The first of these BUTS intimates a fuppofition in the mind of fomething otherwise than it should be; the latter shows, that the mind makes a direct oppofition between that, and what goes before it.

Fifthly, All animals have fenfe; BUT a dog is an animal; here it fignifies little more, but that the latter propofition is joined to the former, as the minor of a fyllogifm.

§ 6.

To thefe, I doubt not, might be added a great many other fignifications of this particle, if it were my bufinefs to examine it in its full latitude, and consider it in all the places it is to be found, which if one should do, I doubt, whether in all thofe manners it is made use of, it would deferve the title of difcretive, which grammarians give to it. But I intend not here a full explication of this fort of figns. The inftances I have given in this one, may give occafion to reflect upon their use and force in language, and lead us into the contemplation of feveral actions of our minds in difcourfing, which it has found a way to intimate to others by these particles; fome whereof conftantly, and others in certain constructions, have the fenfe of a whole sentence contained. in them.

CHAP. VIII.

OF ABSTRACT AND CONCRETE TERMS.

§ 1. Abstract Terms not predicable one of another, and

T

why.

HE ordinary words of language, and our common ufe of them, would have given us light into the nature of our ideas, if they had been but confidered with attention. The mind, as has been fhown, has a power to abstract its ideas, and fo they became effences, general effences, whereby the forts of things are diftinguished. Now each abftract idea being distinct, so that of any two the one can never be the other, the mind will, by its intuitive knowledge, perceive their difference; and there-fore in propofitions, no two whole ideas can ever be af

firmed one of another. This we fee in the common ufe of language, which permits not any two abstract words, or names of abftract ideas, to be affirmed one of another. For how near of kin foever they may feem to be, and how certain foever it is, that man is an animal, or rational, or white, yet every one at first hearing perceives the falfehood of thefe propofitions, bumanity is animality, or ra tionality, or whiteness; and this is as evident as any of the most allowed maxims. All our affirmations then are only inconcrete, which is the affirming, not one abstract idea to be another, but one abstract idea to be joined to another; which abftract ideas, in fubftances, may be of any fort; in all the reft, are little elfe but of relations; and in substances the most frequent are of powers: v. g. a man is white, fignifies that the thing that has the ef fence of a man, has alfo in it, the effence of whitenefs, which is nothing but a power to produce the idea of whitenefs in one, whole eyes can difcover ordinary ob jects; or a man is rational, fignifies that the fame thing that hath the effence of a man, hath alfo in it the effence of rationality, i. e. a power of reafoning.

$2. They foow the difference of our Ideas. THIS diftinction of names fhows us alfo the difference of our ideas; for if we obferve them, we shall find that our fimple ideas have all abstract, as well as concrete names; the one whereof is (to fpeak the language of grammarians) a fubftantive, the other an adjective; as whiteness, white; fweetness, fweet. The like alfo holds in our ideas of modes and relations; as juftice, juft; equality, equal, only with this difference, that fome of the concrete names of relations amongst men chiefly are fubftantives; as paternitas, pater; whereof it were easy to render a reafon. But as to our ideas of fubftances, we have very few or no abftract names at all; for though the schools have introduced animalitas, humanitas, corporietas, and fome others, yet they hold no proportion with that infinite number of names of substances, to which they never were ridiculous enough to attempt the coining of abftract ones; and thofe few that the schools forged, and put into the mouths of their fcholars, could

never yet get admittance into common ufe, or obtain the licence of public approbation; which feems to me at least to intimate the confeffion of all mankind, that they have no ideas of the real effences of fubftances, fince they have not names for fuch ideas; which no doubt they would have had, had not their confciousness to themselves of their ignorance of them, kept them from fo idle an attempt. And therefore, though they had ideas enough to distinguish gold from ftone, and metal from wood, yet they but timorously ventured on fuch terms, as aurietas and faxietas, metallietas and lignietas, or the like names, which should pretend to fignify the real effences of those fubftances, whereof they knew they had no ideas. And indeed it was only the doctrine of fubftantial forms, and the confidence of miftaken pretenders to a knowledge that they had not, which first coined, and then introduced animalitas, and humanitas, and the like; which yet went very little farther than their own schools, and could never get to be current amongst understanding men. Indeed, humanitas was a word familiar amongft the Romans, but in a far different sense, and ftood not for the abftract effence of any substance, but was the abstract name of a mode, and its concrete humanus, not homo.:

CHAP. IX.

