has of specific names and ideas a little more clear, and to fhow how the complex ideas of modes are referred fometimes to archetypes in the minds of other intelligent beings, or, which is the fame, to the fignification annexed by others to their received names, and fometimes to no archetypes at all. Give me leave also to fhow how the mind always refers its ideas of fubftances, either to the fubftances themfelves, or to the fignification of their names as to the archetypes; and alfo to make plain the nature of fpecies, or forting of things, as apprehended, and made ufe of by us; and of the effences belonging to thofe fpecies, which is perhaps of more moment, to difcover the extent and certainty of our knowledge than we at first imagine.

$44. Inftance of Mixed Modes in Kinneah and Ni

ouph.

LET us fuppofe Adam in the ftate of a grown man, with a good understanding, but in a strange country, with all things new and unknown about him, and no other faculties, to attain the knowledge of them, but what one of this age has now. He obferves Lamech more melancholy than ufual, and imagines it to be from a fufpicion he has of his wife Adah (whom he moft ardently loved), that she had too much kindness for another man. Adam difcourfes these his thoughts to Eve, and defires her to take care that Adah commit not folly: and in these difcourfes with Eve he makes use of these two new words, Kinneab and Nicuph. In time Adam's mistake appears, for he finds Lamech's trouble proceeded from having killed a man: but yet the two names, Kinneah and Nicuph, the one standing for fufpicion, in a husband, of his wife's difloyalty to him, and the other for the act of committing difloyalty, loft not their diftinct fignifications. It is plain then that here were two distinct complex ideas of mixed modes, with names to them, two diftinct fpecies of actions effentially different. I ask wherein confifted the effences of these two diftinct fpecies of action? And it is plain it confifted in a precife combination of fimple ideas, different in one from the other. I ask, whether the complex idea in Adam's mind,

which he called Kinneah, were adequate or no? And it is plain it was; for it being a combination of fimple ideas, which he, without any regard to any archetype, without refpe&t to any thing as a pattern, voluntarily put together, abstracted and gave the name Kinneah to, to exprefs in fhort to others, by that one found, all the fimple ideas contained and united in that complex one, it muft neceflarily follow, that it was an adequate idea; his own choice having made that combination, it had all in it he intended it fhould, and so could not but be perfect, could not but be adequate, it being referred to no other archetype which it was supposed to represent.

$45.

THESE words, Kinneah and Niouph, by degrees grew into common ufe, and then the cafe was fomewhat altered. Adam's children had the fame faculties, and thereby the fame power that he had to make what complex ideas of mixed modes they pleafed in their own minds, to abstract them, and make what founds they pleafed the figns of them. But the ufe of names being to make our ideas within us known to others, that cannot be done but when the fame fign ftands for the fame idea in two who would communicate their thoughts, and difcourfe together. Thofe, therefore, of Adam's children, that found these two words, Kinneah and Niouph, in familiar use, could not take them for infignificant founds, but muft needs conclude they stood for fomething, for certain ideas, abftract ideas, they being general names; which abstract ideas were the effences of the fpecies diftinguished by thofe names. If, therefore, they would ufe these words as names of fpecies already established and agreed on, they were obliged to conform the ideas in their minds fignified by these names, to the ideas that they stood for in other mens minds, as to their patterns and archetypes; and then indeed their ideas of thefe complex modes were liable to be inadequate, as being very apt (especially thofe that confifted of combinations of many fimple ideas), not to be exactly conformable to the ideas in other mens minds, using the fame names, though for this there be ufually a remedy at hand, which is to afk

the meaning of any word we understand not of him that ufes it, it being as impoffible to know certainly what the words jealousy and adultery (which I think answer

NP and DIN), ftand for in another man's mind, with whom I would discourse about them, as it was impoffible, in the beginning of language, to know what Kinneah and Niouph stood for in another man's mind, without explication, they being voluntary figns in every one.

$46. Inflance of Subftances in Zahab.

