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very criminal, fenfible that he ought to be punished, dreads punishment from others; and this dread, however fmothered during profperity, breaks out in adverfity, or in depreflion of mind: his crime ftares him in the face, and every accidental misfortune is in his disturbed imagination interpreted to be a punishment: "And they faid one to another, We are verily guilty concerning "our brother, in that we faw the anguifh of his "foul, when he befought us; and we would not

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hear therefore is this diftrefs come upon us. "And Reuben anfwered them, faying, Spake "I not unto you, faying, Do not fin against "the child; and ye would not hear? therefore be"hold alfo his blood is required (a).” *

No

(a) Genefis, xlii. 21.

John Duke of Britany, commonly termed the Good Duke, illuftrious for generofity, clemency, and piety, reigned forty-three years, wholly employed about the good of his fubjects. He was fucceeded by his eldest fon Francis, a prince weak and fufpicious, and confequently liable to be misled by favourites. Arthur of Montauban, in love with the wife of Gilles, brother to the Duke, perfuaded the Duke that his brother was laying plots to dethrone him. Gilles being imprisoned, the Duke's best friends conjured him to pity his unhappy brother, who might be imprudent, but affuredly was innocent;all in vain. Gilles being profecuted before the three eftates of the province for high treason, was unanimously abfolved; which irritated the Duke more and more. Arthur of Montauban artfully fuggefted to his mafter to try poison; which having miscarried, they next refolved to starve the prifoner to death. The unfortunate prince, through the bars of a window, cried aloud for bread; but the paffengers durft not fupply him. One poor woman only had courage more than once to flip fome bread within the window. He charged a priest, who had received his confeffion, to declare to the Duke, "That feeing juftice was refused him in this world, he appealed to Heaven; and called upon the Duke to appear before the "judgement-feat of God in forty days." The Duke and his favourite, amazed that the prince lived fo long without nourishment, employed affaffins to fmother him with his bed-cloaths. The priest, in obedience to the orders he had received, presented himself before the Duke, and with a loud voice cited him in name of the deceased Lord Gilles to appear before God in forty days. Shame and remorfe verified the prediction. The Duke was feized with a fudden terror; and the image of his brother expiring by his orders, haunted him day and night. He decayed daily without any marks of a regular disease, and died within the forty days in frightful agony.

See this fubject further illuftrated in the Sketch Principles and Progress of Theology, chap. I.

No tranfgreffion of felf-duty efcapes punishment, more than tranfgreffion of duty to others. The punishments, though not the fame, differ in degree more than in kind. Injustice is punifhed with remorfe: impropriety with fhame, which is remorse in a lower degree. Injuftice raises indignation in the beholder, and fo doth every flagrant impropriety flighter improprieties receive a milder punishment, being rebuked with fome degree of contempt, and commonly with derifion (a).

So far we have been led in a beaten track; but in attempting to proceed, we are entangled in mazes and intricacies. An action well intended may happen to produce no good; and an action ill intended may happen to produce no mischief: a man overawed by fear, may be led to do mischief against his will; and a perfon, mistaking the ftandard of right and wrong, may be innocently led to do acts of injuftice.By what rule, in fuch cafes, are rewards and punishments to be applied? Ought a man to be rewarded when he does no good, or punished when he does no mifchief; ought he to be punished for doing mifchief against his will, or for doing mischief when he thinks he is acting innocently? These questions suggest a doubt, whether the standard of right and wrong be applicable to rewards and punishments.

We have seen that there is an invariable standard of right and wrong, which depends not in any degree on private opinion or conviction. By that ftandard, all pecuniary claims are judged, all claims of property, and in a word, every demand founded on intereft, not excepting reparation, as will afterward appear. But with refpect to the moral characters

(a) See Elements of Criticism, chap. 10.

