magistrates had been steadily increasing, and at last included, besides the two consuls, the prætors, the ædiles, and the censors, without counting the ten tribunes of the people. All these magistrates together formed the executive government-i.e. they were entrusted with the duty of preserving public order and of watching over the execution of the laws; they were, in fact, what we should call, in the present time, the ministry. We are accustomed to take for granted that in a ministry there exists a general agreement in the political views of the individual members, as well as mutual support and what has lately come to be called 'solidarity'-i.e. the feeling that each member is answerable for the actions of the rest. The ministry of a truly constitutional state forms a complete whole, and must necessarily have the same opinion, at least on all important questions. An independent policy on the part of a single minister or a tendency to opposition is not admissible. Opposition, it is true, is justified in constitutional states, but its place is outside the ministry, and in that place, though it can watch, criticise, and influence the government, it cannot disturb its regular, legal action. CHAP. cohesion magis In Rome such unity of the executive power was never Want of realised, nor was it even aimed at. For, in the first among instance, the right of intercession given to each magis- Roman trate for the purpose of resisting any illegal or inoppor- trates. tune action of his colleague was a fundamental law of the republic and an indispensable safeguard for the protection of personal freedom. And, moreover, even if this had not been the case, yet the manner of electing magistrates could not possibly have had the result of selecting every year homogeneous elements for the formation of the executive government; for the right of election was vested in different assemblies (comitia centuriata and comitia tributa), and the elections took place at different times, consequently under various influences, and independently of one another. Hence not only difference of opinion was often found among the various magistrates of one year, but even determined hostility. Concord and BOOK VI. Effects of the annual officers. agreement among colleagues are frequently praised by the Roman historians as almost an unexpected piece of good fortune, and in times of danger their disputes had often deplorable consequences. In the very midst of the troubles of the Hannibalic war this weakness of the republican constitution was frequently apparent. Nor was it in war only, but also in the internal management of the state, that the same want of a united administration and government was felt; and this want produced at times the very absence and negation of all government when the intercession of the tribunes brought every magisterial action to a standstill. A defect not less serious than the want of unity change of among the magistrates of each year was the want of consistency caused by the annual change of these magistrates. It is true that a consistent policy may not be always desirable. It may even become a curse, if it helps to resist a necessary reform. In the progress of a political community new questions are constantly presenting themselves, and to deal with these is rarely within the power of the same men who have previously advocated other principles. The change of persons is, therefore, absolutely necessary for political growth. But it is evident that this growth cannot be determined by the annual revolution of the sun. It is dependent upon variable contingencies, upon internal and external complications, upon good or bad fortune, and finally upon the accidental .concurrence of leading minds; it can be for a long time restrained by unexpected impediments, then suddenly furthered by fortunate circumstances-in short, it is irregular and beyond all calculation. It was a defect, therefore, in the Roman republic-as it is a defect of every republican constitution-that the change of magistrates was made dependent, not, as it is in modern constitutional countries, merely upon new conformations of political parties, or upon extraordinary events or the rising up of new problems which demand new men for their solution, but upon a cause unconnected with the internal life of the state-in short, that it was made to coincide with certain periods of time previously fixed. The frequent change of magistrates after short periods of office therefore impeded the natural course of development, and interfered, without any internal cause, with the consistency of the administration. New men with new views were constantly called upon to continue a work which they had not begun, and often had to defend principles which they did not hold. The chances of elections were incalculable. Men might be chosen who, not from principle, but from mere whims or personal dislike for their predecessors, defended other views, and thus caused an uncertainty and a vacillation necessarily disadvantageous to the state. CHAP. III. of the The two last-named evils were so serious that they Counterwould have sufficed to injure the Roman state most influence materially had they not been checked by the power of senate. the senate. This body possessed precisely those qualities which were wanting to the magistracy. In opposition to the continual change of the magistrates we find here personified stability, and oneness of will in opposition to the divisions and conflicts of opinion in the many-headed magistracy. The Roman senate was, therefore, the bond of union which