LET us now alfo confider, after the fame manner, the names of substances in their first application. One of Adam's children roving in the mountains, lights on a glittering fubftance which pleases his eye; home he carries it to Adam, who, upon confideration of it, finds it to be hard, to have a bright yellow colour, and an exceeding great weight. Thefe, perhaps, at firft, are all the qualities he takes notice of in it, and, abstracting this complex idea, confifting of a fubftance having that peculiar bright yellowness, and a weight very great in proportion to its bulk, he gives it the name Zahab, to denote and mark all fubftances that have these fenfible qualities in them. It is evident now, that, in this cafe, Adam acts quite differently from what he did before in forming thofe ideas of mixed modes, to which he gave the name Kinneah and Niouph; for there he puts ideas together only by his own imagination, not taken from the exiftence of any thing, and to them he gave names, to denominate all things that should happen to agree to those his abftract ideas, without confidering whether any fuch thing did exift or no; the standard there was of his own making. But in the forming his idea of this new subftance, he takes the quite contrary courfe: Here he has a ftandard made by nature; and, therefore, being to represent that to himfelf, by the idea he has of it, even when it is abfent, he puts in no fimple idea into his complex one, but what he has the perception of from the thing itself; he takes care that his idea be conformable to this archetype, and intends the name should stand for an idea fo conformable.

§ 47.

THIS piece of matter, thus denominated Zahab by Adam, being quite different from any he had feen before, nobody, I think, will deny to be a diftinct fpecies, and to have its peculiar eflence; and that the name Zahab is the mark of the fpecies, and a name belonging to all things partaking in that effence: But here it is plain, the effence Adam made the name Zahab stand for, was nothing but a body hard, shining, yellow, and very heavy. But in the inquifitive mind of man, not content with the knowledge of thefe, as I may fay fuperficial qualities, puts Adam on farther examination of this matter; he therefore knocks and beats it with flints, to fee what was discoverable in the infide; he finds it yield to blows, but not easily separate into pieces; he finds it will bend without breaking. Is not now ductility to to be added to his former idea, and made part of the effence of the fpecies that name Zahab stands for? Farther trials difcover fufibility and fixedness. Are not they alfo, by the fame reason that any of the others were, to be put into the complex idea fignified by the name Zahab? If not, what reafon will there be shown more for the one than the other? If these must, then all the other properties, which any farther trials thall difcover in this matter, ought by the fame reafon to make a part of the ingredients of the complex idea, which the name Zahab ftands for, and fo be the effences of the species marked by that name; which properties, because they are endless, it is plain, that the idea made after this fashion by this archetype, will be always inadequate.

§ 48. Their Ideas imperfect, and therefore various. BUT this is not all; it would alfo follow, that the names of fubftances would not only have (as in truth they have), but would also be supposed to have different fignifications, as used by different men, which would very much cumber the ufe of language; for if every distinct quality, that were discovered in any matter by any one, were fuppofed to make a neceflary part of the complex idea fignified by the common name given it, it must follow, that men muft fuppofe the fame word to fignify different things,

in different men; fince they cannot doubt but different men may have difcovered feveral qualities in fubftances of the fame denomination, which others know nothing of. § 49. Therefore to fix their Species, a real Effence is

fuppofed.

To avoid this, therefore, they have fuppofed a real effence belonging to every fpecies, from which thefe properties all flow, and would have their name of the species ftand før that. But they not having any idea of that real effence in fubftances, and their words fignifying nothing but the ideas they have, that which is done by this attempt, is only to put the name or found in the place and stead of the thing having that real effence, without knowing what the real effence is; and this is that which men do, when they speak of fpecies of things, as fuppofing them made by nature, and diftinguifhed by real effences.

$50. Which Suppofition is of no use.

FOR let us confider, when we affirm, that all gold is fixed, either it means that fixednefs is a part of the definition, part of the nominal effence the word gold ftands for; and fo this affirmation, all gold is fixed, contains nothing but the fignification of the term gold; or else it means, that fixedness not being a part of the definition of the word gold, is a property of that fubftance itself ; in which cafe, it is plain, that the word gold stands in the place of a fubftance, having the real effence of a fpecies of things made by nature. In which way of subftitution it has fo confufed and uncertain a fignification, that though this propofition, gold is fixed, be in that fense an affirmation of fomething real, yet it is a truth will always fail us in its particular application, and fo is of no rel ufe nor certainty; for let it be never fo true, that all geld, i. e. all that has the real effence of gold, is fixed, what ferves this for, whilft we know not in this fenfe what is or is not gold? For if we know not the real effence of gold, it is impoffible we fhould know what parcel of matter has that effence, and fo whether it be true gold or no.

$51. Conclufion.

To conclude; what liberty Adam had at first to make