greatest part of the words made ufe of in divinity, ethics, law, and politics, and feveral other fciences. All that is requifite to my prefent defign, is to show what fort of ideas thofe are which I call mixed modes, how the mind comes by them, and that they are compofitions made up of fimple ideas got from fenfation and. reflection, which, I fuppofe, I have done.

CHAP. XXIII.

OF OUR COMPLEX IDEAS OF SUBSTANCES,

THE

§ 1. Ideas of Subftances, how made.

HE mind being, as I have declared, furnished with a great number of the fimple ideas, conveyed in by the fenfes, as they are found in exterior things, or by reflection on its own operations, takes notice alfo, that a certain number of thefe fimple ideas go conftantly together; which being prefumed to belong to one thing, and words being fuited to common apprehenfions, and made ufe of for quick dispatch, are called, fo united in one fubject, by one name; which, by inadvertency, we are apt afterwards to talk of, and confider, as one fimple idea, which indeed is a complication of many ideas together: Because, as I have faid, not imagining how thefe fimple ideas can fubfift by themfelves, we accuftom ourselves to fuppofe fome fubftratum wherein they do fubfift, and from which they do refult; which there-fore we call fubftance.

§ 2. Our Idea of Subflance in general.

So that if any one will examine himself concerning his notion of pure fubftance in general, he will find he has no other idea of it at all, but only a fuppofition of he knows not what fupport of fuch qualities, which are capable of producing fimple ideas in us; which qualities are commonly called accidents. If any one fhould be afk ed, What is the fubject wherein colour or w.gh inheres? he would have nothing to fay, but the folia extended parts: And if he were demanded, What is it that folidity and extenfion inhere in? he would not be

in a much better cafe than the Indian before mentioned, who, faying that the world was fupported by a great elephant, was asked what the elephant refted on; to which his answer was, A great tortoife. But being again preffed to know what gave fupport to the broadbacked tortoife, replied, Something, he knew not what. And thus here, as in all other cafes where we use words without having clear and diftinct ideas, we talk like children, who being questioned what fuch a thing is, which they know not, readily give this fatisfactory anfwer, That it is fomething: which, in truth, fignifies no more, when so used either by children or men, but that they know not what; and that the thing they pretend to know and talk of, is what they have no diftinct idea of at all, and fo are perfectly ignorant of it, and in the dark. The idea, then, we have, to which we give the general name Subftance, being nothing but the fuppofed, but unknown, fupport of thofe qualities we find exifting, which we imagine cannot fubfift fine re fubftante, without fomething to fupport them, we call that fupport fubftantia, which, according to the true import of the word, is, in plain English, fanding under, or upholding. 3. Of the forts of Subftances.

AN obfcure and relative idea of fubftance in general being thus made, we come to have the ideas of particular forts of fubftances, by collecting fuch combinations of fimple ideas, as are, by experience and obfervation of mens fenfes, taken notice of to exift together, and are therefore fuppofed to flow from the particular internal conftitution, or unknown effence of that fubftance. Thus we come to have the ideas of a man, horse, gold, water, &c. of which fubftances, whether any one has any other clear idea, farther than of certain fimple ideas co-existing together, I appeal to every one's own experience. It is the ordinary qualities obfervable in iron, or a diamond, put together, that make the true complex idea of thofe fubftances, which a fmith or a jeweller commonly knows better than a philofopher; who, whatever fubftantial forms he may talk of, as no other idea of thofe fubftances than what is framed by a col

lection of thofe fimple ideas which are to be found in them only we must take notice, that our complex ideas of fubftances, befides all thofe fimple ideas they are made up of, have always the confufed idea of fomething to which they belong, and in which they fubfift. And therefore, when we fpeak of any fort of fubftance, we fay, it is a thing having fuch or fuch qualities; as body is a thing that is extended, figured, and capable of motion; fpirit, a thing capable of thinking; and fo hardnefs, friability, and power to draw iron, we fay, are qualities to be found in a- loadftone. These, and the like fashions of speaking, intimate, that the fubftance is fuppofed always fomething befides the extenfion, figure, folidity, motion, thinking, or other obfervable ideas, though we know not what it is.

§ 4. No clear Idea of Subftance in general. HENCE, when we talk or think of any particular fort of corporeal fubftances, as harfe, Stone, &c. though the idea we have of either of them be but the complication or collection of thofe feveral fimple ideas of fenfible qualities, which we use to find united in the thing called horfe or ftone; yet because we cannot conceive how they fhould fubfift alone, nor one in another, we fuppose them exifting in and fupported by fome common fubject; which fupport we denote by the name Subftance, though it be certain we have no clear or diftinct idea of that thing we fuppofe a fupport.

