and in her foreign dependencies, it was impossible not to observe, in the language of party, in the resolutions of popular meetings, in debate, in conversation, in the general strain of those fugitive and diurnal addresses to the public which such occasions call forth, the prevalency of those ideas of civil authority, which are displayed in the works of Mr. Locke. The credit of that great name, the courage and liberality of his principles, the skill and clearness with which his arguments are proposed, no less than the weight of the arguments themselves, have given a reputation and currency to his opinions, of which I am persuaded, in any unsettled state of public affairs, the influence would be felt. As this is not a place for examining the truth or tendency of these doctrines, I would not be understood, by what I have said, to express any judgment concerning either. I mean only to remark, that such doctrines are not without effect; and that it is of practical importance to have the principles from which the obligations of social union, and the extent of civil obedience, are derived, rightly explained, and well understood. Indeed, as far as I have observed, in political, beyond all other subjects, where men are without some fundamental and scientific principles to resort to, they are liable to have their understandings played on by cant phrases and unmeaning terms, of which every party in every country possesses a vocabulary. We appear astonished when we see the multitude led away by sounds: but we should remember, that if sounds work miracles, it is always upon ignorance. The influence of names is in exact proportion to the want of knowledge. These are the observations with which I have judged it expedient to prepare the attention of my reader. Concerning the personal motives which engaged me in the following attempt, it is not necssary that I say much; the nature of my academical situation, a great deal of leisure since my retirement from it, the recommendation of an honoured and excellent friend, the autho rity of the venerable prelate to whom these labours are inscribed, the not perceiving in what way I could employ my time or talents better, and my disapprobation in literary men of that fastidious indolence, which sits still because it disdains to do little, were the considerations that directed my thoughts to this design. Nor have I repented of the undertaking. Whatever be the fate or reception of this work, it owes its author nothing. In sickness and in health I have found in it that which can alone alleviate the one, or give enjoyment to the other, occupation and engagement.,

MORAL PHILOSOPHY.

BOOK I.

PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS

CHAPTER I.

DEFINITION AND USE OF THE SCIENCE.

MORAL PHILOSOPHY, Morality, Ethics, Casuistry, Natural Law, mean all the same thing; namely, that science which teaches men their duty and the reasons of it.

The use of such a study depends upon this, that, without it the rules of life, by which men are ordinarily governed, oftentimes mislead them through a defect either in the rule, or in the appli

cation.

These rules are, the Law of Honour, the Law of the Land, and the Scriptures.

CHAPTER II.

THE LAW OF HONOUR.

· THE Law of Honour is a system of rules constructed by people of fashion, and calculated to facilitate their intercourse with one another; and for no other purpose.

Consequently, nothing is adverted to by the Law of Honour, but what tends to incommode this intercourse.

Hence this law only prescribes and regulates the duties betwixt equals; omitting such as relate to the Supreme Being, as well as those which we owe to our inferiors.

For which reason, profaneness, neglect of public worship, or private devotion, cruelty to servants, rigorous treatment of tenants or other dependents, want of charity to the poor, injuries done

to tradesmen, by insolvency or delay of payment, with numberless examples of the same kind, are accounted no breaches of honour; because a man is not a less agreeable companion for these vices, nor the worse to deal with, in those concerns which are usually transacted between one gentleman and another.

Again, the law of Honour, being constituted by men occupied in the pursuit of pleasure, and for the mutual conveniency of such men, will be found, as might be expected from the character and design of the law-makers, to be in most instances favourable to the licentious indulgence of the natural passions.

Thus it allows of fornication, adultery, drunkenness, prodigality, duelling, and of revenge in the extreme; and lays no stress upon the virtues opposite to these.

CHAPTER III.

THE LAW OF THE LAND.

THAT part of mankind, who are beneath the Law of Honour, often make the Law of the Land their rule of life; that is, they are satisfied with themselves, so long as they do or omit nothing for the doing or omitting of which the law can punish them.

Whereas every system of human laws, considered as a rule of life, labours under the two following defects :

I. Human laws omit many duties, as not objects of compulsion; such as piety to God, bounty to the poor, forgiveness of injuries, education of children, gratitude to benefactors.

The law never speaks but to command, nor commands but where it can compel; consequently those duties, which by their nature must be voluntary, are left out of the statute-book, as lying beyond the reach of its operation and authority.

