CHAPTER V.

THE MORAL SENSE.

"THE father of Caius Toranius had been proscribed by the tri<umvirate. Caius Toranius, coming over to the interest of that "party, discovered to the officers, who were in pursuit of his "father's life, the place where he concealed himself, and gave "them withal a description, by which they might distinguish his person when they found him. The old man, more anxious for "the safety and fortunes of his son, than about the little that "might remain of his own life, began immediately to inquire of "the officers who seized him, whether his son was well, whether "he had done his duty to the satisfaction of his generals? “That

son," replied one of the officers, so dear to thy affections, be"trayed thee to us; by his information thou art apprehended, and "diest." "The officer with this struck a poniard to his heart, "and the unhappy man fell, not so much affected by his fate, as "by the means to which he owed it."*

Now the question is, whether, if the story were related to the wild boy caught some years ago in the woods of Hanover, or to a savage without experience, and without instruction, cut off in his infancy from all intercourse with his species, and, consequently, under no possible influence of example, authority, education, sympathy, or habit; whether, I say, such a one would feel, upon the relation, any degree of that sentiment of disapprobation of Toranius's conduct which we feel, or not?

They who maintain the existence of a moral sense, of innate maxims, of a natural conscience, that the love of virtue and hatred of vice are instinctive, or the perception of right and wrong intuitive (all which are only different ways of expressing the same thing) affirm that he would.

They who deny the existence of a moral sense, &c. affirm that he would not.

*"Caius Toranius triumvirum partes secutus, proscripti patris sui prætorii et ornati viri latebras, ætatem, notasque corporis, quibus agnosci posset, centurionibus edidit, qui eum persecuti sunt. Senex de filii magis vita, et incrementis, quàm de reliquo spiritu suo solicitus, an incolumis esset, et an imperatoribus, satisfaceret, interrogare eos cœpit. E quibus unus: ab illo, inquit quem tantopere diligis, demonstratus nostro ministerio, filii indicio occideris: protinusque pectus ejus gladio trajecit, Collapsus itaque est infelix, auctore cædis, quam ipsa cede, miserior."

Valer. Max. Lib. ix. cap. 11.

And upon this, issue is joined.

As the experiment has never been made, and from the diffi culty of procuring a subject, (not to mention the impossibility of proposing the question to. him, if we had one) is never likely to be made, what would be the event can only be judged of from probable reasons.

They who contend for the affirmative, observe, that we approve examples of generosity, gratitude, fidelity, &c. and condemn the contrary, instantly, without deliberation, without having any interest of our own concerned in them, oft-times without being conscious of, or able to give any reason for our approbation; that this approbation is uniform and universal, the same sorts of conduct being approved or disapproved in all ages and countries of the world-circumstances, say they, which strongly indicate the operation of an instinct or moral sense.

On the other hand, answers have been given to most of these arguments by the patrons of the opposite system; and,

First, As to the uniformity above alleged, they controvert the fact. They remark, from authentic accounts of historians and travellers, that there is scarce a single vice which, in some age or country of the world, has not been countenanced by public opinion; that in one country, it is esteemed an office of piety in children to sustain their aged parents, in another, to despatch them out of the way; that suicide, in one age of the world, has been heroism, in another felony; that theft, which is punished by most laws, by the laws of Sparta was not unfrequently rewarded; that the promiscuous commerce of the sexes, although condemned by the regulations and censure of all civilized nations, is practised by the savages of the tropical regions without reserve, compunction, or disgrace: that crimes, of which it is no longer permitted us even to speak, have had their advocates amongst the sages of very renowned times; that, if an inhabitant of the polished nations of Europe be delighted with the appearance, wherever he meets with it, of happiness, tranquillity, and comfort, a wild American is no less diverted with the writhings and contortions of a victim at the stake; that even amongst ourselves, and in the present improved state of moral knowledge, we are far from a perfect consent in our opinions or feelings; that you shall hear duelling alternately reprobated and applauded, according to the sex, age, or station of the person you converse with; that the forgiveness of injuries and insults is accounted by one sort of people magna

nimity, by another, meanness; that in the above instances, and perhaps in most others, moral approbation follows the fashions and institutions of the country we live in; which fashions also and institutions themselves have grown out of the exigencies, the climate, situation, or local circumstances of the country; or have been set up by the authority of an arbitrary chieftain, or the unaccountable caprice of the multitude;-all which, they observe, looks very little like the steady hand and indelible characters of nature. But,

Secondly, Because after these exceptions and abatements, it cannot be denied but that some sorts of actions command and receive the esteem of mankind more than others, and that the approbation of them is general, though not universal: As to this they say, that the general approbation of virtue, even in instances where we have no interest of our own to induce us to it, may be accounted for without the assistance of a moral sense; thus:

"Having experienced, in some instances, a particular conduct "to be beneficial to ourselves, or observed that it would be so, a "sentiment of approbation rises up in our minds; which senti"ment afterwards accompanies the idea or mention of the same "conduct, although the private advantage which first excited it "be no more."

