§ 4.

THERE are yet, befides thofe, other words of, time, that ordinarily are thought to ftand for pofitive ideas, which yet will, when confidered, be found to be relative, fuch as are young, old, &c. which include and intimate the relation any thing has to a certain length of duration, whereof we have the idea in our minds. Thus, having fettled in our thoughts the idea of the ordinary duration of a man to be feventy years, when we fay a man is young, we mean that his age is yet but a small part of that which ufually men attain to; and when we denominate him old, we mean that his duration is run out almoft to the end of that which men do not ufually exceed; and fo it is but comparing the particular age, or duration of this or that man, to the idea of that duration which we have in our minds, as ordinarily belonging to that fort of animals, which is plain, in the application of these names to other things; for a man is called young at twenty years, and very young at feven years old: But yet a horfe we call old at twenty, and a dog at feven years; because, in each of these, we compare their age to different ideas of duration, which are fettled in our minds, as belonging to these feveral forts of animals, in the ordinary courfe of nature. But the fun and ftars, though they have outlafted feveral generations of men, we call not old, becaufe we do not know what period God hath fet to that fort of beings; this term belonging properly to those things which we can obferve, in the ordinary courfe of things, by a natural decay, to come to an end in a certain period of time; and fo have, in our minds as it were, a standard to which we can compare the feveral parts of their duration; and by the relation they bear thereunto, call them young or old; which we cannot therefore do to a ruby or a diamond, things whofe ufual periods we know not.

5. Relations of Place and Extenfion. THE relation alfo that things have to one another in their places and diftances, is very obvious to obferve; as above, below, a mile diftant from Charing-crofs in

England, and in London. But as in duration, fo in extenfion and bulk, there are fome ideas that are relative, which we fignify by names that are thought pofitive; as great and little are truly relations. For here alfo having, by obfervation, fettled in our minds the ideas of the bignefs of feveral fpecies of things, from those we have been most accustomed to, we make them as it were the standards whereby to denominate the bulk of others. Thus we call a great apple, fuch a one as is bigger than the ordinary fort of those we have been ufed to; and little horse, fuch a one as comes not up to the fize of that idea which we have in our minds to belong ordinarily to horfes; and that will be a great horse to a Welshman, which is but a little one to a Fleming; they two having, from the different breed of their countries, taken feveral fized ideas to which they compare, and in relation to which they denominate their great and their little.

$6. Abfolute Terms often ftand for Relations. So likewife queak and strong are but relative denominations of power compared to fome ideas we have at that time, of greater or lefs power. Thus, when we fay a weak man, we mean one that has not fo much strength or power to move, as ufually men have, or ufually thofe of his fize have; which is a comparing his ftrength to the idea we have of the ufual ftrength of men, or men of fuch a fize. The like, when we fay the creatures are all weak things; weak, there, is but a relative term, fignifying the difproportion there is in the power of God and the creatures. And fo abundance of words, in ordinary fpeech, ftand only for relations (and perhaps the greatest part) which at first fight feem to have no fuch fignification; v. g. the fhip has neceffary ftores. Neceffary and ftores are both relative words; one having a relation to the accomplishing the voyage intended, and the other to future ufe. All which relations, how they are confined to and terminate in ideas derived from senfation and reflection, is too obvious to need any explication.

A

CHAP. XXVII.

OF IDENTITY AND DIVERSITY.

f1. Wherein Identity confifts.

NOTHER occafion the mind often takes of comparing, is the very being of things, when confidering any thing as exifting at any determined time and place, we compare it with its felf-exifting at another time, and thereon form the ideas of identity and diverfity. When we fee any thing to be in any place in any instant of time, we are fure (be it what it will) that it is that very thing, and not another, which at that fame time exifts in another place, how like and undistinguishable foever it may be in all other refpects: And in this confifts identity, when the ideas it is attributed to vary not at all from what they were that moment wherein we confider their former existence, and to which we compare the present. For we never finding nor conceiving it poffible, that two things of the fame kind fhould exift in the fame place at the fame time, we rightly conclude, that whatever exifts any where at any time, excludes all of the fame kind, and is there itself alone. When therefore we demand, whether any thing be the fame or no, it refers always to fomething that exifted fuch a time in fuch a place, which it was certain at that inftant was the fame with itself, and no other. From whence it follows, that one thing cannot have two beginnings of existence, nor two things one beginning; it being impoffible for two things of the fame kind to be or exift in the fame inftant, in the very fame place, or one and the fame thing in different places. That therefore that had one beginning, is the fame thing; and that which had a different beginning in time and place from that, is not the fame, but diverfe. That which has made the difficulty about this relation, has been the little care and attention used in having precile notions of the things to which it is attributed.