held together the centrifugal forces represented by the magistrates. Even in the senate, it is true, different views were held and violent conflicts frequently broke out; but the result of every debate was always a clear resolution of the majority, to which the minority was obliged to submit, and which it could neither prevent by intercession nor annul by disapprobation. Thus the senate determined upon the policy and laid down the In order to decide rival claims of colleagues--for instance, to settle which of the consuls was to carry on a campaign-the Romans availed themselves of the rude process of casting lots, or at the request of the senate the two claimants came to a friendly agreement among themselves. Sometimes the question was decided by a decree of the senate, which was the only proper and sensible mode. At the time of the established authority of the senate the decision was generally given by that body. Mommsen, Röm. Staatsrecht, i. p. 82. By a law of C. Gracchus the senate determined the consular provinces before the elections had taken place. Cic. De Prov. Cons. 2, 3. BOOK Difficulties besetting the elec tion of magistrates. rules destined to guide the action of the magistrates, whose voluntary submission to the authority of the senate was an essential condition for the preservation of order, uniformity, and consistency in the government. At the same time there was in the organization of the senate a guarantee for the further development of political institutions, while its experience, wisdom, and patriotism insured the success of its foreign policy. The election of magistrates by the suffrages of the people is one of the fundamental conditions of every republican constitution, and together with the limitation of the terms of office and the responsibility of officials thus rendered possible, it forms the groundwork of a republic.1 Nothing sounds better in theory than this arrangement. If a whole people by its free choice elects the most suitable man in order to confer upon him public power, it would appear that the state must be in a happy condition. There is but one drawback in the working of this ruleviz. that it has always been found extremely difficult to hit upon the best man, and still more difficult to convince the majority of the people that precisely this man and no other is the best man. Opinions about the fittest choice have always varied considerably, and the necessity has thus arisen for a minority to submit to the decree of a majority. This necessity is in itself no misfortune. For it will occur in all human affairs as long as difference of opinion exists, and as long as laws and measures have to be adopted for the community as a whole. The minority of the people can perhaps more easily consent to submit to a man chosen by the majority than to the laws decreed by the majority. For it may hope upon a new election to carry its candidate, whereas laws as a rule are destined to remain in force for indefinite periods. But a far greater danger than the necessary division of the people in their choice of a leader is caused by the circumstance that offices, as soon as they present personal advantages, are sought for by unworthy men and in an unworthy manner. 1 Comp. Polyb. vi. 14, 8: καὶ μὴν τὰς ἀρχὰς ὁ δῆμος δίδωσι τοῖς ἀξίοις ὅπερ ἐστὶ κάλλιστον ἆθλον ἐν πολιτεία καλοκαγαθίας. It is then no longer the people who seek for the most suitable candidates, but candidates come forward on their own account, proclaim themselves anxious to obtain the suffrages of the people, and vie with one another for the popular favour. The question is now no longer who is the most able man, but who has the greatest influence to secure for himself the largest number of votes. The result is a formal competition for office among rivals who soon resort to very questionable means. The evil had not yet proceeded very far; on the contrary, it was still a period of political innocence at Rome when candidates for office endeavoured to support their claims merely by artificially making their togas more white and shining than those of other citizens in order to attract attention. It was likewise a time of political virtue when, in the year 432 B.C., measures were taken to prevent this harmless proceeding by a law which of course was utterly useless.1 The matter became a little more serious when, in the year 358 B.C., the candidates visited the markets and public assemblies in order to canvass for votes. It was now thought necessary to restrain these electioneering proceedings by a new law. If this law was directed merely against the natural and legitimate endeavours of candidates seeking to obtain votes, and not against really objectionable practices, such as bribery and the like, it was an attempt as foolish and senseless as the attempt to forbid the taking of interest for money loans. A popular election presupposes the solicitation of votes, and candidates must have lawful means at their disposal for obtaining their ends. Perhaps the Roman nobility on making this law (shortly after 366 B.C., the year of the Leges Licinia) flattered themselves with the hope that it would be possible for the ruling families, if free canvassing were restricted, to designate on each occasion the candidates of 1 Liv. iv. 25, 11: Placet tollenda ambitionis causa tribunos legem promul gare, ne cui album in vestimentum addere petitionis liceret causa. 2 The Lex Poetelia de ambitu. Liv. vii. 15, 12: Ea rogatione novorum maxime hominum ambitionem, qui nundinas et conciliabula obire soliti erant, compressam credebant. CHAP. III. |