and the principal means, by which he conceived that end to be attainable, has been the preservation of peace; to that end he has not been unwilling to sacrifice the influence and those principles, which would have been the surest guarantees of the honour and prosperity of France.

The French embassy at Vienna is filled by M. de St. Aulaire, who has the same literary pretensions as M. de Barante. As a man of quality, he is no unfitting personification of the French marquises of the ancient régime; but, although he can boast the graces of a courtier, he is deficient in the penetration and comprehensive activity of a statesman. M. de St. Aulaire has identified himself at Vienna with the politics of Prince Metternich. He has been content to follow and approve, where he ought to have led the Austrian cabinet into a closer alliance with the French government. He might have fanned the incipient jealousies with which Prince Metternich watched the conduct of Russia, in the affairs of the East. He might have convinced the Austrian cabinet that the intimate alliance of Russia and Prussia is a source of numberless perils to her interests, on every side; that, on the West, the issues of the Danube are already guarded by the former power; and, on the East, the influence of Prussia claims an exaggerated preponderance in the Germanic Confederation. It became the duty of a French minister at Vienna, to counteract, by every possible means, the influence which the Czar is said to have acquired over Prince Metternich by the agency of gold-to strengthen the ties which unite Austria to her Sclavonic States-to warn her that her share of the Polish booty is already marked out as the object of Russian conquest or Russian perfidy—and that the interests of Austria are identical with those of France and England, in resisting the common enemy.

We have gone into these details, relating to the diplomatic agents of France, because they are necessary to explain the conduct of the French government, as a member of the Quadruple Alliance, toward the northern states, which met in conference at Töplitz. We now turn to the disturbances which arose out of the Revolution, and which threatened, on three different spots, to kindle the actual hostility of the three powers. We allude to the Belgian revolution, which more

especially affected the government of Prussia ;-the Polish war, by which the sympathies of the French nation were so warmly excited against Russia ;-and the insurrections in Italy, which, for a time, rendered the communications of the French and Austrian governments exceedingly delicate and precarious.

The King of the French immediately perceived the extent of the dangers to which the Belgian revolution exposed him ; and he certainly looked upon that event as one of the most untoward consequences of the Revolution of July. On the one hand, the movement party demanded the immediate union of Belgium with France-without reflecting that such an act would have been a flagrant violation of treaties, and that it would inevitably have led to an open rupture with England-since all parties in this country would have deprecated the possession of Antwerp by the French. The kingdom of the Netherlands had been created, by the policy of England, at the Congress of Vienna. It had been protected from the possible encroachments of France, by a line of fortresses, which were placed under the inspection of the Duke of Wellington. Under these circumstances, Louis Philippe peremptorily refused the union of the two countries, which was secretly proposed to him by the Belgian deputies; and when M. de Lafayette seconded their offers, and suggested the extension of the French frontiers to the Rhine, he replied, “Mon cher Général, souvenez-vous que Jemappes "et Valmy furent suivis de 25 ans de guerre." M. de Talleyrand strengthened the king's resolution; and by his able conduct, the affairs of Belgium were arranged, without awakening the jealousy of England or the hostility of

Prussia.

The difficulties, which arose out of the Polish revolution, exhibited, on the contrary, the irresolute and double-sided policy of Louis Philippe, in its worst colours. The influence of Count Pozzo di Borgo had so entirely paralysed the French ministry, that the demand which had been made by the English government, to join in a common protest, in favour of the existence of Poland, was eluded-and events were left to take their course. The timid notes, which were ultimately addressed to the victorious Czar by the cabinet, were treated with every mark of contempt; and language was

used, which scarcely fell short of the brutal and barbarous address made, on a more public and recent occasion, to the municipality of Warsaw. It cannot be supposed that the same answer would have been made, if France and England had uniformly acted in concert. The Emperor of Russia was emboldened by the hesitating language, and the isolated character, of the representations addressed to him. On that occasion, the fundamental and necessary union of the policy of France and England, which is indispensable to the success of their measures, was lost sight of. The same union ought now to be shown in the nomination of French and English consuls, accredited to the free town of Cracow; a point to which we drew the attention of the public in our last number, and which we are happy to learn has attracted the serious attention of both cabinets. The same union must extend from the east to the west, making itself heard from the divan of the Grand Signior to the mountains of Navarre. As long as France and England speak or act alone, they are listened to with comparative indifference, or they are deceived by paltry excuses; but if they once for all combine their forces, their flags, their diplomatic agents, and their national principles, they will assume an aspect most fitted to command respect, and to consolidate, if it be possible, the peace of the world. France would abandon her part in European politics, if she were not to appreciate all these duties of her position; and she can no more remain neuter between Russia and England, than she can be indifferent to the progress of knowledge, or callous to the invasion of barbarians.