II. Human laws permit, or which is the same thing, suffer to go unpunished, many crimes, because they are incapable of being defined by any previous description.—Of which nature is luxury, prodigality, partiality in voting at those elections where the qualifications of the candidate ought to determine the success, caprice in the disposition of men's fortunes at their death, disrespect to parents, and a multitude of similar examples.

For this is the alternative: the law must either define beforehand and with precision the offences which it punishes, or it must

be left to the discretion of the magistrate, to determine upon each particular accusation, whether it constitutes that offence which the law designed to punish, or not; which is, in effect, leaving to the magistrate to punish or not to punish, at his pleasure, the individual who is brought before him; which is just so much tyranny. Where, therefore, as in the instances above-mentioned, the distinction between right and wrong is of too subtle or of too secret a nature to be ascertained by any preconcerted language the law of most countries, especially of free states, rather than commit the liberty of the subject to the discretion of the magistrate, leaves, men in such cases to themselves.

CHAPTER IV.

THE SCRIPTURES.

WHOEVER expects to find in the Scriptures particular directions for every moral doubt that arises, looks for more than he will meet with. And to what a magnitude such a detail of particular precepts would have enlarged the sacred volume, may be partly understood from the following consideration :-The laws of this country, including the acts of the legislature, and the decisions of our supreme courts of justice are not contained in fewer than fifty folio volumes; and yet it is not once in ten attempts that you can find the case you look for, in any law-book whatever: to say nothing of those numerous points of conduct, concerning which the law professes not to prescribe or determine any thing. Had then the same particularity which obtains in human laws, so far as they go, been attempted in the Scriptures, throughout the whole extent of morality, it is manifest they would have been by much too bulky to be either read or circulated; or rather, as St. John 66 says, even "the world itself could not contain the books that should be "written."

Morality is taught in Scripture in this wise:-General rules are laid down of piety, justice, benevolence, and purity; such as worshipping God in spirit and in truth; doing as we would be done by; loving our neighbour as ourself; forgiving others, as we expect forgiveness from God; that mercy is better than sacrifice; that not that which entereth into a man, (nor by parity of reason, any ceremonial pollutions) but that which proceedeth from the

heart, defileth him. Several of these rules are occasionally illus trated, either in fictitious examples, as in the parable of the good Samaritan; of the cruel servant, who refused to his fellow-servant that indulgence and compassion which his master had shown to him; or in instances which actually presented themselves, as in Christ's reproof of his disciples at the Samaratan village; his praise of the poor widow, who cast in her last mite; his censure of the Pharisees, who chose out the chief rooms,-and of the tradition, whereby they evaded the command to sustain their indigent parents; or, lastly, in the resolution of questions, which those who were about our Saviour proposed to him; as his answer to the young man who asked him, "What lack I yet?" and to the honest scribe, who had found out, even in that age and country, that "to love God and his neighbour, was more than all whole burnt "offerings and sacrifice."

And this is the way in which all practical sciences are taught, as Arithmetic, Grammar, Navigation, and the like.--Rules are laid down, and examples are subjoined: not that these examples are the cases, much less all the cases that will actually occur, but by way only of explaining the principle of the rule, and as so many specimens of the method of applying it. The chief difference is, that the examples in Scripture are not annexed to the rules with the didactic regularity to which we are now-a-days accustomed, but delivered dispersedly, as particular occasions suggested them; which gave them, however, (especially to those who heard them, and were present to the occasions which produced them) an energy and persuasion, much beyond what the same or any instances would have appeared with, in their places in a system.

Besides this, the Scriptures commonly pre-suppose in the persons they speak to, a knowledge of the principles of natural justice; and are employed, not so much to teach new rules of morality, as to enforce the practice of it by new sanctions, and a greater certainty; which last seems to be the proper business of a revelation from God, and what was most wanted.

Thus the "unjust covenant-breakers, and extortioners," are condemned in Scripture, supposing it known, or leaving it, where it admits of doubt, to moralists to determine, what injustice, extortion, or breach of covenant, are.

The above considerations are intended to prove, that the Scriptures do not supersede the use of the science of which we profess to treat, and to acquit them of any charge of imperfection or insufficiency on that account.