Comparing Political Corruption and ClientelismJunichi Kawata Routledge, 2 mar 2017 - 248 pagine Past modernization literature has assumed that corruption and clientelism reflect a pre-modern social structure and could be referred to as a pathologic phenomenon of the political system. Very few have considered corruption and clientelism as structural products of an interwoven connection between capital accumulation, bureaucratic rationalization, interest intermediation and political participation from below. This volume analyzes key aspects of the debate such as: should corruption and clientelism be evaluated as a 'lubricant' in terms of administrative efficiency - legitimate demands from the margins of society to redress social and economic inequality or to readdress economic development? What would be the effect of strengthening policing to control political corruption? Could electoral reform or a decentralization of government power be a cure for all? These questions among others are answered in this comprehensive volume. |
Dall'interno del libro
Risultati 1-5 di 44
Pagina 1870
... roles in the coordination of corruption deals. In party corruption, the main resources used to reduce transaction costs are party-controlled allocations of careers, candidacies and nominations; in gang corruption, the resources of ...
... roles in the coordination of corruption deals. In party corruption, the main resources used to reduce transaction costs are party-controlled allocations of careers, candidacies and nominations; in gang corruption, the resources of ...
Pagina 1871
... role as an agent of citizens. Corrupt rent-seeking is an illicit and covert activity. Furthering the interests of one's constituents through district-level projects is not corrupt, although it may have undesirable consequences. This ...
... role as an agent of citizens. Corrupt rent-seeking is an illicit and covert activity. Furthering the interests of one's constituents through district-level projects is not corrupt, although it may have undesirable consequences. This ...
Pagina 1884
... role of , as it were , ' innate politics ' , and this can be understood as a ' vertical generalized exchange ' . This theory on clientelism could be termed a ' structuralist theory of clientelism ' . Observed from this perspective , the ...
... role of , as it were , ' innate politics ' , and this can be understood as a ' vertical generalized exchange ' . This theory on clientelism could be termed a ' structuralist theory of clientelism ' . Observed from this perspective , the ...
Pagina 1890
... role in unofficial controls and regulations involving permits and services . In terms of the definitions of public concerns and theories on social systems , corruption was considered the least of the evils that may become prevalent ...
... role in unofficial controls and regulations involving permits and services . In terms of the definitions of public concerns and theories on social systems , corruption was considered the least of the evils that may become prevalent ...
Pagina 1901
... role in political corruption , but political corruption includes various examples of relationships that are not one - on - one in nature . There are other cases included in political corruption , such as patronage involving relatives ...
... role in political corruption , but political corruption includes various examples of relationships that are not one - on - one in nature . There are other cases included in political corruption , such as patronage involving relatives ...
Sommario
1858 | |
1866 | |
1880 | |
1916 | |
Multilevel | 1979 |
Internal Party Organization in the Italian Christian | |
The End of the ConservativeReformist Era and | |
Mafia Corrupted Violence and Incivism | |
The Long Life of Clientelism in Southern Italy | |
The Development of Political Clientelism in 20thcentury | |
Index | |
Altre edizioni - Visualizza tutto
Comparing Political Corruption and Clientelism Junichi Kawata,Junʼichi Kawata Visualizzazione estratti - 2006 |
Parole e frasi comuni
actors administration anti-fraud Arlacchi associations Basilicata benefits bosses bribery bribes bureaucrats cabinet Caciagli candidates cent chapter Christian Democrats civic clientele networks clientelistic CLPR coalition Communist competition corrupt exchanges Cosa Nostra countries DC factions Democracy Democrazia Cristiana Diet members districts economic effectiveness elected electoral entrepreneurs European example Gamson predictions Giovanni Falcone illegal incentives individual institutional Italian Italy Japan Japanese junior Korea La Repubblica largest faction legitimacy Mafia Mafiosi Mezzogiorno ministers ministries monitoring Nakasone Palermo Paris parliamentary particularistic party leaders pentito plurality rule political clientelism political corruption political parties Political Science politicians Porta and Vannucci portfolio allocation president presidential presidential systems public resources reform reformist regional relationships rent-seeking role Rose-Ackerman scandal Sicily social social capital Socialists society Southern Italy strategy structure subsidies Tanaka theories of political Tokyo Tommaso Buscetta transaction vertical vertical limited voters votes