§ 2. Identity of Subftances.

WE have the ideas but of three forts of fubftances; 1. God. 2. Finite intelligences. 3. Bodies. First, God is without beginning, eternal, unalterable, and every where; and therefore, concerning his identity there can be no doubt, Secondly, Finite spirits having had each its determinate time and place of beginning to exift, the relation to that time and place will always determine to each of them its identity, as long as it exifts. Thirdly, The fame will hold of every particle of matter, to which no addition or subtraction of matter being made, it is the fame. For though these three forts of fubftances, as we term them, do not exclude one another out of the fame place, yet we cannot conceive but that they must neceffarily each of them exclude any of the fame kind out of the fame place; or elfe the notions and names of identity and diverfity would be in vain, and there could be no fuch diftinction of subftances, or any thing elfe one from another. For example: Could two bodies be in the fame place at the fame time, then those two parcels of matter muft be one and the fame, take them great or little. Nay, all bodies must be one and the fame; for, by the fame reason that two particles of matter may be in one place, all bodies may be in one place; which, when it can be fuppofed, takes away the diftinction of identity and diverfity of one and more, and renders it ridiculous. Butit being a contradiction that two or more should be one, identity and diverfity are relations and ways of comparing well founded, and of use to the understanding. All other things being but modes or relations ultimately terminated in fubftances, the identity and diverfity of each particular existence of them too will be by the fame. way determined: only as to things whofe existence is in fucceffion; fuch as are the actions of finite beings, v. g. motion and thought, both which confift in a continued train of fucceffion: Concerning their diverfity, there can be no queftion, because each perishing the moment it begins, they cannot exift in different times, or in different places, as permanent beings can at different times

exist in distant places; and therefore no motion; or thought, confidered as 'at different times, can be the fame, each part thereof having a different beginning of existence. !

བླམས § 3. Principium Individuationis, to dim & FROM what has been faid, it is eafy to discover what is: fo much inquired after, the principium individuationiss and that, it is plain, is existence itself, which determines a being of any fort to a particular time and place incommunicable to two beings of the fame kind. This, though it seems easier to conceive in simple substances or modes, yet when reflected on, is not more difficult in compounded ones, if care be taken to what it is ap plied u. g. Let us suppose an atom, i. e. a continued body, under one immutable fuperficies, exifting in a determined time and place; it is evident that, confidered in any inftant of its exiftence, it is in that inftant the fame with itself; for being at that inftant what it is, and nothing else, it is the fame, and so must continue as long as its exiftence is continued, for fo long it will be the fame, and no other. In like manner, if two or more atoms be joined together into the fame mafs, every one of those atoms will be the fame, by the foregoing rule; and whilst they exift united together, the mafs, confifting of the fame atoms, must be the fame mals, or the fame body, let the parts be ever fo differently jumbled; but if one of thefe atoms be taken away, or one new one added, it is no longer the fame mafs, or the fame body. In the ftate of living creatures, their identity depends not on a mass of the fame particles, but on fomething elfe; for in them the variation of great parcels of matter alters not the identity: An oak growing from a plant to a great tree, and then lopped, is ftill the fame oak; and a colt grown up to a horfe, fometimes fat, fometimes lean, is all the while the fame horfe; though in both these cafes, there may be a manifeft change of the parts; fo that truly they are not either of them the fame maffes of matter, though they be truly one of them the fame oak, and the other the fame horfe. The reafon whereof is