Coercive Cooperation: Explaining Multilateral Economic SanctionsPrinceton University Press, 16 gen 1994 - 324 pagine This innovative study shows that multilateral sanctions are coercive in their pressure on their target and in their origin: the sanctions themselves frequently result from coercive policies, with one state attempting to coerce others through persuasion, threats, and promises. To analyze this process, Lisa Martin uses a novel methodology combining game-theoretic models, statistical analysis, and case studies. She emphasizes that credible commitments gain international cooperation, and concludes that the involvement of international institutions and the willingness of the main "sender" to bear heavy costs are the central factors influencing the sanction's credibility. |
Sommario
Introduction | 3 |
Model and Hypotheses | 15 |
Measuring Cooperation and Explanatory Variables | 46 |
Estimating Models of Cooperation | 61 |
Explaining | 99 |
The Falkland Islands Conflict | 131 |
Western TechnologyExport Controls | 169 |
Altre edizioni - Visualizza tutto
Coercive Cooperation: Explaining Multilateral Economic Sanctions Lisa L. Martin Anteprima limitata - 1994 |
Coercive Cooperation: Explaining Multilateral Economic Sanctions Lisa L. Martin Anteprima limitata - 2021 |
Coercive Cooperation: Explaining Multilateral Economic Sanctions Lisa L. Martin Anteprima non disponibile - 1992 |
Parole e frasi comuni
action administration Afghanistan allies American analysis April Argentina argued assistance bandwagoning behavior bilateral Britain British called for sanctions Carter chapter Chile coadjustment CoCom coefficient coercion game COLDWAR Committee Congress COOP cooperation problems COSTD costs credibility decisions dependent variable dominant strategy economic sanctions effect Europe example expect explained export controls factors Falklands Falklands War Foreign Policy goals grain embargo Hufbauer human rights hypotheses Ibid impact impose sanctions increase INST interests international cooperation international institutions Ireland Irish issue linkage Latin America leading sender level of cooperation major sender measures military Minister NATO neoliberal nomic NONMAJ North European Service outcome payoff percent pipeline Player Poisson distribution political potential sanctioners preferences probit probit model Reagan refused regression Reuters Reuters North European role sanc Schott significant Soviet Union statistical threats tions U.S. government U.S. representatives U.S. sanctions U.S. Senate unilateral sanctions United West Germany Western