ufually in difcourfe and contemplation, that carries the name which operates strongest, and appears moft in the present ftate of the mind: nay, there is, I think, fcarce any of the paffions to be found without defire joined with it. I am fure, wherever there is uneafinefs, there is defire; for we conftantly defire happiness; and whatever we feel of uneafiness, so much it is certain we want of happiness, even in our own opinion, let our ftate and condition otherwife be what it will. Befides, the prefent moment not being our eternity, whatever our enjoyment be, we look beyond the prefent, and defire goes with our forefight, and that ftill carries the will with it; fo that even in joy itfelf, that which keeps up the action, whereon the enjoyment depends, is the defire to continue it, and fear to lofe it; and whenever a greater uneasiness than that takes place in the mind, the will presently is by that determined to fome new action, and the prefent delight neglected.

§ 40. The most preffing Uneafinefs naturally determines

the Will.

BUT we being in this world befet with fundry uneafineffes, distracted with different defires, the next inquiry naturally will be, which of them has the precedency in determining the will to the next action? And to that the aufwer is, That ordinarily which is the most preffing of thofe that are judged capable of being then removed: For the will, being the power of directing our operate faculties to fome action, for fome end, cannot at any time be moved towards what is judged at that time unattainable; that would be to fuppofe an intelligent being defignedly to act for an end, only to lofe its labour, for fo it is to act for what is judged not attainable; and therefore very great uneafineffes move not the will, when they are judged not capable of a cure; they, in that cafe, put us not upon endeavours. But these fet apart, the most important and urgent uneafinefs we at that time feel, is that which ordinarily determines the will facceflively, in that train of voluntary actions which makes up our lives. The greatest present uneasiness is the fpur to action, that is conftantly felt, and for moft part de

241 termines the will in its choice of the next action: For this we must carry along with us, that the proper and only object of the will is fome action of ours, and nothing elfe; for we producing nothing by our willing it, but fome action in our power, it is there the will terminates, and reaches no farther.

§41. All defire Happiness.

If it be farther afked what it is moves defire? I answer, Happiness, and that alone. Happiness and mifery are the names of two extremes, the utmost bounds whereof we know not; it is what eye hath not seen, ear hath not heard, nor hath it entered into the heart of man to conceive. But of fome degrees of both we have very lively impreffions, made by several inftances of delight and joy on the one fide, and torment and forrow on the other; which, for fhortnefs fake, I fhall comprehend under the names of pleasure and pain, there being pleasure and pain of the mind as well as the body; With him is fullness of joy, and pleasure for evermore. Or, to speak truly, they are all of the mind, though fome have their rife in the mind from thought, others in the body from certain modifications of motion.

$42. Happiness, what.

HAPPINESS, then, in its full extent, is the utmost pleafure we are capable of, and mifery the utmoft pain; and the loweft degree of what can be called happiness, is fo much eafe from all pain, and fo much prefent pleasure, as without which any one cannot be content. Now, because pleasure and pain are produced in us by the operation of certain objects, either on our minds or our bodies, and in different degrees; therefore what has an aptnefs to produce pleasure in us, is that we call good; and what is apt to produce pain in us we call evil, for no other reafon, but for its aptnefs to produce pleasure and pain in us, wherein confits our happiness and mifery. Farther, though what is apt to produce any degree of pleasure, be in itself good; and what is apt to produce any degree of pain, be evil; yet it often happens, that we do not call it fo, when it comes in competition with a greater of its fort, because when

they come in competition, the degrees alfo of pleasure and pain have justly a preference; fo that if we will rightly eftimate what we call good and evil, we shall find. it lies much in comparison; for the caufe of every lefs degree of pain, as well as every greater degree of pleafure, has the nature of good, and vice verfa..

