: For fince all things that exift are only particulars, how come we by general terms, or where find we thofe general natures they are fuppofed to stand for? Words become general, by being made the figns of general ideas, and ideas become general, by feparating from them the circumstances of time and place, and any other ideas, that may determine them to this or that particular existence. By this way of abftraction they are made capable of reprefenting more individuals than one;