and particularly the common fenfe of right and wrong; which accordingly is perceived by all to be perfect, having authority over every individual as the ultimate and unerring standard of morals, even in contradiction to private conviction. Thus, a law in our nature binds us to regulate our conduct by that ftandard: and its authority is univerfally acknowledged; as nothing is more ordinary in every difpute about meum et tuum, than an appeal to common fenfe as the ultimate and unerring standard.

At the fame time, as that ftandard, through infirmity or prejudice, is not confpicuous to every individual; many are mifled into erroneous opinions, by mistaking a falfe ftandard for that of nature. And hence a diftinction between a right and a wrong fenfe in morals; a diftinction which every one understands, but which, unless for the conviction of a moral standard, would have no meaning.

The final caufe of this branch of our nature is confpicuous. Were there no standard of right and wrong for determining endless controverfies about matters of intereft, the ftrong would have recourse to force, the weak to cunning, and fociety would diffolve. Courts of law could afford no remedy; for without a standard of morals, their decifions would be arbitrary, and of no authority. Happy it is for men to be provided with fuch a standard it is neceffary in fociety that our actions be uniform with respect to right and wrong; and in order to uniformity of action, it is neceffary that our perceptions of right and wrong be alfo uniform to produce fuch uniformity, a ftandard of morals is indifpenfable. Nature has provided us with that ftandard, which is daily applied by courts of law with fuccefs (a).

(a) Elements of Criticism, vol. 2. p. 490, edit, 5,

In reviewing what is faid, it must afford great fatisfaction, to find morality established upon the folid foundations of intuitive perception; which is a fingle mental act complete in itself, having no dependence on any antecedent propofition. The most accurate reasoning affords not equal conviction; for every fort of reafoning, as explained in the sketch immediately foregoing, requires not only felf-evident truths or axioms to found upon, but employs over and above various propofitions to bring out its conclufions. By intuitive perception folely, without reasoning, we acquire knowledge of right and wrong; of what we may do, of what we ought to do, and of what we ought to abftain from and confidering that we have thus greater certainty of moral laws than of any propofition difcoverable by reafoning, man may well be deemed a favourite of heaven, when he is fo admirably qualified for doing his duty. The moral fenfe or confcience is the voice of God within us; conftantly admonishing us of our duty, and requiring from us no exercife of our faculties but attention merely. The celebrated Locke ventured what he thought a bold conjecture, That moral duties are fufceptible of demonftration how agreeable to him would have been the discovery, that they are founded upon intuitive perception,' ftill more convincing and authoritative!

By one branch of the moral fenfe, we are taught what we ought to do, and what we ought

to do; and by another branch, what we may do, or leave undone. But fociety would be imperfect, if the moral fenfe ftopped here. There is a third branch that makes us accountable for our conduct to our fellow-creatures; and it will be made evident afterward in the third sketch, that we are accountable to our Maker, as well as to our fellow-creatures.

4

It

It follows from the standard of right and wrong, that an action is right or wrong, independent of what the agent may think. Thus, when a man, excited by friendship or pity, refcues a heretic from the flames, the action is right, even tho' he think it wrong, from a conviction that heretics ought to be burnt. But we apply a different ftandard to the agent: a man is approved and held to be innocent in doing what he himself thinks right: he is difapproved and held to be guilty in doing what he himself thinks wrong. Thus, to affaffinate an atheist for the fake of religion, is a wrong action; and yet the enthufiaft who commits that wrong, may be innocent and one is guilty, who against conscience eats meat in Lent, though the action is not wrong. In short, an action is perceived to be right or wrong, independent of the actor's own opinion: but he is approved or difapproved, held to be innocent or guilty, according to his own opinion.

SE C T. III.

Laws of Nature respecting our Moral Conduct in Society.

A Standard being thus established for regulating our moral conduct in fociety, we proceed to inveftigate the laws that refult from it. But first we take under confideration, what other principles concur with the moral fenfe to qualify men for fociety.

