Comparing Political Corruption and ClientelismJunichi Kawata Routledge, 2 mar 2017 - 248 pagine Past modernization literature has assumed that corruption and clientelism reflect a pre-modern social structure and could be referred to as a pathologic phenomenon of the political system. Very few have considered corruption and clientelism as structural products of an interwoven connection between capital accumulation, bureaucratic rationalization, interest intermediation and political participation from below. This volume analyzes key aspects of the debate such as: should corruption and clientelism be evaluated as a 'lubricant' in terms of administrative efficiency - legitimate demands from the margins of society to redress social and economic inequality or to readdress economic development? What would be the effect of strengthening policing to control political corruption? Could electoral reform or a decentralization of government power be a cure for all? These questions among others are answered in this comprehensive volume. |
Dall'interno del libro
Risultati 1-5 di 30
Pagina 1856
... Rose - Ackerman 4 Anti - fraud Politics in the European Union : Multi - level Disjuncture of Legitimacy and Effectiveness LO 5 Ariyoshi Ogawa Internal Party Organization in the Italian Christian Democrats and Japanese Liberal Democrats ...
... Rose - Ackerman 4 Anti - fraud Politics in the European Union : Multi - level Disjuncture of Legitimacy and Effectiveness LO 5 Ariyoshi Ogawa Internal Party Organization in the Italian Christian Democrats and Japanese Liberal Democrats ...
Pagina 1862
... Rose- Ackerman). Chapter 2 Alberto Vannucci is Professor of Political Science in the Faculty List of Contributors.
... Rose- Ackerman). Chapter 2 Alberto Vannucci is Professor of Political Science in the Faculty List of Contributors.
Pagina 1863
... Rose-Ackerman is the Henry R. Luce Professor of Law and Political Science at Yale University and holds a Ph.D. in Economics from Yale. She is the author of Corruption: A Study in Political Economy (1978) and Corruption and Government ...
... Rose-Ackerman is the Henry R. Luce Professor of Law and Political Science at Yale University and holds a Ph.D. in Economics from Yale. She is the author of Corruption: A Study in Political Economy (1978) and Corruption and Government ...
Pagina 1866
... Rose-Ackerman, Donatella della Porta, Yves Mény, and Alberto Vannucci are the main proponents in this area (Heywood, 1997; Rose-Ackerman, 1978, 1999; della Porta, 1992; Vannucci, 1997; della Porta and Mény, 1997; della Porta and ...
... Rose-Ackerman, Donatella della Porta, Yves Mény, and Alberto Vannucci are the main proponents in this area (Heywood, 1997; Rose-Ackerman, 1978, 1999; della Porta, 1992; Vannucci, 1997; della Porta and Mény, 1997; della Porta and ...
Pagina 1871
... Rose-Ackerman emphasizes the institutional roots of corruption. She defines corruption as the misuse of public office for private or political gain. In a representative democracy, elected officials should act as the agents of those who ...
... Rose-Ackerman emphasizes the institutional roots of corruption. She defines corruption as the misuse of public office for private or political gain. In a representative democracy, elected officials should act as the agents of those who ...
Sommario
1858 | |
1866 | |
1880 | |
1916 | |
Multilevel | 1979 |
Internal Party Organization in the Italian Christian | |
The End of the ConservativeReformist Era and | |
Mafia Corrupted Violence and Incivism | |
The Long Life of Clientelism in Southern Italy | |
The Development of Political Clientelism in 20thcentury | |
Index | |
Altre edizioni - Visualizza tutto
Comparing Political Corruption and Clientelism Junichi Kawata,Junʼichi Kawata Visualizzazione estratti - 2006 |
Parole e frasi comuni
actors administration anti-fraud Arlacchi associations Basilicata benefits bosses bribery bribes bureaucrats cabinet Caciagli candidates cent chapter Christian Democrats civic clientele networks clientelistic CLPR coalition Communist competition corrupt exchanges Cosa Nostra countries DC factions Democracy Democrazia Cristiana Diet members districts economic effectiveness elected electoral entrepreneurs European example Gamson predictions Giovanni Falcone illegal incentives individual institutional Italian Italy Japan Japanese junior Korea La Repubblica largest faction legitimacy Mafia Mafiosi Mezzogiorno ministers ministries monitoring Nakasone Palermo Paris parliamentary particularistic party leaders pentito plurality rule political clientelism political corruption political parties Political Science politicians Porta and Vannucci portfolio allocation president presidential presidential systems public resources reform reformist regional relationships rent-seeking role Rose-Ackerman scandal Sicily social social capital Socialists society Southern Italy strategy structure subsidies Tanaka theories of political Tokyo Tommaso Buscetta transaction vertical vertical limited voters votes