occupied by the thoughts of fighting, and he lost all recollection of the orders of the dictator, who had charged him to advance only so far as he might with safety, and to retreat before he should come within the enemy's sight. Several different parties of the Numidians, by skirmishing and retreating, drew him on almost to their camp, by which time both his men and horses were greatly fatigued. Here Cartalo, commander-in-chief of the cavalry, advancing in full career, obliged his party to fly before he came within a dart's throw, and, almost without relaxing in speed, pursued them in their flight through the length of five miles. Mancinus, when he saw that the enemy did not desist from their pursuit, and that there was no prospect of escaping, exhorted his men to act with courage, and faced about on the foe, though superior to him in every particular. The consequence was, that he, and the bravest of his party, were surrounded, and cut to pieces: the rest, betaking themselves to a precipitate flight, made their escape, first to Cales, and thence, by ways almost impassable, to the dictator. It happened that, on the same day, Minucius rejoined Fabius, having been sent to secure, by a body of troops, a woody hill, which, above Tarracina, forms a narrow defile, and hangs over the sea; because it was apprehended, that, if that barrier of the Appian way were left unguarded, the Carthaginian might penetrate into the territory of Rome. The dictator and master of the horse, having re-united their forces, marched down into the road, through which Hannibal was to pass. At this time the enemy were two miles distant.

XVI. Next day the Carthaginians, marching forward, filled the whole road which lay between the two camps; and though the Romans had taken post close to their own rampart, with an evident advantage of situation, yet the Carthaginian advanced with his light horsemen, and, in order to provoke the enemy, made several skirmishing attacks, charging, and then retreating. The Romans kept their position, VOL. III.-D

and the fight proceeded without vigour, more agreeably to the wish of the dictator than to that of Hannibal. Two hundred Romans, and eight hundred of the enemy fell. There was now reason to think, that by the road to Casilinum being thus blockaded, Hannibal was effectually pent up; and that while Capua and Samnium, and such a number of wealthy allies at their back, should furnish the Romans with supplies, the Carthaginian, on the other hand, would be obliged to winter between the rocks of Formiæ, the sands of Linternum, and horrid stagnated marshes. Nor was Hannibal insensible that his own arts were now played off against himself. Wherefore, seeing it impracticable to make his way through Casilinum, and that he must direct his course to the mountains, and climb over the summit of the Callicula, lest the Romans should fall on his troops in their march, when entangled in the vallies, he devised a stratagem for baffling the enemy by a deception calculated to inspire terror, resolving to set out secretly in the beginning of the night, and proceed toward the mountains. The means which he contrived for the execution of his plan were these: collecting combustible matter from all the country round, he caused bundles of rods and dry twigs to be tied fast on the horns of oxen, great numbers of which, trained and untrained, he drove along with him, among the other spoil taken in the country, and he made up the number of almost two thousand. He then gave in charge to Hasdrubal, that as soon as the darkness of the night came on, he should drive this numerous herd, after first setting fire to their horns, up the mountains, and particularly, if he found it practicable, over the passes where the enemy kept guard.

XVII. As soon as it grew dark the army decamped in silence, driving the oxen at some distance before the van. When they arrived at the foot of the mountains and the narrow roads, the signal was instantly given that fire should be set to the horns of the oxen, and that they should be driven

violently up the mountains in front; when their own fright, occasioned by the flame blazing on their heads, together with the heat, which soon penetrated to the quick, and to the roots of their horns, drove them on as if goaded by madness. By their spreading about in this manner all the bushes were quickly in a blaze, just as if fire had been set to the woods and mountains, and the fruitless tossing of their heads serving to increase the flames, they afforded an appearance as of men running up and down on every side. The troops stationed to guard the passage of the defiles, seeing several fires on the tops of the mountains, concluded they were surrounded, and quitted their post, taking their way, as the safest course, towards the summits, where they saw fewest fires blazing. Here they fell in with several of the oxen, which had scattered from the herds to which they belonged. At first, when they saw them at a distance, imagining that they breathed out flames, they halted in utter astonishment at the miraculous appearance; but afterwards, when they discovered that it was an imposition of human contrivance, and believing that they were in danger of being ensnared, they hastily, and with redoubled terror, betook themselves to flight. They met also the enemy's light infantry, but night inspiring equal fears, prevented either from beginning a fight until day-light. In the mean time Hannibal led his whole army through the defile, where he surprised some Romans in the very pass, and pitched his camp in the territory of Allifæ.

