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HISTORICISM AND INTELLECTUALISM IN
These relations between intuitive or aesthetic knowledge and the other fundamental or derivative forms of knowledge having been definitely established, we are now in a position to reveal the errors of a series of theories which have been, or are, presented as theories of Esthetic. Criticism of From the confusion between the demands of art in probability and general and the particular demands of history has resulted
of naturalism, f , i • , , , j . j i_ ,
the theory (wh1ch has lost ground to-day, but was once dominant) of the probable as the object of art. I As is generally the case with erroneous propositions, the meaning of those who employed and employ the concept of probability has no doubt often been much more reasonable than their definition of the word. By probability used really to be meant the artistic coherence of the representation, that is to say, its completeness and effectiveness, its actual presence. If "probable" be translated "coherent," a very just meaning will often be found in the discussions, examples, and judgements of the critics who employ this word. An improbable personage, an improbable ending to a comedy, are really badly-drawn personages, badly-arranged endings, happenings without artistic motive. It has been said with reason that even fairies and sprites must have probability, that is to say, be really sprites and fairies, coherent artistic intuitions. Sometimes the word "possible" has been used instead of "probable." As we have already remarked in passing, this word possible is
synonymous with the imaginable or intuitible. Every- 1
Confusions between the methods of art and those Criticism of of the philosophic sciences have been far more frequent. ^f^f Thus it has often been held to be the task of art to expound and of the concepts, to unite an intelligible with a sensible, to repre- tyPtcal-eat ideas or universals ; putting art in the place of science, that is, confusing the artistic function in general with the particular case in which it becomes aesthetico-logical.
The theory of art as supporting theses, of art considered as an individual representation exemplifying scientific laws, can be proved false in like manner. The example, as example, stands for the thing exemplified, and is thus an exposition of the universal, that is to say, a form of science, more or less popular or vulgarizing.
The same may be said of the aesthetic theory of the typical, when by type is understood, as it frequently is, the abstraction or the concept, and it is affirmed that art should make the species shine in the individual. If individual be here understood by typical, we have here too a merely verbal variation. To typify would signify, in this case, to characterize; that is, to determine and
to represent the individual. Don Quixote is a type; but of what is he a type, save of all Don Quixotes? A type, so to speak, of himself. Certainly he is not a type of abstract concepts, such as the loss of the sense of reality, or of the love of glory. An infinite number of personages can be thought of under these concepts, who are not Don Quixotes. In other words, we find our own impressions fully determined and realized in the expression of a poet (for example in a poetical personage). We call that expression typical, which we might call simply aesthetic, „' Thus poetical or artistic universals have sometimes been spoken of, only to show that the artistic product is altogether spiritual and ideal. Criticism of Continuing to correct these errors, or to clear up mis
understandings, we shall also remark that the symbol has
expressing what the poet would like to make a part of his public believe; to the statue nothing but the single word: Clemency or Goodness.
But the greatest triumph of the intellectualist error criticism of lies in the theory of artistic and literary kinds, which '*«.<*«>ryo/
,. artistic and
still has vogue in literary treatises and disturbs the critics literary kinds. and the historians of art. Let us observe its genesis.
The human mind can pass from the aesthetic to the logical, just because the former is a first step in respect to the latter. It can destroy expression, that is, the thought of the individual, by thinking of the universal. It can gather up expressive facts into logical relations. We have already shown that this operation becomes in its turn concrete in an expression, but this does not mean that the first expressions have not been destroyed. They have yielded their place to the new aesthetico-logical expressions. When we are on the second step, we have left the first.
One who enters a picture-gallery, or who reads a series of poems, having looked and read, may go further: he may seek out the nature and the relations of the things there expressed. Thus those pictures and compositions, each of which is an individual inexpressible in logical terms, are gradually resolved into universals and abstractions, such as costumes, landscapes, portraits, domestic life, battles, animals, flowers, fruit, seascapes, lakes, deserts; tragic, comic, pathetic, cruel, lyrical, epic, dramatic, chivalrous, idyllic facts, and the like. They are often also resolved into merely quantitative categories, such as miniature, picture, statuette, group, madrigal, ballad, sonnet, sonnetsequence, poetry, poem, story, romance, and the like.
When we think the concept domestic life, or chivalry, or idyll, or cruelty, or one of the quantitative concepts 1 * mentioned above, the individual expressive fact from '1 which we started has been abandoned. From aesthetes that we were, we have changed into logicians; from contemplators of expression, into reasoners. Certainly no objection can be made to such a process. In what other way could science arise, which, if it have aesthetic expressions
presupposed in it, must yet go beyond them in order to fulfil its function? The logical or scientific form, as such, excludes the aesthetic form. He who begins to think scientifically has already ceased to contemplate aesthetically; although his thought assumes of necessity in its turn an aesthetic form, as has already been said, and as it would be superfluous to repeat.
Error begins when we try to deduce the expression from the concept, and to find in what takes its place the laws of the thing whose place is taken; when the difference between the second and the first step has not been observed, and when, in consequence, we declare that we are standing on the first step, when we are really standing on the second. This error is known as the theory of artistic and literary kinds.
•^ "What is the (esthetic form of domestic life, of chivalry, of the idyll, of cruelty, and so forth? How should these contents be represented?" Such is the absurd problem implied in the theory of artistic and literary classes, when it has been shorn of excrescences and reduced to a simple formula. It is in this that consists |all search after laws or rules of classes. Domestic life, chivalry, idyll, cruelty and the like, are not impressions, but concepts. They are not contents, but logical-aesthetic forms. You cannot express the form, for it is already itself expression. For what are the words cruelty, idyll, chivalry, domestic life, and so on, but the expression of those concepts?
Even the most refined of such distinctions, which
possess the most philosophic appearance, do not resist
criticism; as when works of art are divided into subjective
and objective kinds, into lyric and epic, into works of
feeling and decorative works. In aesthetic analysis it is
impossible to separate subjective from objective, lyric
from epic, the image of feeling from that of things.
Errors derived From the theory of artistic and literary kinds derive
fromthistheory those erroneous modes of judgement and of criticism,
on art. thanks to which, instead of asking before a work of art if
it be expressive and what it expresses, whether it speak