Comparing Political Corruption and ClientelismJunichi Kawata Routledge, 2 mar 2017 - 248 pagine Past modernization literature has assumed that corruption and clientelism reflect a pre-modern social structure and could be referred to as a pathologic phenomenon of the political system. Very few have considered corruption and clientelism as structural products of an interwoven connection between capital accumulation, bureaucratic rationalization, interest intermediation and political participation from below. This volume analyzes key aspects of the debate such as: should corruption and clientelism be evaluated as a 'lubricant' in terms of administrative efficiency - legitimate demands from the margins of society to redress social and economic inequality or to readdress economic development? What would be the effect of strengthening policing to control political corruption? Could electoral reform or a decentralization of government power be a cure for all? These questions among others are answered in this comprehensive volume. |
Dall'interno del libro
Risultati 1-5 di 57
Pagina 1866
... relationships and structure for that country. The less competitive these three elements are, the more united they become through 'inner profits'. This leads to a love of payoffs as a means unto itself, which engenders a desire for ...
... relationships and structure for that country. The less competitive these three elements are, the more united they become through 'inner profits'. This leads to a love of payoffs as a means unto itself, which engenders a desire for ...
Pagina 1867
... relationships between politicians and voters are largely based on asymmetric, vertical, and subordinate ties. It is ... relationship' (Mintz and Wolf, 1950; Pitts-Rivers, 1954; Foster, 1961, 1963; Campbell, 1964; Wolf, 1966). In the ...
... relationships between politicians and voters are largely based on asymmetric, vertical, and subordinate ties. It is ... relationship' (Mintz and Wolf, 1950; Pitts-Rivers, 1954; Foster, 1961, 1963; Campbell, 1964; Wolf, 1966). In the ...
Pagina 1874
... relationships and deference to the landlords were more important than horizontal solidarity. At the beginning of the democratic Republic, born in 1946, an agrarian reform destroyed the force and the power of the landowners. The old ...
... relationships and deference to the landlords were more important than horizontal solidarity. At the beginning of the democratic Republic, born in 1946, an agrarian reform destroyed the force and the power of the landowners. The old ...
Pagina 1878
... Relationship ' , American Anthropologist , vol . 65 , pp . 1280-94 . Gellner , E. and Waterbury , J. ( eds ) ( 1977 ) ... Relationships in Southern Italy ' , European Journal of Political Research , vol . 1 , pp . 3–34 . Heywood , P. ( ed ) ...
... Relationship ' , American Anthropologist , vol . 65 , pp . 1280-94 . Gellner , E. and Waterbury , J. ( eds ) ( 1977 ) ... Relationships in Southern Italy ' , European Journal of Political Research , vol . 1 , pp . 3–34 . Heywood , P. ( ed ) ...
Pagina 1880
... relationship between aboss and his subordinates' (Oyabun-Kobun Kankei in Japanese) suggests an outmoded phenomenon. From ... relationships became commonly recognizable, it became universally referred to as 'clientelism' or 'patron-client ...
... relationship between aboss and his subordinates' (Oyabun-Kobun Kankei in Japanese) suggests an outmoded phenomenon. From ... relationships became commonly recognizable, it became universally referred to as 'clientelism' or 'patron-client ...
Sommario
1858 | |
1866 | |
1880 | |
1916 | |
Multilevel | 1979 |
Internal Party Organization in the Italian Christian | |
The End of the ConservativeReformist Era and | |
Mafia Corrupted Violence and Incivism | |
The Long Life of Clientelism in Southern Italy | |
The Development of Political Clientelism in 20thcentury | |
Index | |
Altre edizioni - Visualizza tutto
Comparing Political Corruption and Clientelism Junichi Kawata,Junʼichi Kawata Visualizzazione estratti - 2006 |
Parole e frasi comuni
actors administration anti-fraud Arlacchi associations Basilicata benefits bosses bribery bribes bureaucrats cabinet Caciagli candidates cent chapter Christian Democrats civic clientele networks clientelistic CLPR coalition Communist competition corrupt exchanges Cosa Nostra countries DC factions Democracy Democrazia Cristiana Diet members districts economic effectiveness elected electoral entrepreneurs European example Gamson predictions Giovanni Falcone illegal incentives individual institutional Italian Italy Japan Japanese junior Korea La Repubblica largest faction legitimacy Mafia Mafiosi Mezzogiorno ministers ministries monitoring Nakasone Palermo Paris parliamentary particularistic party leaders pentito plurality rule political clientelism political corruption political parties Political Science politicians Porta and Vannucci portfolio allocation president presidential presidential systems public resources reform reformist regional relationships rent-seeking role Rose-Ackerman scandal Sicily social social capital Socialists society Southern Italy strategy structure subsidies Tanaka theories of political Tokyo Tommaso Buscetta transaction vertical vertical limited voters votes