identity between the thing itself and its model? But while similarity prevailing in the distinction produces accord (Einklang), qualitative disharmony is as such disagreeable, and demands a resolution. (It is easy to detect the sleight of hand with which Zimmermann first slips the characteristic into the relations of pure form, thereby entirely altering Herbart's original thought; and how, by a second trick, he here introduces into pure beauty the variations and modifications of the beautiful, by the help of the despised Hegelian dialectic.) If such resolution is effected by the skilful substitution of something other than the unpleasant image, we shall certainly have removed the cause of offence and established quietude (not accord: Eintracht, nicht Einklang), but we shall have gained the mere form of correctness: it is better, then, to supersede this by means of the true image so as to reach the form of compensation (Ausgleichung); and, when the true image is also pleasing in itself, the final form of definitive compensation (abschliessende Ausgleich), with which we exhaust the series of possible forms. And, in conclusion, what is Beauty? It is a conjunction of all these forms: a model (Vorbild) which has grandeur, plenitude, order, accord, correctness, definitive compensation; all this appears in a copy (Nachbild) in the form of the characteristic. Putting on one side the artificial connexion Zimmermann makes between the sublime, the comic, the tragic, the ironic, the humorous and the aesthetic forms, notice must be taken (so that we may recognize into which of the seven heavens he is wafting us) that these general æsthetic forms concern art equally with nature and morality, whose individual spheres are differentiated solely by the application of the general æsthetic forms to particular contents. These forms, applied to nature, give us natural beauty, the cosmos; applied to representation, beauty of wit (Schöngeist) or imagination; applied to feeling, the beautiful soul (schöne Seele) or taste; applied to the will, character or virtue. On one side, then, is natural beauty, on the other human beauty, in which (latter), on one hand, we have the beauty of representation, that is to say æsthetic fact in the strict sense (art); on the other, we have the beauty of will, or morality; and between the two, lastly, we have taste, common to Ethics and Esthetic. Esthetic in the narrow sense, as the theory of beautiful representation, determines the beauty of representations, divided into the three classes of the beauty of temporal and spatial connexion (figurative arts); the beauty of sensitive representation (music); and the beauty of thoughts (poetry). This tripartition of beauty into figurative, musical and poetical brings to a conclusion theoretical Esthetic, the only section developed by Zimmermann. Zimmermann's work was a polemic against the prin- Vischer versus cipal representative of Hegelian Esthetic, Vischer, who Zimmermann. had little difficulty in defending his own position and counter-attacking that of his assailant. He held Zimmermann up to ridicule, for example, in connexion with his view of symbolism. Zimmermann defined a symbol as the object "round which beautiful forms adhere." A painter depicts a fox simply for the sake of painting a part of animal nature. Nothing of the sort: this is a symbol, because the painter "makes use of lines and colours to express things other than lines and colours." "You think I'm a fox," says the animal in the picture, "but you make a great mistake: I'm a clothes-peg: I'm an appearance created by the painter with gradations of grey, white, yellow and red." Even easier was it to make game of Zimmermann's enthusiastic praises of the æsthetic quality of the sense of touch. It was a pity, the latter had written, that the pleasures of this sense were so difficult to attain; since "to touch the back of the Resting Hercules and the sinuous limbs of the Venus of Melos or the Barberini Faun would give to the hand a delight comparable only with that felt by the ear when listening to the majestic fugues of Bach or the suave melodies of Mozart." Vischer does not seem to be far wrong in declaring formalistic Esthetic to be "a grotesque union of mysticism and mathematics." 1 1 Kritische Gänge, vi., Stuttgart, 1873, pp. 6, 21, 32. Hermann Efforts to reconcile Esthetic of form and Esthetic of content. The works of Zimmermann seem to have given satisfaction to nobody save himself. Even Lotze, by no means an adversary of Herbartianism, blames him severely in his History of Esthetic in Germany (1868) and other writings. Still, Lotze was unable to offer any better substitute for æsthetic formalism than of a variant of the old idealism. "Can any one persuade us," he wrote in criticism of the formalists, "that a spiritual discord expressed by a corresponding discord in external appearances may have a value equal to that of the harmonious expression of a harmonious content solely because, in both cases, the formal relation of accord is respected? Can any one persuade us that the human form is pleasing solely for its formal stereometric relations, irrespective of the spiritual life by which it is animated? In empirical reality the three domains of laws, facts and values invariably appear as divided; and although they are united in the Highest Good, in Goodness in itself, in the living Love of a Personal God, in the Ought which is the basis of Being, our