Comparing Political Corruption and ClientelismJunichi Kawata Routledge, 2 mar 2017 - 248 pagine Past modernization literature has assumed that corruption and clientelism reflect a pre-modern social structure and could be referred to as a pathologic phenomenon of the political system. Very few have considered corruption and clientelism as structural products of an interwoven connection between capital accumulation, bureaucratic rationalization, interest intermediation and political participation from below. This volume analyzes key aspects of the debate such as: should corruption and clientelism be evaluated as a 'lubricant' in terms of administrative efficiency - legitimate demands from the margins of society to redress social and economic inequality or to readdress economic development? What would be the effect of strengthening policing to control political corruption? Could electoral reform or a decentralization of government power be a cure for all? These questions among others are answered in this comprehensive volume. |
Dall'interno del libro
Risultati 1-5 di 67
Pagina 1869
... institutional or structural reform needed? Could an electoral reform or a decentralization of governmental power be the cure-all? We feel keenly that new work on political corruption and clientelism should be done to answer these ...
... institutional or structural reform needed? Could an electoral reform or a decentralization of governmental power be the cure-all? We feel keenly that new work on political corruption and clientelism should be done to answer these ...
Pagina 1871
... institutional roots of corruption. She defines corruption as the misuse of public office for private or political ... institutions. The goals are both to reduce the corrupt incentives facing bribe payers and recipients and to facilitate ...
... institutional roots of corruption. She defines corruption as the misuse of public office for private or political ... institutions. The goals are both to reduce the corrupt incentives facing bribe payers and recipients and to facilitate ...
Pagina 1872
... institution and mechanism within complex European institutions , which , eventually , failed to enhance political legitimacy at either the supranational or national level . Chapter 5 examines how party factions attempt to link their ...
... institution and mechanism within complex European institutions , which , eventually , failed to enhance political legitimacy at either the supranational or national level . Chapter 5 examines how party factions attempt to link their ...
Pagina 1876
... institutional setup, which is cross- nationally different, determines where clientele networks are formed, how extensive they are and how long they can persist. He claims that the configuration of political and social forces, which ...
... institutional setup, which is cross- nationally different, determines where clientele networks are formed, how extensive they are and how long they can persist. He claims that the configuration of political and social forces, which ...
Pagina 1877
... Institutions and Moral Values in a Greek Mountain Community, Oxford University Press, Oxford. Clapham, C. (ed) (1982), Private Patronage and Public Power: Political Clientelism in the Modern State, Frances Pinter, London. della Porta, D ...
... Institutions and Moral Values in a Greek Mountain Community, Oxford University Press, Oxford. Clapham, C. (ed) (1982), Private Patronage and Public Power: Political Clientelism in the Modern State, Frances Pinter, London. della Porta, D ...
Sommario
1858 | |
1866 | |
1880 | |
1916 | |
Multilevel | 1979 |
Internal Party Organization in the Italian Christian | |
The End of the ConservativeReformist Era and | |
Mafia Corrupted Violence and Incivism | |
The Long Life of Clientelism in Southern Italy | |
The Development of Political Clientelism in 20thcentury | |
Index | |
Altre edizioni - Visualizza tutto
Comparing Political Corruption and Clientelism Junichi Kawata,Junʼichi Kawata Visualizzazione estratti - 2006 |
Parole e frasi comuni
actors administration anti-fraud Arlacchi associations Basilicata benefits bosses bribery bribes bureaucrats cabinet Caciagli candidates cent chapter Christian Democrats civic clientele networks clientelistic CLPR coalition Communist competition corrupt exchanges Cosa Nostra countries DC factions Democracy Democrazia Cristiana Diet members districts economic effectiveness elected electoral entrepreneurs European example Gamson predictions Giovanni Falcone illegal incentives individual institutional Italian Italy Japan Japanese junior Korea La Repubblica largest faction legitimacy Mafia Mafiosi Mezzogiorno ministers ministries monitoring Nakasone Palermo Paris parliamentary particularistic party leaders pentito plurality rule political clientelism political corruption political parties Political Science politicians Porta and Vannucci portfolio allocation president presidential presidential systems public resources reform reformist regional relationships rent-seeking role Rose-Ackerman scandal Sicily social social capital Socialists society Southern Italy strategy structure subsidies Tanaka theories of political Tokyo Tommaso Buscetta transaction vertical vertical limited voters votes