this the case concerning their popular Divinities? Do they ever represent these as the only foundation and support of the belief of a Deity?

3. Lastly, The Philosophers held a PRINCIPLE (and we are now about to enter upon that matter) which was inconsistent with a future state of rewards and punishments: in consequence of which, they formally, and in express words, disclaim and reject all such state and condition. But I know of no principle they held, inconsistent with the belief of a God; nor of any declarations they ever made against such belief. We conclude, therefore, that the two cases are altogether dissimilar and unrelated.

SECT. IV.

NOTWITHSTANDING this full evidence against the PHILOSOPHERS; I much doubt, the general prejudice in their favour, supported by the reasonableness of the doctrine itself, will be yet apt to keep the reader's opinion on this point suspended.

I shall therefore, in the last place, explain the CAUSES which withheld the Philosophers from believing and these will appear to have been certain fundamental PRINCIPLES of the ancient Greek Philosophy, altogether inconsistent with the doctrine of a future state of rewards and punishments.

But to give this its due force, it will be proper to premise, that the constitution of that Philosophy,

being above measure refined and speculative, it was always wont to judge and determine rather on METAPHYSICAL than on MORAL maxims; and to stick to all consequences, how absurd soever, which were seen to arise from the former.

Of this, we have a famous instance in the ancient Democritic Philosophy: which holding, that not only sensations, but even the cogitations of the mind, were the mere passion of the Thinker; and so, all knowledge and understanding, the same thing with sense; the consequence was, that there could not be any error of false judgment; because all passion was true passion, and all appearance true appearFrom hence it followed, that the sun and moon were no bigger than they seemed to us: and these men of reason chose rather to avow this conclusion, than to renounce the metaphysic principle which led them into it.

ance.

So just is that censure which a celebrated French writer passes upon them: when the Philosophers once besot themselves with a prejudice, they are even more incurable than the People themselves; because they besot themselves not only with the prejudice, but with the false reasonings employed to support it *.

* Quand les philosophes s'entêtent une fois d'un prejugé, ils sont plus incurables que le peuple même; parce qu'ils s'entêtent également & du prejugé & des fausses raisons dont ils le soutiennent. Fontenelle, Hist. des Oracles.

The

The regard to metaphysic principles being so great, the Greek Philosophers (as we shall see) must needs reject the doctrine of a future state of rewards and punishments, how innumerable and invincible soever the moral arguments are which may be brought to support it. For now we come to shew, that there were two METAPHYSICAL PRINCIPLES concerning GOD and the SOUL, universally embraced by all, which necessarily exclude all notion of a future state of reward and punishment.

The FIRST PRINCIPLE, which led the Philosophers to conclude against such a state was, THAT GOD COULD NEITHER BE ANGRY NOR HURT ANY ONE. This, Cicero assures us, was held universally; as well by those who believed a Providence, as by those who believed not: "At hoc quidem COMMUNE EST OMNIUM PHILOSOPHORUM, non eorum modo, qui Deum nihil habere ipsum negotii dicunt, & nihil exhibere alteri: sed

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eorum etiam qui Deum semper agere aliquid & "moliri volunt, NUMQUAM NEC IRASCI DEUM " NEC NOCERE What conclusion the Epicucureans drew from hence (those who, he here says, held, Deum nihil habere ipsum negotii), he tells us in another place, by the mouth of Velleius their spokesman." Intelligitur enim" (an expression denoting that, in this point, the philosophers were agreed)" à beata, immortalique natura, & iram " & gratiam segregari: quibus remotis, nullos a *Offic. lib. iii. сар. 28.

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superis

"superis impendere METUS." And that the other Sects drew the same conclusion (which infers the denial of a future state of rewards and punishments) we shall now see by Cicero himself, who speaks for them all.

He is here commending Regulus for preferring the public good to his own, and the honest to the profitable; in dissuading the release of the Carthaginian prisoners, and returning back to certain misery, when he might have spent his age at home in peace and pleasure. All this, he observes, was done out of regard to his oath. But it may, perhaps, says he, be objected, what is there in an oath ? The violator need not fear the wrath of Heaven; for all Philosophers hold, that God cannot be angry nor hurt any one. He replies, that, indeed, it was a consequence of the principle of God's not being angry, that the perjured man had nothing to fear from divine vengeance: but then it was not this fear, which was really NOTHING, but justice and good faith, which made the sanction of an oath. The learned will chuse to hear him in his own words. "M. Atilius Regulus Carthaginem rediit: neque

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eum caritas patriæ retinuit, nec suorum. Neque vero tum ignorabat se ad crudelissimum hostem, " & ad exquisita supplicia proficisci Sed jusjurandum conservandum putabat. Quid est igitur, dixerit quis, in jurejurando? Num iratum "timemus jovem ? At hoc quidem commune * De Nat. Deor. 1. i. c. 17.

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est

"est omnium philosophorum.-NUMQUAM NEC; IRASCI DEUM, NEC NOCERE.-Hæc quidem "ratio non magis contra Regulum, quam contra

omne jusjurandum valet: Sed in jurejurando, non qui metus, sed quæ vis sit, debet intelligi. "Est enim jusjurandum affirmatio religiosa: Quod

autem affirmatè, quasi Deo teste, promiseris, id "tenendum est: Jam enim non ad iram Deorum,

quæ NULLA EST; sed ad justitiam & ad finem pertinet *. It is true, the same Tully says t, "deos placatos pietas efficiet et sanctitas," which looks as if he thought the Gods might be angry; and that, therefore, by quæ nulla est, in the words above, he did not mean, what the words imply,que vana et commentitia est; but, what they do not imply-quæ nihil ad rem pertinet. But placatos is not here used in the strict specific sense of appeased, which infers preceding anger; but in the more loose generic sense of propitious, which infers no such thing. And my reason for understanding the word in this sense, is, that, two or three lines afterwards, he declares it to be the opinion of the Philosophers (to which he agrees) Deos non nocere : But this opinion was founded on that other, in question, Deos non irasci.

Here then, we see, Tully owns the consequence of this universal principle; that it overthrew the notion of divine punishments: And it will appear

* Cap. 26, 27, 28, 29. VOL. III.

+ Offic. ii. 3.

K

presently,