they held their mind in an eternal suspense, and continued going on disputing against every thing, without ever finding the probable to determine their judgments. O Academiam volaticam & sui similem, modo huc modo illuc*, says the man whose business it was to shew only its fair side. And indeed how could it be otherwise, when, as he himself tells us, in the case of the same Arcesilaus, they endeavoured to prove, that the moment, or weight of evidence, on each side the question, was exactly equalHuic rationi, quod erat consentaneum, faciebat, ut contra omnium sententias dies jam plerosque deduceret: [diceret] ut cum in eadem re paria contrariis in partibus momenta rationum invenirentur, facilius ab utraque parte adsentio sustineretur. This they held to be the case, even in the most important subjects, such as the SOUL. And in the most interesting questions concerning it, as whether it was, in its nature, MORTAL or IMMORTAL.-Quod intelligi quale sit vix potest: et quicquid est, mortale sit, an æternum? Nam utraque in parte multa dicuntur. Horum aliquid vestro sapienti certum videtur: nostro ne quid maxime quidem probabile sit, occurrit: ita sunt in plerisque contrariarum rationum PARIA MOMENTA †.

Thus it appears, that the sect was thoroughly sceptical : And Sextus Empiricus, a master of * Ep. ad Att. I. 13.

+ See note [K] at the end of this Book.

See note [L] at the end of this Book.

this argument, says no less: who, though he denies the Academics and Pyrrhonians to be exactly the same, as some ancients affirmed, because, though both agreed that truth was not to be found, yet the Academics held there was a difference in those things which pretended to it (the mystery of which has been explained above) yet owns that Arcesilaus and Pyrrho had one common philosophy *. Origen, or the author of the fragment that goes under his name, seems to have transcribed the opinion of those whom Sextus hints at. "But another sect "of philosophers (says he) was called the Academic, "because they held their disputations in the Aca❝demy.

Pyrrho was the head and founder of

Φασὶ μένλοί τινες ὅτι ἡ ̓Ακαδημαϊκή φιλοσοφία ή αυτή επι τῇ σκέψει. Ο μέν τι ̓Αρκεσίλα, ὃν τῆς μέσης ̓Ακαδημίας, ἐλέγομεν εἶναι προςάτην καὶ ἀρχηγὸν, πάνο μοι δοκεῖ τοῖς Πυῤῥωνείοις

κοινωνεῖν λόγοις, ὡς μίαν εἶναι σχηδὸν τὴν κατ'

αὐτὸν ἀγωγὴν καὶ τὴν

ἡμετέραν. nulégav. Hypot. Pyrh. lib. i. c. 33. Agellius, too, assures us, that the difference between the two sects amounted to just nothing. Vetus autem quæstio et a multis scriptoribus Græcis tractata est, in quid et quantum Pyrrhonios et Academicos Philosophos intersit. Utrique enim ΣΚΕΠΤΙΚΟΙ, ἐφεκτικοί, ἀπορητικοί, dicuntur, quoniam utrique nihil affirmant, nihilque comprehendi putant- -differre tamen inter sese--vel maxime propterea existimati sunt. Academici quidem ipsum illud nihil posse comprehendi, quasi comprehendunt, et nihil posse decerni quasi decernunt: Pyrrhonii ne id quidem ullo pacto videri verum dicunt, quod nihil esse verum videtur. l. ii. c. 5.

"these; from whom they were called Pyrrhonians. "He first of all brought in the Axalaλnía, or in"comprehensibility, as an instrument to enable "them to dispute on both sides the question, without proving or deciding any thing**

But now a difficulty arises which will require some explanation. We have represented the Academy as entirely sceptical: We have represented Socrates a dogmatist; and yet on his sole authority, as we are assured by Tully, did this sect hold its principles of knowing nothing and disputing all things. The true solution seems to be this:

1. SOCRATES, to deter his hearers from all studies but those of morality, was perpetually representing the obscurity, in which all other lay involved: not only affirming that he knew nothing of them, but that nothing could be known; while, in Morals, he was a dogmatist, as appears largely by Xenophon, and the less fabulous parts of Plato. But Arcesilaus and Carneades took him at his word, when he said he knew nothing; and extended that principle of uncertainty ad omne scibile.

2. Again, the adversaries, with whom Socrates had to deal, in his project of discrediting natural

* Άλλη δὲ αἵρεσις φιλοσόφων ἐκλήθη ̓Ακαδεμαϊκή, διὰ τὸ ἐν τῇ ̓Ακαδημίᾳ τὰς διατριβὰς αὐτὸς ποιεῖσθαι, ὧν ἄρξας ὁ Πύῤῥων, ἀφ' * Πυῤῥώνιοι ἐκλήθησαν φιλόσοφοι, τὴν ἀκαλαληψίαν ἁπάντων πρῶτο εἰσήγαγεν, ὡς ἐπιχειρεῖν μὲν εἰς ἑκάτερα, μὴ μένιοι ἀποφαί verbau pandey. Orig. Philosophica, wepì 'Anaònu.

knowledge,

knowledge, and of recommending the study of morality, were the SOPHISTS properly so called; a race of men, who, by their eloquence and fallacies, had long kept up the credit of Physics, and much vitiated the purity of Morals: And These being the Oracles of science at that time in Athens, it became the modesty and humility of his pretensions, to attack them covertly, and rather as an enquirer than a teacher. This produced the way of disputing by interrogation; from the inventor, called the Socratic: And as this could not be carried on but under a professed admiration of their wisdom, and acquiescence in their decisions, it gave birth to the famous Attic Irony*. Hence it appears, his method of confutation must begin in doubt; be carried on in turning their own arms against them, and end in advancing nothing of his own.

Now Arcesilaus and Carneades having, as we say, extravagantly extended the Socratic principle of knowing nothing; easily mistook this other, of advancing nothing of his own, when disputing with the Sophists, as a necessary consequence of the former; and so made that a general rule for their school, which, in their master, was only an occasional and confined practice.

* Socrates autem de se ipse detrahens in disputatione, plus tribuebat iis, quos volebat refellere. Ita cum aliud diceret atque sentiret, libenter uti solitus est ea dissimulatione, quam Græci sigorian vocant. Acad. 1. ii. c. 5.

£ 3

On

On these two mistaken principles was the New Academy erected. 1. Omnia latere in occulto, nec esse quidquam, quod cerni aut intelligi possit. 2. Quibus de causis nihil oportere neque profiteri, neque affirmare quemquam, neque assertione approbare *.

They of the OLD ACADEMY †, who came first after Socrates, did, with more judgment, decline their master's method of disputation; easily perceiving that it was adapted to the occasion: and that to make it a general practice, and the characteristic of their school, would be irrational and absurd. But the MIDDLE and NEW, instead of profiting by this sage conduct of their Predecessors, made it a handle to extol their own closer adherence to their Master; and an argument that they were returned to his true principles, from which the old had licentiously digressed. A passage in Cicero will justify these observations; and these observations will explain that passage, which, I presume, without them would not be thought very intelligible. Thus the Roman Orator expresses himself, under the character of an Academic : Primùm, inquam, deprecor, ne me, tanquam philosophum, putetis scholam vobis aliquam explicaturum quod ne in ipsis quidem philosophis magnopere unquam probavi: quando enim Socrates, qui parens philosophiæ jure dici potest, quidquam *Acad. Quæst. lib. i. c. 12.

+ See note [M] at the end of this Book.

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