us.

How far then mixed modes which admit of the various combinations of simple different ideas, and their infinite modes, are from being few and scanty, we may easily imagine. So that before we have done, we shall see that nobody need be afraid he shall not have scope and compass enough for his thoughts to range in, though they be, as I pretend, confined only to simple ideas received from sensation or reflection, and their several combinations.

Motion, thinking, and power have been most modified.

I

§. 10. It is worth our observing, which of all our simple ideas have been most modified, and had most mixed ideas made out of them, with names given to them; and those have been these three; thinking and motion (which are the two ideas which comprehend in them all action) and power, and from whence these actions are conceived to flow. The simple ideas, say, of thinking, motion, and power, have been those which have been most modified, and out of whose modifications have been made most complex modes, with names to them. For action being the great business of mankind, and the whole matter about which all laws are conversant, it is no wonder that the several modes of thinking and motion should be taken notice of, the ideas of them observed, and laid up in the memory, and have names assigned to them; without which, laws could be but ill made, or vice and disorder repressed. Nor could any communication be well had amongst men, without such complex ideas, with names to them and therefore men have settled names, and supposed settled ideas in their minds of modes of action distinguished by their causes, means, objects, ends, instruments, time, place, and other circumstances, and also of their powers fitted for those actions v. g. boldness is the power to speak or do what we intend, before others, without fear or disorder; and the Greeks call the confidence of speaking by a peculiar name, appnoía: which power or ability in man, of doing ang thing, when it has been acquired by frequent doing the same thing, is that idea we name habit; when it is forward, and ready upon every occa

sion to break into action, we call it disposition. Thus testiness is a disposition or aptness to be angry.

To conclude: Let us examine any modes of action, v. g. consideration and assent, which are actions of the mind; running and speaking, which are actions of the body; revenge and murder, which are actions of both together and we shall find them but so many collections of simple ideas, which together make up the complex ones signified by those names.

words seem

nify action, the effect. signify but

§. I. Power being the source from Several whence all action proceeds, the substances wherein these powers are, when they exerting to sig this power into act, are called causes; and the substances which thereupon are produced, or the simple ideas which are introduced into that subject by the exerting of that power, are called effects. The efficacy whereby the new substance or idea is produced, is called, in the subject exerting that power, action; but in the subject wherein any simple idea is changed or produced, it is called passion which efficacy, however various, and the effects almost infinite, yet we can, I think, conceive it, in intellectual agents, to be nothing else but modes of thinking and willing; in corporeal agents, nothing else but modifications of motion. I say, I think we cannot conceive it to be any other but these two; for whatever sort of action, besides these, produces any effects, I confess inyself' to have no notion or idea of; and so its quite remote from my thoughts, apprehensions, and knowledge; and as much in the dark to me as five other senses, or as the ideas of colours to a blind man: and therefore many words, which seem to express some action, signify nothing of the action or modus operandi at all, but barely the effect, with some circumstances of the subject wrought on, or cause operating; v. g. creation, annihilation, contain in them no idea of the action or manner whereby they are produced, but barely. of the cause, and the thing done. And when a countryman says the cold freezes water, though the word freezing seems to import some action, yet truly it signifies nothing but the effect, viz. that water that was

before fluid is become hard and consistent, without containing any idea of the action whereby it is done.

Mixed

inodes made

also of other ideas.

6. 12. I think I shall not need to remark here, that though power and action make the greatest part of mixed modes, marked by names, and familiar in the minds and mouths of men; yet other simple ideas, and their several combinations, are not excluded: much less, I think, will it be necessary for me to enumerate all the mixed modes, which have been settled, with names to them. That would be to make a dictionary of the great part of the words made use of in divinity, ethicks, law, and politicks, and several other sciences. All that is requisite to my present design, is, to show what sort of ideas those are which I call mixed modes, how the mind comes by them, and that they are compositions. made up of simple ideas got from sensation and reflection which, I suppose, I have done,

Ideas of sub

of

CHAP. XXIII.

our complex Idea of Substances.

