APPENDI X.

IN reviewing the foregoing sketch, it occurred,

that a fair analyfis of Ariftotle's logic, would be a valuable addition to the hiftorical branch. A diftinct and candid account of a fyftem that for many ages governed the reasoning part of mankind, cannot but be acceptable to the public. Curiofity will be gratified, in feeing a phantom delineated that fo long fafcinated the learned world; a phantom, which shows infinite genius, but like the pyramids of Egypt or hanging gardens of Babylon, is abfolutely useless unless for raifing wonder. Dr. Reid, profeffor of moral philofophy in the college of Glasgow, relifhed the thought; and his friendship to me prevailed on him, after much folicitation, to undertake the laborious task. No man is better acquainted with Ariftotle's writings; and, without any enthufiaftic attachment, he holds that philosopher to be a firstrate genius.

The logic of Ariftotle has been on the decline more than a century; and is at prefent relegated to schools and colleges. It has occafionally been criticised by different writers; but this is the first attempt to draw it out of its obfcurity into day-light. From what follows, one will be enabled to pafs a true judgement on that work, and to determine whether it ought to make a branch of education. The Doctor's effay, as a capital article in the progrefs and hiftory of the fciences, will be made welcome, even with the fatigue of fqueezing through many thorny paths, before a diftinct view can be got of that ancient and ftupendous fabric.

It

It will at the fame time fhow the hurt that Ariftotle has done to the reafoning faculty, by drawing it out of its natural courfe into devious paths. His artificial mode of reafoning, is no lefs fuperficial than intricate: I fay, fuperficial; for in none of his logical works, is a fingle truth attempted to be proved by fyllogifm that requires a proof: the propofitions he undertakes to prove by fyllogifm, are all of them felf-evident. Take for inftance the following propofition, That man has a power of felf-motion. To prove this, he affumes the following axiom, upon which indeed every one of his fyllogifms are founded, That whatever is true of a number of particulars joined together, holds true of every one feparately; which is thus expreffed in logical terms, Whatever is true of the genus, holds true of every fpecies. Founding upon that axiom, he reafons thus: "All animals have

a power of felf-motion: man is an animal: ergo, "man has a power of felf-motion." Now if all animals have a power of felf-motion, it requires no argument to prove, that man, an animal, has that power and therefore, what he gives as a conclufion or confequence, is not really fo; it is not inferred from the fundamental propofition, but is included in it. At the fame time, the felf-motive power of man, is a fact that cannot be known but from experience; and it is more clearly known from experience than that of any other animal. Now, in attempting to prove man to be a felf motive animal, is it not abfurd, to found the argument on a propofition lefs clear than that undertaken to be demonftrated? What is here obferved, will be found applicable to the greater part, if not the whole, of his fyllogifms.

Unless for the reafon now given, it would appear fingular, that Ariftotle never attempts to ap. ply his fyllogiftic mode of reasoning on any fubject handled by himself: on ethics, on rhetoric,

and

and on poetry, he argues like a rational being, without once putting in practice, any of his own rules. It is not fuppofable that a man of his capacity could be ignorant, how infufficient a fyllogifm is for difcovering any latent truth. He certainly intended his fyftem of logic, chiefly if not folely for difputation: and if fuch was his purpose, he has been wonderfully fuccessful; for nothing can be better contrived for wrangling and difputing without end. He indeed in a manner profeffes this to be his aim, in his books De Sophifticis elenchis.

Some ages hence, when the goodly fabric of the Romish spiritual power fhall be laid low in the dust, and scarce a veftige remain; it will among antiquaries be a curious enquiry, What was the nature and extent of a tyranny, more oppreffive to the minds of men, than the tyranny of ancient Rome was to their perfons. During every step of the enquiry, pofterity will rejoice over mental liberty, no lefs precious than perfonal liberty. The defpotifin of Ariftotle with respect to the faculty of reason, was no less complete, than that of the Bishop of Rome with refpect to religion; and it is now a proper fubject of curiofity, to enquire into the nature and extent of that defpotifm. One cannot perufe the following fheets, without fympathetic pain for the weakness of man with refpect to his nobleft faculty; but that pain will redouble his fatisfaction, in now being left free to the dictates of reafon and common fense.

In my reveries, I have more than once compared Aristotle's logic to a bubble made of foap-water for amusing children; a beautiful figure with fplendid colours; fair on the outfide, empty within. It has for more than two thousand years been the hard fate of Ariftotle's followers, Ixion like, to embrace a cloud for a goddess.But this is more than fufficient for a preface: and I had almoft forgot, that I am detaining my readers from better entertainment, in liftening to Dr. Reid.

A BRIEF

ACCOUNT

O F

ARISTOTLE'S LOGIC.

With REMARKS.

CHA P. I.

Of the First Three Treatifes.

SECT. I. Of the Author.

ARISTOTLE had very uncommon advantages: born in an age when the philofophical fpirit in Greece had long flourished, and was in its greatest vigour brought up in the court of Macedon, where his father was the King's phyfician; twenty years a favourite fcholar of Plato, and tutor to Alexander the Great; who both honoured him with his friendship, and fupplied him with every thing neceffary for the profecution of his enquiries.

Thefe advantages he improved by indefatigable ftudy, and immenfe reading. He was the firft, we know, fays Strabo, who compofed a library. And in this the Egyptian and Pergamenian kings, copied his example. As to his genius, it would be difréfpectful to mankind, not to allow an uncommon share to a man who governed the opinions of the moft enlightened part of the fpecies near two thoufand years.

f

If his talents had been laid out folely for the difcovery of truth and the good of mankind, his laurels would have remained for ever fresh but he feems to have had a greater paflion for fame than for truth, and to have wanted rather to be admired as the prince of philosophers than to be ufeful: fo that it is dubious, whether there be in his character, most of the philofopher or of the fophift. The opinion of Lord Bacon is not without probability, That his ambition was as boundless as that of his royal pupil; the one afpiring at univerfal monarchy over the bodies and fortunes of men, the other over their opinions.If this was the cafe, it cannot be faid, that the philofopher pursued his aim with lefs induftry, lefs ability, or lefs fuccefs than the hero.

His writings carry too evident marks of that philofophical pride, vanity, and envy, which have often fullied the character of the learned. He determines boldly things above all human knowledge; and enters upon the most difficult queftions, as his pupil entered on a battle, with full affurance of fuccefs. He delivers his decifions oracularly, and without any fear of mistake. Rather than confefs his ignorance, he hides it under hard words and ambiguous expreffions, of which his interpreters can make what they pleafe. There is even reafon to fufpect, that he wrote often with affected obfcurity, either that the air of mystery might procure greater veneration, or that his books might be understood only by the adepts who had been initiated in his philofophy.

His conduct towards the writers that went before him has been much cenfured. After the manner of the Ottoman princes, fays Lord Verulam, he thought his throne could not be fecure unless he killed all his brethren. Ludovicus Vives charges

him