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economic feelings, must disappear. In this last case, it is clear that it is a question, not of two terms, but of one, and inquiry as to economic feeling must be the same as that relating to economic activity. But in the other cases also, we must attend, not to the substantive, but to the adjective : the aesthetic, moral and logical character will explain the colouring of the feelings as aesthetic, moral and intellectual, whereas feeling, studied alone, will never explain those refractions and colorations. A further consequence is, that we no longer need Meaningoscerretain the well-known distinctions between values or ...f feelings of value, and feelings that are merely hedonistic feelings. and without value ; disinterested and interested feelings, objective feelings and feelings not objective but simply subjective feelings of approbation and of mere pleasure (cf. the distinction of Gefallen and Vergnigen in German). Those distinctions were used to save the three spiritual forms, which were recognized as the triad of the True, the Good and the Beautiful, from confusion with the fourth form, still unknown, and therefore insidious in its indeterminateness and mother of scandals. For us this triad has completed its task, because we are capable of reaching the distinction far more directly, by receiving also the selfish, subjective, merely pleasurable feelings among the respectable forms of the spirit; and where formerly antitheses were conceived (by ourselves and others), between value and feelings, as between spirituality and naturality, henceforth we see nothing but differences between value and value. As has already been said, feeling or the economic Value and activity presents itself as divided into two poles, positive ... . and negative, pleasure and pain, which we can now their union. translate into useful and disuseful (or hurtful). This bipartition has already been noted above, as a mark of the activistic character of feeling, and one which is to be found in all forms of activity. If each of these is value, each has opposed to it antivalue or disvalue. Absence of value is not sufficient to cause disvalue, but activity and passivity must be struggling between themselves, with

The Beautiful as the value of expression, or expression without qualification.

out the one getting the better of the other; hence the
contradiction and disvalue of the activity that is em-
barrassed, impeded, or interrupted. Value is activity
that unfolds itself freely : disvalue is its contrary.
We will content ourselves with this definition of the
two terms, without entering into the problem of the
relation between value and disvalue, that is, the problem
of contraries (that is to say, whether they are to be
thought of dualistically, as two beings or two orders of
beings, like Ormuzd and Ahriman, angels and devils,
enemies to one another ; or as a unity, which is also
contrariety). This definition of the two terms will be
sufficient for our purpose, which is to make clear the
nature of aesthetic activity, and at this particular point one
of the most obscure and disputed concepts of Æsthetic :
the concept of the Beautiful.
AEsthetic, intellectual, economic and ethical values
and disvalues are variously denominated in current
speech : beautiful, true, good, useful, expedient, just, right
and so on—thus designating the free development of
spiritual activity, action, scientific research, artistic pro-
duction, when they are successful ; ugly, false, bad, useless,
finexpedient, unjust, wrong designating embarrassed activity,
the product that is a failure. In linguistic usage, these
denominations are being continually shifted from one
order of facts to another. Beautiful, for instance, is
said not only of a successful expression, but also of a
scientific truth, of an action successfully achieved, and
of a moral action : thus we talk of an intellectual beauty,
of a beautiful action, of a moral beauty. The attempt to
keep up with these infinitely varying usages leads into
a trackless labyrinth of verbalism in which many philo-
sophers and students of art have lost their way. For
this reason we have thought it best studiously to avoid
the use of the word “beautiful '' to indicate successful
expression in its positive value. But after all the ex-
planations that we have given, all danger of misunder-
standing being now dissipated, and since on the other
hand we cannot fail to recognize that the prevailing
tendency, both in current speech and in philosophy, is
to limit the meaning of the word “beautiful" precisely
to the aesthetic value, it seems now both permissible and
advisable to define beauty as successful expression, or
rather, as expression and nothing more, because expression
when it is not successful is not expression.
Consequently, the ugly is unsuccessful expression.
The paradox is true, for works of art that are failures,
that the beautiful presents itself as unity, the ugly as
multiplicity. Hence we hear of merits in relation to
works of art that are more or less failures, that is to Say,
of those parts of them that are beautiful, which is not the
case with perfect works. It is in fact impossible to
enumerate the merits or to point out what parts of the
latter are beautiful, because being a complete fusion they
have but one value. Life circulates in the whole organ-
ism : it is not withdrawn into the several parts.
Unsuccessful works may have merit in various degrees,
even the greatest. The beautiful does not possess
degrees, for there is no conceiving a more beautiful,
that is, an expressive that is more expressive, an adequate
that is more than adequate. Ugliness, on the other
hand, does possess degrees, from the rather ugly (or
almost beautiful) to the extremely ugly. But if the ugly
were complete, that is to say, without any element of
beauty, it would for that very reason cease to be ugly,
because it would be without the contradiction in which
is the reason of its existence. The disvalue would be-
come non-value; activity would give place to passivity,
with which it is not at war, save when activity is really
present to oppose it.
And because the distinctive consciousness of the
beautiful and of the ugly is based on the conflicts and
contradictions in which aesthetic activity is developed, it
is evident that this consciousness becomes attenuated to
the point of disappearing altogether, as we descend from
the more complicated to the more simple and to the
simplest instances of expression. Hence the illusion that
there are expressions neither beautiful nor ugly, those

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True asthetic feelings and concomitant or accidental feelings.

Criticism of apparent feelings.

which are obtained without sensible effort and appear
easy and natural being considered such.
The whole mystery of the beautiful and the ugly is
reduced to these henceforth most easy definitions. Should
any one object that there exist perfect aesthetic expressions
before which no pleasure is felt, and others, perhaps even
failures, which give him the greatest pleasure, we must
recommend him to concentrate his attention in the
aesthetic fact, upon that which is truly aesthetic pleasure.
AEsthetic pleasure is sometimes reinforced or rather com-
plicated by pleasures arising from extraneous facts, which
are only accidentally found united with it. The poet or
any other artist affords an instance of purely aesthetic
pleasure at the moment when he sees (or intuites) his
work for the first time ; that is to say, when his impres-
sions take form and his countenance is irradiated with
the divine joy of the creator. On the other hand, a
mixed pleasure is experienced by one who goes to the
theatre, after a day's work, to witness a comedy: when
the pleasure of rest and amusement, or that of laughingly
snatching a nail from his coffin, accompanies the moment
of true aesthetic pleasure in the art of the dramatist and
actors. The same may be said of the artist who looks
upon his labour with pleasure when it is finished, ex-
periencing, in addition to the aesthetic pleasure, that very
different one which arises from the thought of self-com-
placency satisfied, or even of the economic gain which will
come to him from his work. Instances could be multiplied.
A category of apparent aesthetic feelings has been
formed in modern AEsthetic, not arising from the form,
that is to say, from the works of art as such, but from
their content. It has been remarked that artistic re-
presentations arouse pleasure and pain in their infinite
shades of variety. We tremble with anxiety, we rejoice,
we fear, we laugh, we weep, we desire, with the personages
of a drama or of a romance, with the figures in a picture
and with the melody of music. But these feelings are
not such as would be aroused by the real fact outside
art ; or rather, they are the same in quality, but are

quantitatively an attenuation of real things. AEsthetic and apparent pleasure and pain show themselves to be light, shallow, mobile. We have no need to treat here of these apparent feelings, for the good reason that we have already amply discussed them ; indeed, we have hitherto treated of nothing but them. What are these apparent or manifested feelings, but feelings objectified, intuited, expressed ? And it is natural that they do not trouble and afflict us as passionately as those of real life, because those were matter, these are form and activity; those true and proper feelings, these intuitions and expressions. The formula of apparent feelings is therefore for us nothing but a tautology, through which we can run the pen without scruple.

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