$5. As clear an Idea of Spirit as Body.

THE fame happens concerning the operations of the mind, viz. thinking, reafoning, fearing, &c. which we concluding not to fubfift of themselves, nor apprehending how they can belong to body, or be produced by it, we are apt to think thefe the actions of fome other fubftance, which we call spirit: whereby yet it is evident, that having no other idea cr notion of matter, but fomething wherein thofe many fenfible qualities which affect our fenfes, do fubfift; by fuppofing a fubftance, wherein thinking, knowing, doubting, and a power of moving, &c. do fubfift, we have as clear a notion of the fubftance of fpirit, as we have of body; the one being fuppofed

to be (without knowing what it is) the fubftratum to thofe fimple ideas we have from without; and the other fuppofed (with a like ignorance of what it is) to be the fubftratum to thofe operations we experiment in ourselves within. It is plain, then, that the idea of corporeal fubftance in matter, is as remote from our conceptions and apprehenfions, as that of spiritual substance or spirit : and therefore, from our not having any notion of the fubftance of fpirit, we can no more conclude its nonexiftence, than we can, for the fame reafon, deny the existence of body; it being as rational to affirm there is no body, becaufe we have no clear and diftin&t idea of the fubflance of matter, as to fay there is no fpirit, becaufe we have no clear and diftinct idea of the fubftance of a fpirit.

§ 6. Of the forts of Subftances.

WHATEVER, therefore, be the fecret abítract nature of fubftance in general, all the ideas we have of particular difint forts of fubftances are nothing but feveral combinations of fimple ideas, co-exifting in fuch, though, unknown, caufe of their union, as makes the whole fubfift of itself. It is by fuch combinations of fimple ideas, and nothing else, that we reprefent particular forts of fubflances to ourselves; fuch are the ideas we have of their feveral fpecies in our minds; and fuch only do we, by their fpecific name, fignify to others, v. g. man, horfe, fun, water, iron: upon hearing which words, every one who understands the language, frames in his mind a combination of thofe feveral fimple ideas which he has ufually obferved, or fancied to exift together under that denomination; all which he fuppofes to reft in, and be, as it were, adherent to that unknown common subject, which inheres not in any thing elfe. Though, in the mean time, it be manifeft, and every one upon inquiry into his own thoughts will find that he has no other idea of any fubftance, v. g. let it be gold, horfe, iron, man, vitriol, bread, but what he has barely of those fenfible qualities which he fuppofes to inhere, with a fuppofition of fuch a fubftratum, as gives, as it were, a fupport to those qualities or fimple ideas which he has

obferved to exift united together. Thus, the idea of the fun, what is it but an aggregate of thofe feveral fimple ideas, bright, hot, roundith, having a conftant regular motion, at a certain distance from us, and perhaps fome other? as he who thinks and difcourfes of the fun, has been more or lefs accurate in obferving those fenfible qualities, ideas, or properties, which are in that thing which he calls the fun.

§7. Power, a great part of our complex Ideas of Sub

ftances.

FOR he has the perfectelt idea of any of the particular forts of fubftances, who has gathered and put together moft of thofe fimple ideas which do exift in it, among which are to be reckoned its active powers and paffive capacities; which, though not fimple ideas, yet in this refpect, for brevity fake, may conveniently enough be reckoned amongst them. Thus, the power of drawing iron is one of the ideas of the complex one of that fubftance we call a loadflone; and a power to be fo drawn, is a part of the complex one we call iron: which powers pafs for inherent qualities in thofe fubjects. Because every fubftance, being as apt, by the powers we obferve in it, to change fome fenfible qualities in other fubjects, as it is to produce in us thofe fimple ideas which we receive immediately from it, does, by those new fenfible qualities introduced into other fubjects, discover to us thofe powers which do thereby mediately affect our fenfes, as regularly as its fenfible qualities do it immediately. g. we immediately, by our fenfes, perceive in fire its heat and colour, which are, if rightly confidered, nothing but powers in it to produce thofe ideas in us: We alfo, by our senses, perceive the colour and brittleness of charcoal, whereby we come by the knowledge of another power in fire, which it has to change the colour and confiftency of wood. By the former fire immediately, by the latter it mediately difcovers to us these feveral powers, which therefore we look upon to be a part of the qualities of fire, and fo make them at part of the complex ideas of it. For all thofe powers that we take cognifance of, terminating only in the al