Power Versus Prudence: Why Nations Forgo Nuclear Weapons
T. V. Paul, Teleglobe Raoul-Dandurand Chair of Strategic and Diplomatic Studies, Linda Paul, Université du Québec à Montréal. Centre d'études des politiques étrangères et de sécurité
McGill-Queen's Press - MQUP, 2000 - 227 pagine
With the end of the Cold War, nuclear non-proliferation has emerged as a central issue in international security relations. While most existing works on nuclear proliferation deal with the question of nuclear acquisition, T.V. Paul explains why some states – over 185 at present – have decided to forswear nuclear weapons even when they have the technological capability or potential capability to develop them, and why some states already in possession of nuclear arms choose to dismantle them.
In Power versus Prudence Paul develops a prudential-realist model, arguing that a nation's national nuclear choices depend on specific regional security contexts: the non-great power states most likely to forgo nuclear weapons are those in zones of low and moderate conflict, while nations likely to acquire such capability tend to be in zones of high conflict and engaged in protracted conflicts and enduring rivalries. He demonstrates that the choice to forbear acquiring nuclear weapons is also a function of the extent of security interdependence that states experience with other states, both allies and adversaries. He applies the comparative case study method to pairs of states with similar characteristics – Germany/Japan, Canada/Australia, Sweden/Switzerland, Argentina/Brazil – in addition to analysing the nuclear choices of South Africa, Ukraine, South Korea, India, Pakistan, and Israel. Paul concludes by questioning some of the prevailing supply side approaches to non-proliferation, offering an explication of the security variable and its linking of nuclear proliferation with protracted conflicts and enduring rivalries.
Power versus Prudence will be of interest to students of international relations, policy-makers, policy analysts, and the informed public concerned with the questions of nuclear weapons, non-proliferation, and disarmament.
T.V. Paul is an associate professor in the Department of Political Science, McGill University. He has published several books and numerous articles on international security and the politics of nuclear weapons, including Asymmetric Conflicts: War Initiation by Weaker Powers, The Absolute Weapon Revisited: Nuclear Arms and the Emerging International Order, and International Order and the Future of World Politics.
Cosa dicono le persone - Scrivi una recensione
Nessuna recensione trovata nei soliti posti.
Explaining Nuclear Forbearance
Germany and Japan
Canada and Australia
Sweden and Switzerland
Argentina and Brazil
Nuclear Choices of South Africa Ukraine and South Korea
Altre edizioni - Visualizza tutto
acquire nuclear weapons alliance Argentina argued arms control Australia Bomb Brazil Canada Canadian China co-operation Cold Cold War conventional countries decision enduring rivalries especially factors forgo nuclear weapons Germany's hard realists high conflict IAEA increased independent nuclear India India's nuclear Israel Japan Japan's Non-Nuclear Policy Japanese military Minister missiles moderate conflict NATO negative security externalities neighbours neutrality non-great power non-nuclear policy non-proliferation regime norms nuclear acquisition nuclear arms nuclear attack nuclear capability nuclear choices nuclear deterrent nuclear energy nuclear forbearance nuclear force nuclear non-proliferation nuclear option nuclear policy nuclear program nuclear proliferation nuclear test nuclear umbrella nuclear weapons program Pakistan plutonium political potential protracted conflicts reactor realism region security dilemma security environment security interdependence security policies South Africa South Korea Soviet Union strategic superpowers Sweden Swedish Swiss Switzerland tactical nuclear weapons technologically capable territory tion treaty u.S. nuclear Ukraine United weap West Germany zone