Comparing Political Corruption and ClientelismJunichi Kawata Routledge, 2 mar 2017 - 248 pagine Past modernization literature has assumed that corruption and clientelism reflect a pre-modern social structure and could be referred to as a pathologic phenomenon of the political system. Very few have considered corruption and clientelism as structural products of an interwoven connection between capital accumulation, bureaucratic rationalization, interest intermediation and political participation from below. This volume analyzes key aspects of the debate such as: should corruption and clientelism be evaluated as a 'lubricant' in terms of administrative efficiency - legitimate demands from the margins of society to redress social and economic inequality or to readdress economic development? What would be the effect of strengthening policing to control political corruption? Could electoral reform or a decentralization of government power be a cure for all? These questions among others are answered in this comprehensive volume. |
Dall'interno del libro
Risultati 1-5 di 29
Pagina 1867
... clientelistic exchange has deep roots. But one must not overlook the fact that the vast corruption scandal which triggered the downfall of the Prima Repubblica opened in 1992 in Milan, a 'modern' city not characterized by clientelism ...
... clientelistic exchange has deep roots. But one must not overlook the fact that the vast corruption scandal which triggered the downfall of the Prima Repubblica opened in 1992 in Milan, a 'modern' city not characterized by clientelism ...
Pagina 1870
... clientelistic machines allow the bosses of public bodies to construct their corrupt machines; monopolistic control of relevant markets is a main resource for the development of entrepreneurs who are able to control public decisions ...
... clientelistic machines allow the bosses of public bodies to construct their corrupt machines; monopolistic control of relevant markets is a main resource for the development of entrepreneurs who are able to control public decisions ...
Pagina 1874
... clientelistic because the peasants were in constant competition for the best strips of land on the latifondo. Vertical relationships and deference to the landlords were more important than horizontal solidarity. At the beginning of the ...
... clientelistic because the peasants were in constant competition for the best strips of land on the latifondo. Vertical relationships and deference to the landlords were more important than horizontal solidarity. At the beginning of the ...
Pagina 1883
... clientelistic type relationships , despite a change of form from traditional to neo - clientelism , would experience ... clientelistic mode of generalized exchange ' . Using this theory , they also explained macro - clientelistic ...
... clientelistic type relationships , despite a change of form from traditional to neo - clientelism , would experience ... clientelistic mode of generalized exchange ' . Using this theory , they also explained macro - clientelistic ...
Pagina 1885
Junichi Kawata. Clientelism and the Relation between Public and Private Why is clientelism generally thought of as a ... clientelistic relationships influence politics , benefits for those who are outside of these relationships tend to ...
Junichi Kawata. Clientelism and the Relation between Public and Private Why is clientelism generally thought of as a ... clientelistic relationships influence politics , benefits for those who are outside of these relationships tend to ...
Sommario
1858 | |
1866 | |
1880 | |
1916 | |
Multilevel | 1979 |
Internal Party Organization in the Italian Christian | |
The End of the ConservativeReformist Era and | |
Mafia Corrupted Violence and Incivism | |
The Long Life of Clientelism in Southern Italy | |
The Development of Political Clientelism in 20thcentury | |
Index | |
Altre edizioni - Visualizza tutto
Comparing Political Corruption and Clientelism Junichi Kawata,Junʼichi Kawata Visualizzazione estratti - 2006 |
Parole e frasi comuni
actors administration anti-fraud Arlacchi associations Basilicata benefits bosses bribery bribes bureaucrats cabinet Caciagli candidates cent chapter Christian Democrats civic clientele networks clientelistic CLPR coalition Communist competition corrupt exchanges Cosa Nostra countries DC factions Democracy Democrazia Cristiana Diet members districts economic effectiveness elected electoral entrepreneurs European example Gamson predictions Giovanni Falcone illegal incentives individual institutional Italian Italy Japan Japanese junior Korea La Repubblica largest faction legitimacy Mafia Mafiosi Mezzogiorno ministers ministries monitoring Nakasone Palermo Paris parliamentary particularistic party leaders pentito plurality rule political clientelism political corruption political parties Political Science politicians Porta and Vannucci portfolio allocation president presidential presidential systems public resources reform reformist regional relationships rent-seeking role Rose-Ackerman scandal Sicily social social capital Socialists society Southern Italy strategy structure subsidies Tanaka theories of political Tokyo Tommaso Buscetta transaction vertical vertical limited voters votes