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Identity of art and intuitive knowledge.
Corollaries and Before proceeding further, it may be well to draw explanations. cgftgjji consequences from what has been established and to add some explanations.
We have frankly identified intuitive or expressive knowledge with the aesthetic or artistic fact, taking works of art as examples of intuitive knowledge and attributing to them the characteristics of intuition, and vice versa. But our identification is combated by a view held even by many philosophers, who consider 1art to be an intuition of an altogether special sort. 'Let us admit" (they say) "that art is intuition; but intuition is not always art: artistic intuition is a distinct species differing from intuition in general by something more."
But no one has ever been able to indicate of what this something more consists. It has sometimes been thought that art is not a simple intuition, but an intuition of an intuition, in the same way as the concept of science has been defined, not as the ordinary concept, but as the concept of a concept.; Thus man would attain to art by objectifying, not his sensations, as happens with ordinary intuition, but intuition itself.^ But this process of raising to a second power does not exist; and the comparison of it with the ordinary and scientific concept does not prove what is intended, for the good reason that it is not true that the scientific concept is the concept of a concept. If this comparison proves anything, it proves just the opposite. The ordinary concept, if it be really a concept
No specific difference.
\ and not a simple representation, is a perfect concept, howler-poor and limited. Science substitutes concepts for representations; for those concepts that are poor and limited it substitutes others, larger and more comprehensive; it is ever discovering new relations. But its method does not differ from that by which is formed the smallest universal in the brain of the humblest of men. What is) generally called par excellence art, collects intuitions that are wider and more complex than those which we generally experience, but these intuitions are always of sensations and impressions.
Art is expression of impressions, not expression of expression.
For the same reason, it cannot be asserted that the No difference intuition, which is generally called artistic, differs from °ftntensttyordinary intuition as intensive intuition. This would be the case if it were to operate differently on the same matter. But since the artistic function is extended to wider fields, yet does not differ in method from ordinary intuition, the difference between them is not intensive but extensive. The intuition of the simplest popular love-song, which says the same thing, or very nearly, as any declaration of love that issues at every moment from the lips of thousands of ordinary men, may be intensively perfect in its poor simplicity, although it be extensively j so much more limited than the complex intuition of a' love-song by Leopardi.
The whole difference, then, is quantitative^ and as The difference such is indifferent to philosophy, scientia qualitatum." Certain men have a greater aptitude, a more frequent^ inclination fully to express certain complex states of the soul. These men are known in ordinary language as artists. Some very complicated and difficult expressions are not often achieved, and these are called works of art. The limits of the expression-intuitions that are called art, as opposed to those that are vulgarly called non-art, are empirical and impossible to define. If an epigram be art, why not a simple word? If a story, why not the news-jottings of the journalist? If a landscape,
why not a topographical sketch? The teacher of philosophy in Moliere's comedy was right: "whenever we speak, we create prose." But there will always be scholars like Monsieur Jourdain, astonished at having spoken prose for forty years without knowing it, who will have difficulty in persuading themselves that when they call their servant John to bring their slippers, they have spoken nothing less than—prose.
We must hold firmly to our identification, because among the principal reasons which have prevented ^Esthetic, the science of art, from revealing the true nature of art, its real roots in human nature, has been its separation from the general spiritual life, the having made of it a sort of special function or aristocratic club. No one is astonished when he learns from physiology that every cell is an organism and every organism a cell or synthesis of cells. No one is astonished at finding in a lofty mountain the same chemical elements that compose a small stone fragment. There is not one physiology of small animals and one of large animals,; nor is there a special chemical theory of stones as distinct from mountains. In the same way, there is not a science of lesserintuition as distinct from a science of greater intuition, nor one of ordinary intuition as distinct from artistic intuition. There is but one ^Esthetic, the science of intuitive or expressive knowledge, which is the aesthetic or artistic fact. And this ^Esthetic is the true analogue of Logic, which includes, as facts of the same nature, the formation of the smallest and most ordinary concept and the most complicated scientific and philosophical system.
Artistic Nor can we admit that the word genius or artistic genius. genmS, £3 distinct from the non-genius of the ordinary man, possesses more than a quantitative signification. Great artists are said to reveal us to ourselves. But_how_ could this be possible, unless there were identity of nature_ between their imagination and ours, and unless the difference were only one of quantity? It were better to change poeta nascitur into homo nascitur poeta: some men
are born great poets, some small. The cult of the genius I
with all its attendant superstitions has arisen from this,
quantitative difference having been taken as a difference}^''
of quality. It has been forgotten that genius is not
something that has fallen from heaven, but humanity \" •
itself. The man of genius who poses or is represented as
remote from humanity finds his punishment in becoming
or appearing somewhat ridiculous. Examples of this are
the genius of the romantic period and the superman of our /•-*-.'!.•
But it is well to note here, that those who claim un: consciousness as the chief quality of an artistic genius, hurl him from an eminence far above humanity to a position far below it. Intuitive or artistic genius, like^ every form of human activity, is always conscious; otherwise it would be blind mechanism. The only thing that can be wanting to artistic genius is the reflective consciousness, the superadded consciousness of the historian or critic, which is not essential to it.
The relation between matter and form, or between content and content and form, as is generally said, is one of the most disputed questions in ^Esthetic. Does the aesthetic fact consist of content alone, or of form alone, or of both together? This question has taken on various meanings, which we shall mention, each in its place. But when these words are taken as signifying what we have above denned, and matter is understood as emotionality not aesthetically elaborated, or impressions, and form as intellectual activity and expression, then our view cannot be in doubt. We must, that is to say, reject both the thesis that makes the aesthetic fact to consist of the content alone (that is, the simple impressions), and the thesis which makes it to consist of a junction between form and content, that is, of impressions plus expressions. In the sesthetic fact, expressive activity is not added to the fact of the impressions, but these latter are formed and elaborated by it. The impressions reappear as it were in expression, like water put into a filter, which reappears the same and yet different on the other side.
The aesthetic fact, therefore, is form,_and nothing but
From this was inferred not that the content is something superfluous (it is, on the contrary, the necessary point of departure for the expressive fact); but that there is no passage from the qualities of the content to those of the form. It has sometimes been thought that the content, in order to be aesthetic, that is to say, transformable into form, should possess some determined or determinable qualities. But were that so, then form and content, expression and impression, would be the 'same thing. It is true that the content is that which is convertible into form, but it has no determinable qualities \until this transformation takes place. We know nothing I about it. It does not become aesthetic content before, Vjmt only after it has been actually transformed. Thie aesthetic content has also been defined as the interesting. That is not an untrue statement; it is merely void of meaning. Interesting to what? To the expressive activity? Certainly the expressive activity would not \ have raised the content to the dignity of form, had it not \been interested in it. Being interested is precisely the raising of the content to the dignity of form. But the word "interesting" has also been employed in another and a illegitimate sense, which we shall explain further on. Criticism of the F~ The proposition that art is imitation of nature has also ^several meanings. Sometimes truths have been expressed / or at least shadowed forth in these words, sometimes errors 'have been promulgated. More frequently, no definite thought has been expressed at all. One of the scientifically legitimate meanings occurs when "imitation" is understood as representation or intuition of nature, a form of knowledge. And when the phrase is used with this intention, and in order to emphasize the spiritual character of the process, another proposition becomes legitimate also: namely, that art is the idealization or idealizing imitation of nature. But if by imitation of nature be understood that art gives mechanical reproductions, more or less perfect duplicates of natural