Comparing Political Corruption and ClientelismJunichi Kawata Routledge, 2 mar 2017 - 248 pagine Past modernization literature has assumed that corruption and clientelism reflect a pre-modern social structure and could be referred to as a pathologic phenomenon of the political system. Very few have considered corruption and clientelism as structural products of an interwoven connection between capital accumulation, bureaucratic rationalization, interest intermediation and political participation from below. This volume analyzes key aspects of the debate such as: should corruption and clientelism be evaluated as a 'lubricant' in terms of administrative efficiency - legitimate demands from the margins of society to redress social and economic inequality or to readdress economic development? What would be the effect of strengthening policing to control political corruption? Could electoral reform or a decentralization of government power be a cure for all? These questions among others are answered in this comprehensive volume. |
Dall'interno del libro
Risultati 1-5 di 67
Pagina 1857
... Italy Mario Caciagli The Development of Political Clientelism in 20th-century France: Party Networks and Patterns of 'Voter Loyalization' Yohei Nakayama Clientelism's Electoral Connection and its Policy Effects: Comparison between Korea ...
... Italy Mario Caciagli The Development of Political Clientelism in 20th-century France: Party Networks and Patterns of 'Voter Loyalization' Yohei Nakayama Clientelism's Electoral Connection and its Policy Effects: Comparison between Korea ...
Pagina 1862
... Italy, France, Germany and Spain. Among her publications on political corruption are: Lo scambio occulto (1992); Corruzione politica e amministrazione pubblica (1994, with A. Vannucci); Démocratie et corruption en Europe (1995, ed. with ...
... Italy, France, Germany and Spain. Among her publications on political corruption are: Lo scambio occulto (1992); Corruzione politica e amministrazione pubblica (1994, with A. Vannucci); Démocratie et corruption en Europe (1995, ed. with ...
Pagina 1869
... Italy, France and the EU to Korea and Japan. We are convinced that findings acquired in this volume will contribute to making our democracies work better. As mentioned above, there is a parallel in the development of theories of ...
... Italy, France and the EU to Korea and Japan. We are convinced that findings acquired in this volume will contribute to making our democracies work better. As mentioned above, there is a parallel in the development of theories of ...
Pagina 1870
... Italy, different forms of corruption — party, clan, gang, and entrepreneurial corruption — have been distinguished according to the actors who fill the main roles in the coordination of corruption deals. In party corruption, the main ...
... Italy, different forms of corruption — party, clan, gang, and entrepreneurial corruption — have been distinguished according to the actors who fill the main roles in the coordination of corruption deals. In party corruption, the main ...
Pagina 1872
... do much to explain the DC's and LDP's longevity in national government . Finally , Kato and Mershon suggest that in both Italy and Japan , interfactional competition over offices has not only perpetuated incumbency but also.
... do much to explain the DC's and LDP's longevity in national government . Finally , Kato and Mershon suggest that in both Italy and Japan , interfactional competition over offices has not only perpetuated incumbency but also.
Sommario
1858 | |
1866 | |
1880 | |
1916 | |
Multilevel | 1979 |
Internal Party Organization in the Italian Christian | |
The End of the ConservativeReformist Era and | |
Mafia Corrupted Violence and Incivism | |
The Long Life of Clientelism in Southern Italy | |
The Development of Political Clientelism in 20thcentury | |
Index | |
Altre edizioni - Visualizza tutto
Comparing Political Corruption and Clientelism Junichi Kawata,Junʼichi Kawata Visualizzazione estratti - 2006 |
Parole e frasi comuni
actors administration anti-fraud Arlacchi associations Basilicata benefits bosses bribery bribes bureaucrats cabinet Caciagli candidates cent chapter Christian Democrats civic clientele networks clientelistic CLPR coalition Communist competition corrupt exchanges Cosa Nostra countries DC factions Democracy Democrazia Cristiana Diet members districts economic effectiveness elected electoral entrepreneurs European example Gamson predictions Giovanni Falcone illegal incentives individual institutional Italian Italy Japan Japanese junior Korea La Repubblica largest faction legitimacy Mafia Mafiosi Mezzogiorno ministers ministries monitoring Nakasone Palermo Paris parliamentary particularistic party leaders pentito plurality rule political clientelism political corruption political parties Political Science politicians Porta and Vannucci portfolio allocation president presidential presidential systems public resources reform reformist regional relationships rent-seeking role Rose-Ackerman scandal Sicily social social capital Socialists society Southern Italy strategy structure subsidies Tanaka theories of political Tokyo Tommaso Buscetta transaction vertical vertical limited voters votes