XVIII. Fabius perceived the tumult; but, suspecting some snare, and being utterly averse from fighting, in the night particularly, he kept his men within their trenches. As soon as day appeared, a fight commenced near the summit of the mountain, in which the Romans, who had considerably the advantage in numbers, would have easily overpowered the light infantry of the enemy, separated as they were from their friends, had not a cohort of Spaniards, sent back by

Hannibal for the purpose, come up to the spot. These, both by reason of the agility of their limbs, and the nature of their arms, being lighter and better qualified for skirmishing among rocks and cliffs (to which they were accustomed), by their manner of fighting, easily baffled the enemy, who were used to act on plain ground in steady fight, and who carried weighty arms. After a contest therefore, by no means equal, they both withdrew to their respective camps; the Spaniards with almost all their men safe, the Romans with the loss of many. Fabius likewise decamped, and passing through the defile, seated himself in a high and strong post above Allifæ. annibal, now counterfeiting an intention to proceed to Rome through Samnium, marched back as far as the country of the Pelignians, spreading devastation every where as he went. Fabius led his army along the heights, between the route of the enemy and the city of Rome, constantly attending his motions, but never giving him a meeting. From the territory of Pelignum, Hannibal altered his route; and, directing his march back towards Apulia, came to Gerunium, a city whose inhabitants had abandoned it, being terrified by a part of the walls having fallen in ruins. The dictator formed a strong camp in the territory of Larinum; and, being recalled thence to Rome, on account of some religious ceremonies, he pressed the master of the horse, not only with orders, but with earnest advice, and almost with prayers, to "confide more in prudence than in fortune; and to imitate his conduct in command rather than that of Sempronius and Flaminius. Not to think there had been no advantage gained, in having foiled the designs of the Carthaginian through almost the whole length of the summer; observing, that even physicians sometimes effect their purpose better by rest than by motion and action; that it was a matter of no small importance, to have ceased to be defeated by an enemy so inured to victory; and, after a long course of disasters, to have gained time to breathe." After

urging these cautions, which were thrown away on the mas ter of the horse, he set out for Rome.

XIX. In the beginning of the summer wherein these transactions passed, the operations of the war commenced in Spain also, both by land and sea. Hasdrubal, to the number of ships which he had received from his brother, manned and in readiness for service, added ten; and giving the command of this fleet of forty ships to Himilco, set out from New Carthage, marching his army along the shore, while the fleet sailed on, at a small distance from the land; so that he was prepared to fight on either element, as the foe should come in his way. Cneius Scipio, on hearing that the enemy had moved from their winter-quarters, at first designed to pursue the same plan of operations; but, afterwards, on hearing that they had been joined by vast numbers of new auxiliaries, he judged it not so prudent to meet them on land; sending, therefore, on board his ships, an additional number of chosen soldiers, he put to sea, with a fleet of thirty-five sail. On the next day after his leaving Tarraco, he arrived at an harbour within ten miles of the mouth of the river Iberus, and dispatching thence two Massilian scout-boats, learned from them, that the Carthaginian fleet lay in the mouth of that river, and that their camp was pitched on the bank. Intending therefore, by a general attack with his whole force, at once to overpower the enemy, while unprovided and off their guard, he weighed anchor, and advanced towards them. They have, in Spain, a great many towers built in lofty situations, which are used both as watch-towers, and as places of defence against pirates. From these the Roman fleet was first descried, and notice given of it to Hasdrubal. This caused much confusion in the camp on land, and somewhat earlier than the alarm reached the ships, where they had not heard the dashing of oars, nor any other noise usually accompanying a fleet. The capes, likewise, shut out the enemy from their view, when on a sudden, while