The insurrections which broke out in Italy, soon after the revolution of July, were almost as immediately connected with that great event, as the revolutoin in Poland; and the dangers which seemed to threaten the interests of Austria on the other side of the Alps, appeared to emanate from France. If the French government had countenanced and assisted the revolutionary movements in Modena, Parma, and the States of the Church, it might have been possible to form a state which would have served to counterbalance the influence of Austria in the Lombardo-Venetian kingdom. But the first object was the maintenance of peace-and especially of peace with Austria, whose interests must ultimately lead her to join that

southern coalition to which her principles are opposed. The correspondence of Prince Metternich, at that period, is exceedingly curious; far from pursuing his customary policy of concessions and half-measures, he declared that he was firmly and irrevocably decided to take the most rigorous steps, if they were necessary, to prevent revolutionary principles from penetrating into Italy. M. Casimir Périer, who was at that time president of the council, displayed an equal firmness on his side; and although he did not share the propagandist policy adopted by M. Laffitte, he resolved upon the occupation of Ancona by the French troops. Since that time, a better understanding has arisen between Prince Metternich and the French minister for foreign affairs: the course pursued by the government has been sufficiently repressive to satisfy the chancellor of the Austrian Empire; and since tranquillity has been restored in Italy, the relation of France and Austria may be contemplated with more temper by the former country, and with less apprehension by the latter. Still, the removal of the French troops from Ancona is, perhaps, the object of the increasing display of intimacy and cordiality which has marked the more recent conduct of the Austrian ambassador towards the cabinet of the Tuileries. In the meantime, the French government may be said to have owed its existence to the two opposite characters which it has affected to assume;—at home, it was obliged to boast of having adopted the principles of the revolution of July, in order to retain the support of the liberal party, as long as it required that support;-abroad, its chief object was to abjure the revolutionary designs, which had excited the alarm of all the sovereigns in Europe. To these contradictions, which are more apparent than real, many of the difficulties of its position may be traced.

At whatever sacrifices of consistency, and of political integrity, the stability of the Doctrinaire administration has been obtained,—there is reason to hope, from the conduct of the government, and from the recent language of its most accredited supporters, that it will be able and willing to persevere in a line of foreign policy, more bold and salutary than that which it has hitherto adopted. If the Congress of Töplitz was intended to furnish an opportunity to the Northern Powers, of maturing plans which would virtually reduce the

German Confederation to a mere retinue of princes, dependent on Prussia in the North, and on Austria in the South,-if the policy of Russia is henceforward to be the indirect and invisible, but supreme, rule of the German States,—if the same power which has created a commercial league against England, should succeed in putting a political league into motion against France-if, in short, the statements of the pamphlet, which professes to unveil the secret of that Congress, be not unfounded-then the only hope of the liberal states of Europe is, to dissolve the tie which binds Austria to an alliance so prejudicial to her own interests, and to resist throughout the world the arts, the threats, and the demonstrations, which menace the political and commercial liberties of England and of France. Whether this great warfare be carried on in the cabinet, or in the field, it is one which will demand the unceasing exercise of national energy. We have dwelt at some length on the characters of those who direct the diplomacy of France, because they are instruments in the cause we ourselves perseveringly advocate. But it is not merely by diplomatic address, that the objects, which they ought to have in view, can be attained. They will need the support of public opinion;they must seek all the light that can be collected, to guide them onwards; they will, perhaps, require sacrifices of blood and treasure, to defend the barriers of civilisation, the laws of public justice, and the rights of nations.

ARTICLE XI.

A Letter to the Right Honourable Viscount Melbourne on the present State of the Appellate Jurisdiction of the Court of Chancery and House of Lords. By the Right Honourable Sir EDWARD SUGDEN. London: 1835.

It cannot be denied that the present state of the Chancellorship gives great and general dissatisfaction, to all persons concerned with the administration of justice in the Court of Chancery, or in the House of Lords: and the dissatisfaction appears to us as just as it is general. The reason, however,