$43. What Good is defired, what not. THOUGH this be that which is called good and evil, and all good be the proper object of defire in general, yet all good, even feen, and confeffed to be fo, does not neceffarily move every particular man's defire, but only that part, or fo much of it as is confidered and taken to make a neceffary part of his happiness. All other good, however great in reality or appearance, excites not a man's defires, who looks not on it to make a part of that happinefs, wherewith he, in his prefent thoughts, can fatisfy himfelf. Happiness, under this view, every one conftantly pursues, and defires what makes any part of it; other things, acknowledged to be good, he can look upon without defire, pafs by, and be content without. There is nobody, I think, fo fenfelefs as to deny, that there is pleasure in knowledge; and for the pleasuresof fenfe, they have too many followers to let it be queftioned, whether men are taken with them or no. Now, let one man place his fatisfaction in fenfual pleasures, another in the delight of knowledge; though each of. them cannot but confefs there is great pleafure in what. the other purfues, yet neither of them making the other's delight a part of his happiness, their defires are not moved, but each is fatisfied without what the other enjoys, and fo his will is not determined to the purfuit of. it. But yet as foon as the ftudious man's hunger and. thirst makes him uncafy, he whofe will was never determined to any purfuit of good cheer, poignant fauces, delicious wine, by the pleafant tafte he has found in them, is, by the uneafinefs of hunger and thirst, prefently determined to eating and drinking, though poilibly with great indifferency, what wholefome food comes in his way. And, on the other fide, the epicure buckles to ftudy, when fhame, or the defire to recommend him

2143 felf to his miftrefs, fhall make him uneafy in the want of any fort of knowledge. Thus, how much foever men are in earneft, and conftant in purfuit of happiness, yet they may have a clear view of good, great and con-: feffed goot, without being concerned for it, or moved by it, if they think they can make up their happiness without it; though as to pain, that they are always concerned for; they can feel no uneafinefs without being moved; and therefore, being uneafy in the want of whatever is judged neceffary to their happiness, as foon as any good appears to make a part of their proportion of happinefs, they begin to defire it.

$44. Why the greatest Good is not always defired. THIS, I think, any one may obferve in himself and others, that the greater vifible good does not always raise mens defires, in proportion' to the greatnefs it appears, and is acknowledged to have, though every little trouble. moves us, and fets us on work to get rid of it; the reafon whereof is evident from the nature of our happinefs and mifery itself. A prefent pain, whatever it be, make a part of our prefent mifery; but all abfent good does not at any time make a neceffary part of our prefent happiness, nor the absence of it make a part of our mifery. If it did, we should be conftantly and infinitely miferable; there being infinite degrees of happinefs, which are not in our poffeflion. All uneafness, therefore, being removed, a moderate portion of good ferves at prefent to content men; and fome few degrees of pleature, in a fucceffion of ordinary enjoyments, make up a happiness wherein they can be fatisfied. If this were not fo, there could be no room for thofe indiffe.. rent and visibly trifling actions, to which our wills are fo often determined, and wherein we voluntarily waste fo much of our lives; which remiffhefs could by no means confift with a conftant determination of will or defire to the greatest apparent good. That this is fo, I think few people need go far from home to be convinced; and indeed in this life there are not many whofe happiness reaches fo far as to afford them a constant train of moderate mean pleafurcs, without any mixture of uneaf

1

nefs, and yet they could be content to stay here for ever, though they cannot deny, but that it is poffible there may be a state of eternal durable joys after this life, far furpaffing all the good that is to be found here, Nay, they cannot but fee, that it is more poffible than the attainment and continuation of that pittance of honour, riches, or pleasure, which they pursue, and for which they ne glect that eternal ftate; but yet, in full view of this difference, fatisfied of the poffibility of a perfect, fe-. cure, and lafting happiness in a future ftate, and under a clear conviction, that it is not to be had here, whilft they bound their happiness within fome little enjoy ment, or aim of this life, and exclude the joys of heaven from making any neceffary part of it; their defires are not moved by this greater apparent good, nor their: wills determined to any action, or endeavour for, its attainment.

§ 45 Why not being defired, it moves not the Will. THE ordinary neceffities of our lives fill a great part of them with the uneafiness of hunger, thirst, heat, cold, weari-, nefs with labour, and fleepiness, in their conftant returns,. &c. To which, if befides accidental harms, we add. the fantastical uneafinefs (as itch after honour, power, or: riches, &c.), which acquired habits by fashion, example, and education, have fettled in us, and a thoufand other irregular defires which custom has made natural to us, we shall find, that a very little part of our life is so vacant from these uneafineffes, as to leave us free to the attraction of remoter abient good. We are feldom at cafe, and free enough from the folicitation of our natural or, adopted defires, but a conftant fucceflion of unea-. fineffes out of that stock, which natural wants or acquired habits have heaped up, take the will in their turns; and no fooner is one action dispatched, which by fuch a determination of the will we are fet upon, but another uneasiness is ready to fet us on work: For the removing of the pains we feel, and are at present preffed with, being the getting out of mifery, and confequently the first thing to be done in order to happinefs, abfent good, though thought on, confeffed, and