OF THE IMPERFECTION OF WOrds.

1. Words are used for recording and communicating our Thoughts.

FR

ROM what has been faid in the foregoing chapters, it is eafy to perceive what imperfection there is in language, and how the very nature of words makes it almost unavoidable for many of them to be doubtful and uncertain in their fignifications. To examine the perfection or imperfection of words, it is neceffary first to confider their use and end; for as they are more or lefs fitted to attain that, fo are they more or lefs perfect. We have in the former part of this difcourfe, often upon eccafion mentioned a double ufe of words.

First, One for the recording of our own thoughts. Secondly, The other for the communicating of our thoughts to others.

§2. Any Words will ferve for recording. As to the firft of thefe, for the recording our own thoughts for the help of our own memories, whereby, as it were, we talk to ourselves, any words will ferve the turn; for fince founds are voluntary and indifferent figns of any ideas, a man may ufe what words he pleases, to fignify his own ideas to himself; and there will be no imperfection in them, if he conftantly use the fame fign for the fame idea, for then he cannot fail of having his meaning understood, wherein confists the right use and perfection of language.

§3. Communication by words, Civil or Philofophical. SECONDLY, As to communication of words, that too has a double use.

I. Civil.

11. Philofophical.

First, By their civil ufe, I mean fuch a communication of thoughts and ideas by words, as may ferve for the upholding common converfation, and commerce, about the ordinary affairs and conveniencies of civil life, in the focieties of men one amongst another.

Secondly, By the philofophical ufe of words, I mean fuch an use of them, as may ferve to convey the precife notions of things, and to exprefs, in general propofitions, certain and undoubted truths, which the mind may rest upon and be fatisfied with, in its fearch after true knowledge. These two ufes are very diftinct; and a great deal lefs exactnefs will ferve in the one than in the other, as we shall fee in what follows.

§ 4. The Imperfection of Words is the Doubtfulness of their Signification.

THE chief and of language in communication being to be understood, words ferve not for that end, neither in civil nor philofophical difcourfe, when any word does not excite in the hearer the fame idea which it stands for in the mind of the speaker. Now fince founds have

no. natural connection with our ideas, but have all their fignification from the arbitrary impofition of men, the doubtfulness and uncertainty of their fignification, which is the imperfection we here are speaking of, has its caufe more in the ideas they stand for, than in any incapacity there is in one found more than in another to fignify any idea; for in that regard they are all equally perfect.

That then which makes doubtfulness and uncertainty in the fignification of fome more than other words, is the difference of ideas they ftand for.

$5. Caufes of their Imperfection.

WORDS having naturally no fignification, the idea which each ftands for must be learned and retained by thofe, who would exchange thoughts, and hold intelligible difcourfe with others in any language. But this is hardest to be done, where,

First, The ideas they stand for are very complex, and made up of a great number of ideas put together.

Secondly, Where the ideas they stand for have no certain connection in nature, and fo no fettled ftandard, any where in nature exifting, to rectify and adjust them by.

Thirdly, Where the fignification of the word is referred to a standard, which standard is not fo eafy to be known.

Fourthly, Where the fignification of the word, and the real effence of the thing, are not exactly the fame.

Thefe are difficulties that attend the fignification of feveral words that are intelligible: those which are not intelligible at all, fuch as names ftanding for any simple ideas, which another has not organs or faculties to attain, as the names of colours to a blind man, or founds to a deaf man, need not here be mentioned.

In all these cafes we fhall find an imperfection in words, which I fhall more at large explain, in their particular application to our feveral forts of ideas: For if we examine them, we fhall find that the names of mixed modes are most liable to doubtfulness and imperfection, for the twa