Comparing Political Corruption and ClientelismJunichi Kawata Routledge, 2 mar 2017 - 248 pagine Past modernization literature has assumed that corruption and clientelism reflect a pre-modern social structure and could be referred to as a pathologic phenomenon of the political system. Very few have considered corruption and clientelism as structural products of an interwoven connection between capital accumulation, bureaucratic rationalization, interest intermediation and political participation from below. This volume analyzes key aspects of the debate such as: should corruption and clientelism be evaluated as a 'lubricant' in terms of administrative efficiency - legitimate demands from the margins of society to redress social and economic inequality or to readdress economic development? What would be the effect of strengthening policing to control political corruption? Could electoral reform or a decentralization of government power be a cure for all? These questions among others are answered in this comprehensive volume. |
Dall'interno del libro
Risultati 1-5 di 60
Pagina 1870
... individual costs and benefits of corruption. In particular, they suggest looking at those mechanisms that reduce the costs of collecting information about, being involved in, and enforcing corrupt deals. Using evidence from Italy ...
... individual costs and benefits of corruption. In particular, they suggest looking at those mechanisms that reduce the costs of collecting information about, being involved in, and enforcing corrupt deals. Using evidence from Italy ...
Pagina 1874
... individual and personal relations, the long dominance of feudal power structures on the periphery, and the failure of a central state authority until the 20th century explain the lack of a participatory political culture in southern ...
... individual and personal relations, the long dominance of feudal power structures on the periphery, and the failure of a central state authority until the 20th century explain the lack of a participatory political culture in southern ...
Pagina 1875
... individual politicians who distribute public resources to their electorates in a continuous and particularistic manner in the expectation of more or less loyal political support ( ' voter loyalization ' ) , has consistently prevailed in ...
... individual politicians who distribute public resources to their electorates in a continuous and particularistic manner in the expectation of more or less loyal political support ( ' voter loyalization ' ) , has consistently prevailed in ...
Pagina 1876
... individual Diet members, and more institutionalized ties show a high degree of stable relations. Rebutting alternative explanations based on cultural differences or developmental gaps, the author suggests an institutionalist view that ...
... individual Diet members, and more institutionalized ties show a high degree of stable relations. Rebutting alternative explanations based on cultural differences or developmental gaps, the author suggests an institutionalist view that ...
Pagina 1897
... individual case studies . In most cases , again we cannot help depending on clues from instances of disclosure based on legal standards.R So , republican theories of political corruption adopt a political standard as the working ...
... individual case studies . In most cases , again we cannot help depending on clues from instances of disclosure based on legal standards.R So , republican theories of political corruption adopt a political standard as the working ...
Sommario
1858 | |
1866 | |
1880 | |
1916 | |
Multilevel | 1979 |
Internal Party Organization in the Italian Christian | |
The End of the ConservativeReformist Era and | |
Mafia Corrupted Violence and Incivism | |
The Long Life of Clientelism in Southern Italy | |
The Development of Political Clientelism in 20thcentury | |
Index | |
Altre edizioni - Visualizza tutto
Comparing Political Corruption and Clientelism Junichi Kawata,Junʼichi Kawata Visualizzazione estratti - 2006 |
Parole e frasi comuni
actors administration anti-fraud Arlacchi associations Basilicata benefits bosses bribery bribes bureaucrats cabinet Caciagli candidates cent chapter Christian Democrats civic clientele networks clientelistic CLPR coalition Communist competition corrupt exchanges Cosa Nostra countries DC factions Democracy Democrazia Cristiana Diet members districts economic effectiveness elected electoral entrepreneurs European example Gamson predictions Giovanni Falcone illegal incentives individual institutional Italian Italy Japan Japanese junior Korea La Repubblica largest faction legitimacy Mafia Mafiosi Mezzogiorno ministers ministries monitoring Nakasone Palermo Paris parliamentary particularistic party leaders pentito plurality rule political clientelism political corruption political parties Political Science politicians Porta and Vannucci portfolio allocation president presidential presidential systems public resources reform reformist regional relationships rent-seeking role Rose-Ackerman scandal Sicily social social capital Socialists society Southern Italy strategy structure subsidies Tanaka theories of political Tokyo Tommaso Buscetta transaction vertical vertical limited voters votes