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The PRESIDENT. No, I believe it. I believe it. I think that the struggle is close enough. China is so large, looms so high just beyond the frontiers, that if South Viet-Nam went, it would not only give them an improved geographic position for a guerrilla assault on Malaya but would also give the impression that the wave of the future in Southeast Asia was China and the Communists. So I believe it.

Mr. BRINKLEY. In the last 48 hours there have been a great many conflicting reports from there about what the CIA [Central Intelligence Agency] was up to. Can you give us any enlightenment on it? The PRESIDENT. No.

Mr. HUNTLEY. Does the CIA tend to make its own policy? That seems to be the debate here.

The PRESIDENT. No, that is the frequent charge, but that isn't so. Mr. [John A.] McCone, head of the CIA, sits in the National Security Council. We have had a number of meetings in the past few days about events in South Viet-Nam. Mr. McCone participated in every one, and the CIA coordinates its efforts with the State Department and the Defense Department.

Mr. BRINKLEY. With so much of our prestige, money, so on, committed in South Viet-Nam, why can't we exercise a little more influence there, Mr. President?

THE PRESIDENT. We have some influence. We have some influence and we are attempting to carry it out. I think we don't—we can't expect these countries to do everything the way we want to do them. They have their own interest, their own personalities, their own tradition. We can't make everyone in our image, and there are a good many people who don't want to go in our image. In addition, we have ancient struggles between countries. In the case of India and Pakistan, we would like to have them settle Kashmir. That is our view of the best way to defend the subcontinent against communism. But that struggle between India and Pakistan is more important to a good many people in that area than the struggle against the Communists. We would like to have Cambodia, Thailand, and South Viet-Nam all in harmony, but there are ancient differences there. We can't make the world over, but we can influence the world. The fact of the matter is that with the assistance of the United States and SEATO [Southeast Asia Treaty Organization], Southeast Asia and indeed all of Asia has been maintained independent against a powerful force, the Chinese Communists. What I am concerned about is that Americans will get impatient and say, because they don't like events in Southeast Asia or they don't like the Government in Saigon, that we should withdraw. That only makes it easy for the Communists. I think we should stay. We should use our influence in as effective a way as we can, but we should not withdraw.

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(As dissension between the Buddhists and the Government of Ngo Dinh Diem increased, the U.S. reexamined its policy toward South Viet-Nam, as noted in the following three statements.)

34. U.S. POLICY ON VIET-NAM: WHITE HOUSE

STATEMENT, OCTOBER 2, 19631

Secretary [of Defense Robert S.] McNamara and General [Maxwell D.] Taylor reported to the President this morning and to the National Security Council this afternoon. Their report included a number of classified findings and recommendations which will be the subject of further review and action. Their basic presentation was endorsed by all members of the Security Council and the following statement of United States policy was approved by the President on the basis of recommendations received from them and from Ambassador [Henry Cabot Lodge.

1. The security of South Viet-Nam is a major interest of the United States as other free nations. We will adhere to our policy of workng with the people and Government of South Viet-Nam to deny this country to communism and to suppress the externally stimulated and supported insurgency of the Viet Cong as promptly as possible. Effective performance in this undertaking is the central objective of our policy in South Viet-Nam.

2. The military program in South Viet-Nam has made progress and is sound in principle, though improvements are being energetically sought.

3. Major U.S. assistance in support of this military effort is needed only until the insurgency has been suppressed or until the national security forces of the Government of South Viet-Nam are capable of suppressing it.

Secretary McNamara and General Taylor reported their judgment that the major part of the U.S. military task can be completed by the end of 1965, although there may be a continuing requirement for a limited number of U.S. training personnel. They reported that by the end of this year, the U.S. program for training Vietnamese should have progressed to the point where 1,000 U.S. military personnel assigned to South Viet-Nam can be withdrawn.

4. The political situation in South Viet-Nam remains deeply serious. The United States has made clear its continuing opposition to any repressive actions in South Viet-Nam. While such actions have not yet significantly affected the military effort, they could do so in the future.

5. It remains the policy of the United States, in South Viet-Nam as in other parts of the world, to support the efforts of the people of that country to defeat aggression and to build a peaceful and free society.

35. THE NEXT STEPS TOWARD PEACE: Statement by McGeorge Bundy, Special Assistant to the President, September 30, 1963 (Excerpts)1

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The difficult situation in the troubled country of South Viet-Nam is one which I have even less desire to discuss, in substantive terms, than the other questions I have taken as examples. The important mission of Secretary [of Defense Robert S.] McNamara and General [Maxwell D.] Taylor is only just ending, and it would be wholly inappropriate for me to comment on the course of action which may be chosen in the light of this mission and of the continuing consideration which is going forward in Saigon under the leadership of Ambassador [Henry Cabot] Lodge, and also in Washington.

Yet it is not wrong, I think, to suggest that in this case again there are two propositions, both of them true, and two kinds of error which can result from an unwillingness to accept them both. And again both propositions have been stated clearly by the President. The first is that the object of American policy in this part of the world is to assist in a most difficult and important struggle against Communist subversion-military, paramilitary, and political. The commitment of the United States to the independence of South Viet-Nam goes back many years. This commitment was intensified and reinforced 2

and since then a major cooperative effort has been carried forward with increasing energy-and at least until recently with increasing success by Americans working closely with the people and Government of South Viet-Nam. It is the policy of the United States to sustain that effort.