And this continuance of the passion after the reason of it has ceased, is nothing else, say they, than what happens in other cases; especially in the love of money, which is in no person so strong and eager, as it is often times found to be in a rich, old miser, without family to provide for, or friend to oblige by it, and to whom consequently it is no longer (and he may be sensible of it too) of any real use or value; yet is this man as much overjoyed with gain, and mortified by losses, as he was the first day he opened his shop, and when his very subsistence depended upon his success in it.

By these means the custom of approving certain actions commenced; and when once such a custom hath got footing in the world, it is no difficult thing to explain how it is transmitted and continued; for then the greatest part of those who approve of virtue, approve of it from authority, by imitation, and from a habit of approving such and such actions inculcated in early youth, and receiving, as men grow up, continual accessions of strength and vigour, from censure and encouragement, from the books they read, the conversations they hear, the current application of epi

thets, and turn of language, and the various other causes by which it universally comes to pass, that a society of men, touched, in the feeblest degree with the same passion, soon communicate to one another a great degree of it.* This is the case with most of us at present; and is the cause also that the process of association, described in the last paragraph but one, is now-a-days little either perceived or wanted.

Amongst the causes assigned for the continuance and diffusion of the same moral sentiments amongst mankind, we have mentioned imitation. The efficacy of this principle is most observable in children; indeed, if there be any thing in them which deserves the name of instinct, it is their propensity to imitation. Now, there is nothing which children imitate or apply more readily than expressions of affection and aversion, of approbation, hatred, resentment, and the like; and when these passions and expressions are once connected, which they soon will be by the same associations which unite words with their ideas, the passions will follow the expression, and attach upon the object to which the child has been accustomed to apply the epithet. In a word, when almost every thing else is learned by imitation, can we wonder to find the same cause concerned in the generation of our moral sentiments?

Another considerable objection to the system of moral instincts is this, that there are no maxims in the science which can well be deemed innate, as none perhaps can be assigned, which are abso.. lutely and universally true; in other words, which do not bend to circumstances. Veracity, which seems, if any be, a natural duty, is excused in many cases towards an enemy, a thief, or a mad The obligation of promises, which is a first principle in morality, depends upon the circumstances under which they are made: they may have been unlawful, or become so since, or inconsistent with former promises, or erroneous, or extorted; under all which cases, instances may be suggested, where the obliga

man.

"From instances of popular tumult, seditions, factions, panics, and of all passions which are shared with a multitude, we may learn the influence of society in exciting and supporting any emotion; while the most ungovernable disorders are raised, we find, by that means, from the slightest and most frivolous occasions. He must be more or less than man who kindles not in the common blaze. What wonder, then, that moral sentiments are found of such influence in life, though springing from principles which may appear, at first sight, somewhat small and delicate!"-Hume's Inquiry concerning the Principles of Morals, Sect. ix. p. 326.

tion to perform the promise would be dubious or discharged, and so of most other general rules, when they come to be actually applied.

An argument has been also proposed on the same side of the question, of this kind. Together with the instinct, there must have been implanted, it is said, a clear and precise idea of the ob. ject upon which it was to attach. The instinct and the idea of the object are inseparable even in imagination, and as necessarily accompany each other as any correlative ideas whatever; that is, in plainer terms, if we be prompted by nature to the approbation of particular actions, we must have received also from nature a distinct conception of the action we are thus prompted to approve; which we certainly have not received.

But as this argument bears alike against all instincts, in brutes, as well as men, it will hardly, I suppose, produce conviction, though it may be difficult to find an answer to it.

Upon the whole, it seems to me, either that there exists no such instincts as compose what is called moral sense, or that they are not now to be distinguished from prejudices and habits; on which account they cannot be depended upon in moral reasoning: I mean, that it is not a safe way of arguing, to assume certain principles as so many dictates, impulses, and instincts of nature, and then to draw conclusions from these principles, as to the rectitude or wrongness of actions, independent of the tendency of such actions, or any other consideration whatever.

Aristotle lays down, as a fundamental and self-evident maxim, that nature intended barbarians to be slaves, and proceeds to deduce from this maxim a train of conclusions, calculated to justify the policy which then prevailed. And I question whether the same maxim be not still self-evident to the company of merchants trading to the coast of Africa.

Nothing is so soon made as a maxim; and it appears from the example of Aristotle, that authority and convenience, education, prejudice, and general practice, have no small share in making of them, and that the laws of custom are very apt to be mistaken for the order of nature.

For which reason, I suspect, that a system of morality, built upon instincts, will only find out reasons and excuses for opinions and practices already established-he will seldom correct either

But further, suppose we admit the existence of these instincts, what is their authority? No man, you say, can act in deliberate