Comparing Political Corruption and ClientelismJunichi Kawata Routledge, 2 mar 2017 - 248 pagine Past modernization literature has assumed that corruption and clientelism reflect a pre-modern social structure and could be referred to as a pathologic phenomenon of the political system. Very few have considered corruption and clientelism as structural products of an interwoven connection between capital accumulation, bureaucratic rationalization, interest intermediation and political participation from below. This volume analyzes key aspects of the debate such as: should corruption and clientelism be evaluated as a 'lubricant' in terms of administrative efficiency - legitimate demands from the margins of society to redress social and economic inequality or to readdress economic development? What would be the effect of strengthening policing to control political corruption? Could electoral reform or a decentralization of government power be a cure for all? These questions among others are answered in this comprehensive volume. |
Dall'interno del libro
Risultati 1-5 di 90
Pagina 1865
... Politics in the Graduate School of Law and Politics, the University of Tokyo. He is the author of A Political Experiment in Post-war France: The Fourth Republic and its 'Organized Parties', 1944– 1952 (2002, in Japanese). He has ...
... Politics in the Graduate School of Law and Politics, the University of Tokyo. He is the author of A Political Experiment in Post-war France: The Fourth Republic and its 'Organized Parties', 1944– 1952 (2002, in Japanese). He has ...
Pagina 1867
... political clientelism, referred to as: • a style of vertical mobilized representation (vertical linkage between the elite and the masses) (Barnes, 1977; Nelson, 1977); • a form of mass-oriented adaptation of political parties (Scott ...
... political clientelism, referred to as: • a style of vertical mobilized representation (vertical linkage between the elite and the masses) (Barnes, 1977; Nelson, 1977); • a form of mass-oriented adaptation of political parties (Scott ...
Pagina 1870
... parties lead to party corruption; territorial control from organized crime promotes gang corruption; dispersed control by party appointed politicians favors clan corruption; lack of legal checks on monopoly and conflicts of interest ...
... parties lead to party corruption; territorial control from organized crime promotes gang corruption; dispersed control by party appointed politicians favors clan corruption; lack of legal checks on monopoly and conflicts of interest ...
Pagina 1872
... political legitimacy at either the supranational or national level . Chapter 5 examines how party factions attempt to link their command of offices within the national cabinet to their efforts to build electoral support . Junko Kato and ...
... political legitimacy at either the supranational or national level . Chapter 5 examines how party factions attempt to link their command of offices within the national cabinet to their efforts to build electoral support . Junko Kato and ...
Pagina 1875
... political scandals that exploded in France in the 1980s and 1990s and severely discredited most major parties and their principal leaders did not occur just because the decentralization reforms allowed party politicians to divert more ...
... political scandals that exploded in France in the 1980s and 1990s and severely discredited most major parties and their principal leaders did not occur just because the decentralization reforms allowed party politicians to divert more ...
Sommario
1858 | |
1866 | |
1880 | |
1916 | |
Multilevel | 1979 |
Internal Party Organization in the Italian Christian | |
The End of the ConservativeReformist Era and | |
Mafia Corrupted Violence and Incivism | |
The Long Life of Clientelism in Southern Italy | |
The Development of Political Clientelism in 20thcentury | |
Index | |
Altre edizioni - Visualizza tutto
Comparing Political Corruption and Clientelism Junichi Kawata,Junʼichi Kawata Visualizzazione estratti - 2006 |
Parole e frasi comuni
actors administration anti-fraud Arlacchi associations Basilicata benefits bosses bribery bribes bureaucrats cabinet Caciagli candidates cent chapter Christian Democrats civic clientele networks clientelistic CLPR coalition Communist competition corrupt exchanges Cosa Nostra countries DC factions Democracy Democrazia Cristiana Diet members districts economic effectiveness elected electoral entrepreneurs European example Gamson predictions Giovanni Falcone illegal incentives individual institutional Italian Italy Japan Japanese junior Korea La Repubblica largest faction legitimacy Mafia Mafiosi Mezzogiorno ministers ministries monitoring Nakasone Palermo Paris parliamentary particularistic party leaders pentito plurality rule political clientelism political corruption political parties Political Science politicians Porta and Vannucci portfolio allocation president presidential presidential systems public resources reform reformist regional relationships rent-seeking role Rose-Ackerman scandal Sicily social social capital Socialists society Southern Italy strategy structure subsidies Tanaka theories of political Tokyo Tommaso Buscetta transaction vertical vertical limited voters votes