Democracy, Bureaucracy and Public Choice: Economic Approaches in Political ScienceRoutledge, 3 giu 2014 - 300 pagine First published in 1991. This book initially offers a critique of some key rational public choice models, to show that they were internally inconsistent and ideologically slanted. Then due to the authors’ research the ideas are restructured around a particular kind of institutional public choice method, recognizing the value of instrumental models as a mode of thinking clearly about the manifold complexities of political life. |
Altre edizioni - Visualizza tutto
Democracy, Bureaucracy and Public Choice: Economic Approaches in Political ... Patrick Dunleavy Anteprima limitata - 2014 |
Democracy, Bureaucracy, and Public Choice: Economic Explanations in ... Patrick Dunleavy Visualizzazione estratti - 1992 |
Democracy, Bureaucracy and Public Choice: Economic Explanations in Political ... Patrick Dunleavy Visualizzazione estratti - 1991 |
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activities actor model actors advocacy costs agency types agency's alternative analysis assumptions behaviour budget increments budget-maximizing models bureau budget bureau-shaping model bureaucrats central changes collective action collective benefits Conservative constraints contracts core budget corporatism corporatist cost curve decisions deinstitutionalization delivery agencies democratic Dunleavy economic effects election electoral empirical endogenous groups example existing public choice exogenous external Figure firms free-riding group identity group leaders group members group-joining growth Hence identity set increases indifference curves individual influence interest groups internal labour leadership legislature liberal democracies major marginal mass media maximize median membership Niskanen non-excludable non-joiners Olson organization organizational outputs participation party competition party leaders perfect information pluralist political position potential members preference-accommodating preference-shaping strategies problems program budget public choice accounts public choice models public choice theory rational role senior officials shift social sponsor staff super-program budget trade unions voters voting welfare