...knowing a thing. The first implies that we move round the object; the second that we enter inlcTIl. The first depends on the point of view at which we...to stop at the relative; the second, in those cases whereTTis possible, to attain the absolute. | Consider, for example, the movement of an object in space....

...College, Cambridge. i AN INTRODUCTION TO METAPHYSICS A COMPARISON of the definitions of meta physics and the various conceptions of the absolute leads...••. second, in those cases where it is possible, j to attain the absolute. I Consider, for example, the movement of an object in space. My perception...

...by application to Bergson's advocacy of " intuition " as against " intellect." There are, he says, " two profoundly different ways of knowing a thing....cases where it is possible, to attain the absolute." * The second of these, which is intuition, is, he says, " the kind of intellectual sympathy by which...

...by application to Bergson's advocacy of " intuition " as against " intellect." There are, he says, " two profoundly different ways of knowing a thing....cases where it is possible, to attain the absolute" * The second of these, which is intuition, is, he says, " the kind of intellectual sympathy by which...

...illustrated by application to Bergson's advocacy of 'intuition' as against 'intellect'. There are, he says, 'two profoundly different ways of knowing a thing....cases where it is possible, to attain the absolute.' 1 The second of these, which is intuition, is, he says, 'the kind of intellectual sympathy by which...

...-application to Bergson's advocacy of " intuition " as iagainst " intellect." There are, he says, " two profoundly different ways of knowing a thing....in those cases where it is possible, to attain the absolute."1 The pecond of these, which is intuition, is, he says, " the kind af intellectual sympathy...

...the second that we enter into it. TheTIrst depends on the point of view at which we are placed._and V on the symbols by which we express ourselves. The...cases where it is possible, to attain the absolute." l The first 'way of knowing' is the intellectual, the second the intuitional. The concepts used by...

...knowing a thing. The first implies that we move round the object; the second, that we enter into it. ... The first kind of knowledge may be said to stop at...cases where it is possible, to attain the absolute." (Hvl 21) In categorizing immediate experience, intelligence makes conceptual blueprints, intellectual...

...different ways of knowing a thing. The first implies moving around the object; the second, entry into it. The first kind of knowledge may be said to stop at...cases where it is possible, to attain the absolute .... If a social phenomenon is envisioned as a box the existence of an inside is seen. With this recognition...

...different ways of knowing a thing." The first implies moving around the object; the second, entry into it. The first kind of knowledge may be said to stop at...cases where it is possible, to attain the absolute. An illustration of this design is provided: Inside Experiential knowledge of the everyday world The...