reason is unable to attain or to know such union. Beauty alone can reveal it to us it is in close connexion with the Good and the Holy and reproduces the rhythm of the divine ordinance and the moral government of the universe. Esthetic fact is neither intuition nor concept; it is idea, which presents the essential of an object in the form of an end referred to the ultimate end. Art, like beauty, must include the world of values in the world of forms." The war between the Esthetic of content and that of form, having Zimmermann, Vischer and Lotze as protagonists, reached its culminating point between 1860 and 1870. "1 Several people were in favour of a reconciliation. But the reconciliations they offered were not the right one, which was at least glimpsed by a certain young Johann 1 Geschichte d. Asth. i. Deutschl., passim, esp. pp. 27, 97, 100, 125, 147, 232, 234, 265, 286, 293, 487; Grundzüge der Ästh. (posth., Leipzig, 1884), §§ 8-13; and two juvenile works, Üb. d. Begriff d. Schönheit, Göttingen, 1845, and Üb. d. Bedingungen d. Kunstschönheit, Göttingen, Schmidt, who in his thesis for doctorate observed (1875) that, with all respect for Zimmermann and Lotze, it seemed to him they were both wrong in confusing the various meanings of the word "beauty," and discussed such an absurdity as a beauty or ugliness of natural objects, that is to say, of things external to the spirit; that Lotze, following Hegel, added the second absurdity of an intuitive concept or conceptual intuition: lastly, that neither of them grasped the fact that the æsthetic problem does not turn upon the beauty or ugliness of the abstract content or of form understood as a system of mathematical relations, but with the beauty or ugliness of representation. Form undoubtedly must exist, but "concrete form, full of content." 1 These utterances of Schmidt met with a hostile reception: it is easy (he was told in reply) to identify beauty with artistic perfection, but the whole crux of the matter lies in finding whether, beside this perfection, there exists another beauty dependent on a supreme cosmic or metaphysical principle: otherwise one is guilty of a naïve petitio principii. It was thought better, therefore, to seek other modes of reconciliation, which consisted in cooking up an appetizing dish in which a little formalism and a little contentism were mixed to taste, the latter as a rule giving the predominant flavour. Some Herbartians were found in the ranks of the mediating or conciliatory party. Hardly had Zimmermann's rigid formalism appeared, when Nahlowsky jumped up to protest that it had never entered the master's head to exclude content from Esthetic; 3 but even the ablest of the school, men such as Volkmann and Lazarus, chose a middle course. In the opposite camp Carriere,5 and even Vischer himself (in a criticism of his own old Esthetic), began to concede a larger part to the consideration of 1 Leibniz u. Baumgarten, Halle, 1875, PP. 76-102. 2 G. Neudecker, Studien z. Gesch. d. dtschn. Asth. s. Kant, PP. 54-55. * Polemic in Zeitschr. f. exacte Philos. (Herbartian organ) for 18621863, ii. p. 309 seqq., ii. p. 384 seqq, iv. pp. 26 seqq., 199 seqq., 300 seqq. 4 Volkmann, Lehrbuch der Psychologie, 3rd ed., Cöthen, 1884-1885. Lazarus, Das Leben der Seele, 1856-1858. 5 Moriz Carriere, Asthetik, 1859 (3rd ed., Leipzig, 1885). K. Köstlin. form; thus for Vischer beauty became "life appearing harmoniously," which when it appears in space is called form, and must always possess form, i.e. limitation (Begrenzung) in space and time, measure, regularity, symmetry, proportion, propriety (these characters constituting its quantitative moments) and harmony (qualitative moment), which includes variety and contrast and is therefore the most important characteristic.1 A conciliatory Esthetic in which formalism prevailed was attempted by Karl Köstlin, a professor at Tübingen and formerly collaborator in the musical section of the works of Vischer. Köstlin 2 had been influenced by Schleiermacher, Hegel, Vischer and Herbart, but, truth to tell, does not seem to have perfectly understood the teaching of any one of his predecessors. According to him, the æsthetic object presented three requirements: richness and variety of imagery (anregende Gestaltenfülle), interesting content and beautiful form. Under the first we recognize, with no little difficulty, a distorted reflexion of Schleiermacher's "inspiration" (Begeisterung). Interesting content he defined as that which concerns man; that which he knows or does not know; that which he loves or hates (it is thus always relative to the individual and the conditions in which he exists); and he asserted that interest of content is joined to value of form, that is, he conceived content as a second value, the same of which we have heard Herbart speak. He also agreed with Herbart that form is absolute, and that its general character is determined as being easily perceptible by intuition (anschaulich), and by its power of giving satisfaction, pleasure and delight, in fact, as being beautiful. Its particular characteristics for Köstlin were, according to quantity, circumscription, simplicity (Einheitlichkeit), extensive and intensive size, and equilibrium (Gleichmass); according to quality, determination (Bestimmtheit), unity (Einheit), importance (Bedeutung) extensive and intensive, and harmony. But when Köstlin sets himself to the 1 Kritische Gänge, v., Stuttgart, 1866, p. 59. |