characters of men, and with respect to rewards and punishments, a different standard is erected in the common fense of mankind, neither rigid nor inflexible; which is, the opinion that men have of their own actions. It is mentioned above, that a man is esteemed innocent in doing what he himself thinks right, and guilty in doing what he himself thinks wrong. In applying this ftandard to rewards and punishments, we reward those who in doing wrong are however convinced that they are innocent; and punish those who in doing right are however convinced that they are guilty.* Some, it is true, are fo perverted by improper education or by fuperftition, as to efpoufe numberless abfurd tenets, contradictory to the standard of right and wrong; and yet fuch men are no exception from the general rule: if they act according to conscience, they are innocent, and safe against punishment, however wrong the action may be ; and if they act against confcience, they are guilty and punishable, however right the action may be: it is abhorrent to every moral perception, that a guilty perfon be rewarded, or an innocent perfon punished. Further, if mifchief be done con. trary to Will, as where a man is compelled by fear or by torture, to reveal the fecrets of his party; he may be grieved for yielding to the weakness of his nature, contrary to his firmeft refolves; but he has no check of. confcience, and upon that account is not liable to punishment. And lastly, in order that perfonal merit and demerit may not in any measure depend on chance, we are fo conftituted as to place innocence and guilt, not on the event, but on the intention of doing right or wrong; and accordingly, whatever

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* Virtuous and vicious, innocent and guilty, fignify qualities both of men and of their actions. Approbation and difapprobation, praise and blame, fignify certain emotions or fentiments of thofe who fee or conemplate men and their actions.

be the event, a man is praised for an action well intended, and condemned for an action ill intended.

But what if a man intending a certain wrong, happen by accident to do a wrong he did not intend; as, for example, intending to rob a warren by fhooting the rabbits, he accidentally wounds a child unfeen behind a bufh? The delinquent ought to be punished for intending to rob; and he is alfo fubjected to repair the hurt done to the child but he cannot be punished for the accidental wound; because our nature regulates punishment by the intention, and not by the event *.

A crime against any primary virtue is attended with severe and never-failing punishment, more efficacious than any that have been invented to enforce municipal laws on the other hand, the preferving primary virtues inviolate, is attended with little merit. The fecondary virtues are directly oppofite: the neglecting them is not attend

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*During the infancy of nations, pecuniary compofitions for crimes were universal; and during that long period very little weight was laid upon intention. This proceeded from the cloudinefs and obfcurity of moral perceptions among barbarians, making no diftinction between reparation and pecuniary punishment. Where a man does mischief intentionally, or is verfans in illicito, as expreffed in the Roman law, he is justly bound to repair all the harm that enfues, however accidentally; and from the refemblance of pecuniary punishment to reparation, the rule was childishly extended to punishment. But this rule, fo little confiftent with moral principles, could not long fubfift after pecuniary compofitions gave place to corporal punishment; and accordingly, among civilized nations, the law of nature is reftored, which prohibits punishment for any mischief that is not intentional. The English must be excepted, who remarkably tenacious of their original laws and customs, preferve in force, even as to capital punishment, the above-mentioned rule that obtained among barbarians, when pecuniary compofitions were in vigour. The following paffage is from Hales (Pleas of the Crown, chap. 39.) "Regularly he that voluntarily and knowingly intends hurt to "the perfon of a man, as for example to beat him, though he intend (6 not death, yet if death enfues, it excufeth not from the guilt of mur"der, or manflaughter at least, as the circumstances of the cafe happen." And Fofter, in his Crown-law teaches the fame doctrine, never once fufpecting in it the least deviation from moral principles. "A fhoot"eth at the poultry of B, and by accident killeth a man: if his intention was to fteal the poultry, which must be collected from cir"cumstances, it will be murder by reason of that felonious intent; but "if it was done wantonly, and without that intention, it will be barely "manslaughter." (p. 259.)

ed with any punishment; but the practice of them is attended with illuftrious rewards. Offices of undeserved kindness, returns of good for ill, generous toils and fufferings for our friends or for our country, are attended with confcioufnefs of felf-merit, and with univerfal praife and admiration; the highest rewards a generous mind is fufceptible of.

From what is faid, the following obfervation will occur: The pain of tranfgreffing juftice, fidelity, or any duty, is much greater than the pleasure of performing; but the pain of neglecting a generous action, or any fecondary virtue, is as nothing compared with the pleasure of performing. Among the vices oppofite to the primary virtues, the most striking moral deformity is found; among the fecondary virtues the most striking moral beauty.

TH

SECT. VI.

Laws refpecting Reparation.

HE principle of reparation is made a branch of the moral fyftem for accomplishing two ends: which are, to reprefs wrongs that are not criminal, and to make up the lofs fustained by wrongs of whatever kind. With refpect to the former, reparation is a fpecies of punishment: with refpect to the latter, it is an act of justice. These ends will be better understood, after afcertaining the nature and foundation of reparation; to which the following divifion of actions is neceffary. First, actions that we are bound to perform. Second, actions that we perform in profecution of a right

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