any Refpect as he pleafes, viz. a Liberty of chufing as he pleases." Such an one, if he reflected, would either bluth or laugh at his own Inftance. For, is not chufing as he pleafes, conducting, IN SOME RESPECT, according to his Pleafure, and ftill without determining how he came by that Pleafure? If he fays, "Yes, I came by that Pleasure by my own Choice." If he be a Man of common Sense, by this Time he will fee his own Abfurdity: for he muft needs fee that his Notion or Conception, even of this Liberty, don't contain any Judgment or Conception how he comes by that Choice, which first determines his Pleasure, or which originally fixed his own Will refpecting the Affair. Or if fhall fay, any "That a Man exercifes Liberty in this, even in determining his own Choice, but not as he pleases, or not in Confequence of any Choice, Preference, or Inclination of his own, but by a Determination arifing contingently out of a State of abfolute Indifference;" this is not rifing higher in his Conception of Liberty: as fuch a Determination of the Will would not be a voluntary Determination of it. Surely he that places Liberty in a Power of doing fomething not according to his own Choice, or from his Choice, has not a higher Notion of it, than he that places it in doing as he pleases, or acting from his own Election. If there were a Power in the Mind to determine itself, but not by its Choice or according to its Pleasure, what Advantage would it give? and what Liberty, worth contending for, would be exercifed in it? Therefore no Arminian, Pelagian, or Epicurean, can rife higher in his Conceptions of Liberty, than the Notion of it which I have explained: which Notion is, apparently, perfectly confiftent with the whole of that Neceffity of Mens Actions, which I fuppofe takes Place. And I fcruple not to fay 'tis beyond all their Wits to invent a higher Notion, or

form

form a higher Imagination of Liberty; let them talk of Sovereignty of the Will, felf-determining Power, Self-motion, Self-direction, arbitrary Decifion, Liberty ad utrumvis, Power of chufing differently in given Cafes, &c. &c. as long as they will. 'Tis apparent that these Men, in their ftrenuous Affirmation, and Dispute about these Things, aim at they know not what, fighting for fomething they have no Conception of, fubftituting a Number of confused unmeaning Words, inftead of Things, and instead of Thoughts. They may be challenged clearly to explain what they would have: they never can anfwer the Challenge.

The Author of the Effays, through his whole Effay on Liberty and Neceffity, goes on that Supposition, that, in order to the Being of real Liberty, a Man must have a Freedom that is opposed to moral Neceffity: and yet he supposes, P. 175, that fuch a Liberty must fignify a Power in the Mind of acting without and against Motives, a Power of acting without any View, Purpose or Defign, and even of acting in Contradiction to our own Defires and Averfions, and to all our Principles of Action; and is an Abfurdity altogether inconfiftent with a rational Nature. Now, who ever imagined fuch a Liberty as this, a higher Sort or Degree of Freedom, than a Liberty of following one's own Views and Purpofes, and acting agreeable to his own Inclinations and Paffions? Who will ever reasonably fuppofe that Liberty, which is an Abfurdity altogether inconfiftent with a rational Nature, to be a Kind of Liberty above that which is confiftent with the nature of a rational intelligent defigning Agent.

The Author of the Effays feems to fuppofe fuch a Neceffity to take Place, as is inconfiftent with fome fuppofable POWER OF ARBITRARY CHOICE ;, or that there is fome Liberty conceivable, whereby

• P. 169.

Mens

Mens own Actions might be more PROPERLY IN THEIR POWER, and by which Events might be more DEPENDENT ON OURSELVES: Contrary to what I fuppofe to be evident in my Inquiry What Way can be imagined, of our Actions being more in our Power, from ourselves, or dependent on ourfelves, than their being from our Power to fulfil our own Choice, to act from our own Inclination, pursue our own Views, and execute our own Defigns? Certainly, to be able to act thus, is as properly having our Actions in our Power, and dependent on ourselves, as a Being liable to be the Subjects of Acts and Events, contingently and fortuitoufly, without Defire, View, Purpose or Defign, or any Principle of Action within ourselves; as we must be, according to this Author's own declared Senfe, if our Actions are performed with that Liberty that is opposed to moral Neceffity.