When we reflect on the different branches of human knowledge, it might feem, that of all fubjects human nature fhould be the best understood; because every man has daily opportunities to ftudy it, in his own' paffions and in his own actions. But hu

man

man nature, an interefting fubje&t, is feldom left to the investigation of philofophy. Writers of a fweet difpofition and warm imagination, hold, that man is a benevolent being, and that every man ought to direct his conduct for the good of all, without regarding himself but as one of the number (a). Those of a cold temperament and contracted mind, hold him to be an animal entirely felfish; to evince which, examples are accumulated without end (6). Neither of these fyftems is that of nature. The selfish fyftem is contradicted by: the experience of all ages, affording the clearest evidence, that men frequently act for the fake of others, without regarding themselves, and fome, times in direct oppofition to their own interest *. And however much felfishnefs may prevail in action; man cannot be an animal entirely selfish, when all men confpire to put a high estimation upon generofity, benevolence, and other focial virtues: even the most selfish are difgufted with felfishness in others, and endeavour to hide it in themselves. The most zealous patron of the felfish principle, will not venture to maintain, that it renders us altogether indifferent about our fellow-creatures. Laying afide self-interest with every connection of love and hatred, good fortune happening to any one gives pleafure to all, and bad fortune happening to any one is painful to all. On the other hand, the system of universal benevolence, is no lefs contradictory to experience; from which we learn, that men com. monly are difpofed to prefer their own intereft before that of others, especially where there is no strict connection:

(b) Helvetius.

(a) Lord Shaftesbury. *Whatever wiredrawn arguments may be urged for the selfish system, as if benevolence were but refined selfishness, the emptiness of fuch arguments will clearly appear when applied to children, who know no refinement. In them, the rudiments of the focial principle are no lefs visible than of the felfish principle. Nothing is more common, than mutual good-will and fondnefs between children; which must be the work of nature; for to reflect upon what is one's intereft, is far above the capacity of children.

connection: nor do we find that fuch bias is condemned by the moral sense. Man in fact is a complex being, compofed of principles, fome benevolent, fome selfish: and these principles are fo juftly blended in his nature, as to fit him for acting a proper part in fociety. It would indeed be lofing time to prove, that without fome affection for his fellow-creatures he would be ill qualified for fociety. And it will be made evident afterward (a), that uni-, verfal benevolence would be more hurtful to fociety, than even abfolute selfishness *

V

We are now prepared for investigating the laws that refult from the foregoing principles. The fe-> veral duties we owe to others fhall be firft difcuffed, taking them in order according to the extent of their influence. And for the fake of perfpicuity, I fhall first present them in a general view, and then proceed to particulars. Of our duties to others, one there is fo extenfive, as to have for its object all the innocent part of mankind. It is the duty that prohibites us to hurt others: than which no law is more clearly dictated by the moral fenfe; nor is the tranfgreffion of any other law more deeply stamped with the character of wrong. A man may be hurt externally in his goods, in his perfon, in his relations, and in his reputation. Hence the laws, Do not fteal; Defraud not others; Do not kill nor wound; Be not guilty of defamation. A man may be hurt internally, by an action that occafions to him diftrefs of mind, or by being impreffed with

cr

(a) Sect. 4.

falfe

+ Many moralifts enter fo deeply into one paffion or bias of human nature, that, to ufe the painter's phrafe, they quite overcharge it. "Thus I have feen a whole fyftem of morals founded upon a fingle "pillar of the inward frame; and the entire conduct of life and all the "characters in it accounted for, fometimes from fuperftition, fometimes "from pride, and moft commonly from interest.. They forget how "various a creature it is they re painting; how many fprings and weights, nicely adjufted and balanced, enter into the movement, and require allowance to be made for their feveral clogs and impulfes, ere, σε you can define its operation and effects." Enquiry into the life and writings of Homer.