Yet it would be folly for the United States to neglect, or to regard with indifference, political developments of recent months which raise questions about the ability of the Government and people of South Viet-Nam to support each other effectively in their contest with communism. The President has made it clear that the United States is not indifferent to these events and regards them with great concern. It is and must be the policy of the United States Government to make clear its interest in whatever improvements it judges to be necessary, always of course with a proper regard for responsibilities which rest in the first instance upon the people of South Viet-Nam.

It is no secret that observers of the scene in South Viet-Nam have often differed sharply in their interpretation of events. From these differences there have come divergent recommendations for policy.. There is nothing discreditable in the existence of such differences. In a situation in which easy solutions do not exist and in which commitments of purpose and hope are high, it is only natural that there should be a tendency in each observer to emphasize the part of the truth to which he is nearest. If a particular antisubversive effort is going well, the man who is working on that effort is bound to see that part of reality as very large. If in the cities there is repression and alienation of public support, men living in those cities, with responsibilities more civil than military, will feel a special and intense

concern. Where danger comes is not in these equally right perceptions of important phenomena but in the human tendency, here as in each of my preceding examples, to suppose that one's own reality is the only reality, so that the observation of the other man is somehow misleading.

The requirement upon statesmanship, once again, is to seek ways of meeting both the need for effective prosecution of the struggle and the need for a workable relation between the people and government of a friendly country. No one can say that this task is easy. No one can even say it is certainly possible. But what can be said, and what the President has said already, is that the United States will not shrink from this responsibility or attempt to make it easier than it is by pretending that only one part of it is important.

36. U.S. REVISES AID TO VIET-NAM'S SPECIAL FORCES: Statement by the Department of State, October 22, 1963 1

The U.S. Government has informed the Government of Viet-Nam that U.S. support will no longer be provided to those elements of the special forces which are not committed to field operations or engaged in related training programs. This action is in line with President Kennedy's statement on September 12 that "What helps to win the war we support. What interferes with the war effort we oppose.”

(On November 1, a military coup by virtually the entire Vietnamese leadership against the Government of Ngo Dinh Diem took place and President Diem and his brother Ngo Dinh Nhu were assassinated. A provisional government was set up which was recognized by the United States on November 7. The following day, Secretary of State Rusk met with the press.)

37. SECRETARY RUSK'S NEWS CONFERENCE OF

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NOVEMBER 8, 1963 (Excerpts)2

Q. Mr. Secretary, could you give us your appraisal of the situation now in Viet-Nam, since we have recognized it, and what do you see ahead in the future as to the impact on U.S. policy in Southeast Asia?

A. Well, I think the great question which has been in front of us all along has been how to get on with the main job of assuring that South Viet-Nam is secure and able to work out its own future under its own leadership and without any interference from the outside.

Now, we were very much concerned when in 1959 the Viet Cong, with public support from Hanoi, moved to interfere in South VietNam and indeed threatened to take it over, and there has been steady growth in assistance and help by the United States and others to South Viet-Nam in that struggle.

1 Department of State Bulletin, Nov. 11, 1963, p. 736.

We were also concerned in May and June and July of this year when developments in South Viet-Nam indicated that there was a growing gap between the government and the people of that country, and there was some danger that the solidarity of the country itself in meeting this threat would be undermined by differences within the country.

Now it is our hope that the political and the military leadership that has now formed a new government there in Viet-Nam will be able to rally the country, consolidate the effort, get on with the job, so that that country can be independent and free and secure.

As far as the United States is concerned, we do not have and have never had any special United States interest in terms of military bases or anything of that sort. Our primary concern with Viet-Nam is that it be secure and independent, as it is entitled to be, and we are hopeful now that there will be a consolidation of effort and that the central problem there will be dealt with with expedition, and we will do what we can to assist, and we have every reason to believe that the present leadership will do everything they can on their own side.

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Q. Mr. Secretary, your remarks on neutralization in Viet-Nam may be subject to misinterpretation. Just to sum it up here: You reject neutralization as a solution to the problem in Viet-Nam?

A. Well, I don't know-my point is I don't know what Hanoi talks about when they talk about neutralization. South Viet-Nam was not allied with anyone; it was not a military base for anyone. It was subjected to attack from the outside through penetration, infiltration, arms supplies, subversive activities, matters of that sort.

There can be peace in Southeast Asia if others would leave South Viet-Nam and Laos alone and let the peoples of those countries work out their own future.

My point is I don't know what they mean by neutralization, except that I suspect that it means that they are trying to find some formula by which they can bring South Viet-Nam within the Communist world.

Q. Mr. Secretary, in South Viet-Nam, do you think that the new regime can prosecute the war more effectively than Diem did? If so, why?

A. I think, actually, the principal problem that developed with respect to the previous regime was the alienation of apparently very large sections of the population. We believe that the present regime has moved promptly to consolidate public effort, that they will be able to resolve some of the internal difficulties that grew up, and that there will be a possibility that the people of that country will move in greater unity on behalf of the total effort.

We are encouraged about the possibilities. But there is a good deal of unfinished business and some real problems ahead. But the reception, the support of the people themselves, will be vital in this type of guerrilla warfare. The attitude of the peoples becomes absolutely crucial. As I think it was Mao Tse-tung said, "If guerrillas are operating within a friendly population, every bush is an ally." Well, in the last period we feel that as far as the villages are concerned

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