This Author seems every where to suppose, that Neceffity, moft properly fo called, attends all Mens Actions; and that the Terms neceffary, unavoidable, impoffible, &c. are equally applicable to the Cafe of moral and natural Neceffity. In P. 173, he says, The Idea of neceffary and unavoidable equally agrees, both to moral and phyfical Neceffity. And in P. 184. All Things that fall out in the natural and moral World are alike neceffary. P. 174. This Inclination and Choice is unavoidably caufed or occafioned by the prevailing Motive. In this lies the Neceffity of our Actions, that in fuch Circumftances it was impoffible we could at otherwife. He often expreffes himself in like Manner elsewhere, fpeaking in ftrong Terms of Mens Actions as unavoidable, what they cannot forbear, having no Power over their own Actions, the Order of them being unalterably fixed, and infeparably linked together, &c. .

On

P. 191, 185, 197, 206. < P. 183. f P. 395, 396. P. 180, 188, 193, 194, 195, 197, 198, 199, 205, 206.

On the contrary, I have largely declared, that the Connection between antecedent Things and confequent ones, which takes Place with regard to the Acts of Mens Wills, which is called moral Neceffity, is called by the Name of Neceffity improperly; and that all fuch Terms as muft, cannot, impoffible, unable, irresistible, unavoidable, invincible, &c. when applied here, are not applied in their proper Signification, and are either ufed nonfenfically, and with perfect Infignificance, or in a Senfe quite diverfe from their original and proper Meaning, and their Ufe in common Speech: and that fuch a Neceffity as attends the Acts of Mens Wills, is more properly called Certainty, than Neceffity; it being no other than the certain Connection between the Subject and Predicate of the Propofition which affirms their Exiftence i.

Agreeable to what is obferved in my Inquiry k, I think it is evidently owing to a strong Prejudice in Perfons Minds, arifing from an infenfible habitual Perversion and Mifapplication of fuch like Terms, as neceffary, impoffible, unable, unavoidable, invincible, &c. that they are ready to think, that to fuppofe a certain Connection of Mens Volitions without any foregoing Motives or Inclinations, or any preceding moral Influence whatsoever, is truly and properly to fuppofe fuch a ftrong irrefragable Chain of Caufes and Effects, as ftands in the Way of, and makes utterly vain, oppofite Defires and Endeavours, like immovable and impenetrable Mountains of Brafs; and impedes our Liberty like Walls of Adamant, Gates of Brafs, and Bars of Iron: whereas all fuch Representations fuggeft Ideas as far from the Truth, as the Eaft is from the Weft. Nothing that

1

Inquiry, P. 18-28, 32, 33, 31, 35, 3, 232, 28-293, 296, 304-308, 397, 398, Inquiry, P. 22—2:4• * P. 289–293.

that I maintain, fuppofes that Men are at all hindered by any fatal Neceffity, from doing, and even willing and chufing as they please, with full Freedom; yea with the highest Degree of Liberty that ever was thought of, or that ever' could poffibly enter into the Heart of any Man to conceive. I know it is in vain to endeavour to make fome Perfons believe this, or at least fully and steadily to believe it: for if it be demonstrated to them, ftill the old Prejudice remains, which has been long fixed by the Ufe of the Terms neceffary, muft, cannot, impoffible, &c. the Affociation with thefe Terms of certain Ideas inconfiftent with Liberty, is not broken; and the Judgment is powerfully warped by it; as a Thing that has been long bent and grown ftiff, if it be ftraitened, will return to its former Curvity again and again.

The Author of the Essays moft manifeftly fuppofes, that if Men had the Truth concerning the real Neceffity of all their Actions clearly in View, they would not appear to themselves, or one another, as at all Praife-worthy or culpable, or under any moral Obligation, or accountable for their Actions": which fuppofes, that Men are not to be blamed or praised for any of their Actions, and are not under any Obligations, nor are truly accountable for any thing they do, by Reason of this Neceffity; which is very contrary to what I have endeavoured to prove, throughout the third Part of my Inquiry. I humbly conceive it is there fhewn, that this is fo far from the Truth, that the moral Neceffity of Mens Actions, which truly take Place, is requifite to the Being of Virtue and Vice, or any thing Praife-wor-. thy or culpable: that the Liberty of Indifference and Contingence, which is advanced in Oppofition to that Neceffity, is inconfiftent with the Being of

! P. 207, 209, and other Places.

thefe ;