§. 1. THE mind being, as I have destances how clared, furnished with a great number of the simple ideas, conveyed in by the senses,

made.

as they are found in exterior things, or by reflection on its own operations, takes notice also, that a certain number of these simple ideas go constantly together; which being presumed to belong to one thing, and words being suited to common apprehensions, and made use of for quick dispatch, are called, so united in one subject, by one name: which, by inadvertency, we are apt afterward to talk of, and consider as one simple idea, which indeed is a complication of many ideas together; because as I have said, not imagining how these simple ideas can subsist by themselves, we accustom ourselves to suppose some sub

Our idea of

substance in general.

stratum wherein they do subsist, and from which they do result; which therefore we call substance (1). §. 2 So that if any one will examine himself concerning his notion of pure substance in general, he will find he has no other idea of it at all, but only a supposition of he knows not what support of such qualities, which are capable of producing simple ideas in us; which qualities are commonly called accidents. If any one should be asked, what is the subject wherein colour or

(1) This section, which was intended only to show how the indivi duals of distinct species of substances came to be looked upon as simple ideas, and so to have simple names, viz. from the supposed substratum of substance, which was looked upon as the thing itself in which inhered, and from which resulted that complication of ideas, by which it was represented to us, hath been mistaken for an account of the idea of substance in general; and as such, hath been represented in these words; But how comes the general idea of substance to be framed in our minds? Is this by abstracting and enlarging simple ideas? No: But it is by a complication of many simple ideas together: because, 'not imagining how these simple ideas can subsist by themselves, we accustom ourselves to suppose some substratum wherein they do sub'sist, and from whence they do result; which therefore we call sub'stance.' And is this all, indeed, that is to be said for the being of substance, That we accustom ourselves to suppose a substratum ? Is that custom grounded upon true reason, or not? If not, then accidents or modes must subsist of themselves; and these simple ideas need no tortoise to support them: for figures and colours, &c. would do well enough of themselves, but for some fancies men have accustomed themselves to.

To which objection of the bishop of Worcester, our author * answers thus: Herein your lordship seems to charge me with two faults: one, That I make the general idea of substances to be framed, not by abstracting and enlarging simple ideas, but by a complication of many simple ideas together: the other, as if I had said, the being of substance had no other foundation but the fancies of men.

As to the first of these, I beg leave to remind your lordship, that I say in more places than one, and particularly Book 3. Chap. 3. §. 6. and Book 1. Chap. 11. §. 9. where, ex professo, I treat of abstraction and general ideas, that they are all made by abstracting, and therefore could not be understood to mean, that that of substance was made any other way; however my pen might have slipt, or the negligence of expression, where I might have something else than the general idea of substance in view, might make me seem to say so.

That I was not speaking of the general idea of substance in the passage your lordship quotes, is manifest from the title of that chapter, which * In his first letter to the bishop of Worcester.

weight inheres, he would have nothing to say, but the solid extended parts: and. if he were demanded, what is it that solidity and extension adhere in, he would Hot be in a much better case than the Indian beforementioned, who, saying that the world was supported by a great elephant, was asked what the elephant rested on; to which his answer was, a great tortoise. But being again pressed to know what gave support to the broad-backed tortoise, replied, something, he knew not what. And thus here, as in all other cases where

is, Of the complex ideas of substances: and the first section of it, which your lordship cites for those words you have set down.

In which words I do not observe any that deny the general idea of substance to be made by abstracting, nor any that say it is made by a complication of many simple ideas together. But speaking in that place of the ideas of distinct substances, such as man, horse, gold, &c. I say they are made up of certain combinations of simple ideas, which combinations are looked upon, each of them, as one simple idea, though they are many; and we call it by one name of substance, though made up of modes, from the custom of supposing a substratum, wherein that combination does subsist. So that in this paragraph I only give an account of the idea of distinct substances, such as oak, elephant, iron, &c. how, though they are made up of distinct complications of modes, yet they are looked on as one idea, called by one name, as making distinct sorts of substance.

But that my notion of substance in general is quite different from these, and has no such combination of simple ideas in it, is evident from the immediate following words, where I say, The idea of pure substance in general, is only a supposition of we know not what support of such qualities as are capable of producing simple ideas in us.' And these two I plainly distinguish all along, particularly where I say, 'what6 ever therefore be the secret and abstract nature of substance in gene⚫ral, all the ideas we have of particular distinct substances, are nothing but several combinations of simple ideas, co-existing in such, though ' unknown cause of their union, as makes the whole subsist of itself."

The other thing laid to my charge, is, as if I took the being of substance to be doubtful, or rendered it so by the imperfect and ill-grounded idea I have given of it. To which I beg leave to say, that I ground not the being, but the idea of substance, on our accustoming ourselves to suppose some substratum; for it is of the idea alone I speak there, and not of the being of substance. And having every where affirmed and built upon it, that a man is a substance, I cannot be supposed to question or doubt of the being of substance, till I can question or doubt of my own being. Farther, I say, † Sensation convinces us, that there are + Ib. § 29.

B. 2. C. 23. § 2.