allies of the effort to eradicate the Viet Cong aggression. And we believe this will get an impetus from recent events and they can go ahead now with more confidence. Q. Mr. Secretary, you have twice referred to Hanoi's idea of neutralization in Viet-Nam. What is your understanding of the French point of view and their mention of a truce? A. I think that was perhaps a comment from a very long-range point of view. It had very little to do with what happens tomorrow or the next day, perhaps commenting on the basis of what was anticipated at the time of the 1954 Geneva Accords. But we see no—we see no development specifically along that line from Paris or any ideas. about any particular moves that ought to be taken at this time. (On November 22, 1963 President Kennedy was assassinated in Dallas. In December President Lyndon B. Johnson sent Defense Secretary McNamara and CIA Director John A. McCone to Saigon to evaluate the new Government's war effort. This New Year's greeting from President Johnson pledged the energetic support of the United States.) 38. MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT JOHNSON TO. GEN. DUONG VAN MINH, CHAIRMAN OF THE MILITARY REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIET-NAM, December 31, 1963 1 1 DEAR GENERAL MINH. As we enter the New Year of 1964, I want to wish you, your Revolutionary Government, and your people full success in the long and arduous war which you are waging so tenaciously and bravely against the Viet Cong forces directed and supported by the Communist regime in Hanoi. Ambassador [Henry Cabot] Lodge and Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara have told me about the serious situation which confronts you and of the plans which you are developing to enable your armed forces and your people to redress this situation. This new year provides a fitting opportunity for me to pledge on behalf of the American Government and people a renewed partnership with your government and people in your brave struggle for freedom. The United States will continue to furnish you and your people with the fullest measure of support in this bitter fight. We shall maintain in Viet-Nam American personnel and material as needed to assist you in achieving victory. Our aims are, I know, identical with yours: to enable your government to protect its people from the acts of terror perpetrated by Communist insurgents from the north. As the forces of your government become increasingly capable of dealing with this aggression, American military personnel in South Viet-Nam can be progressively withdrawn. The United States Government shares the view of your government that "neutralization" of South Viet-Nam is unacceptable. As long as the Communist regime in North Viet-Nam persists in its aggressive policy, neutralization of South Viet-Nam would only be another name for a Communist takeover. Peace will return to your country just as soon as the authorities in Hanoi cease and desist from their terrorist aggression. Thus, your government and mine are in complete agreement on the political aspects of your war against the forces of enslavement, brutality, and material misery. Within this framework of political agreement we can confidently continue and improve our cooperation. I am pleased to learn from Secretary McNamara about the vigorous operations which you are planning to bring security and an improved standard of living to your people. I wish to congratulate you particularly on your work for the unity of all your people, including the Hoa Hao and Cao Dai, against the Viet Cong. I know from my own experience in Viet-Nam how warmly the Vietnamese people respond to a direct human approach and how they have hungered for this in their leaders. So again I pledge the energetic support of my country to your government and your people. We will do our full part to ensure that under your leadership your people may win a victory-a victory for freedom and justice and human welfare in Viet-Nam. Sincerely, LYNDON B. JOHNSON 39. SECRETARY RUSK'S NEWS CONFERENCE OF FEBRUARY 7, 1964 (Excerpt)1 Q. Mr. Secretary, to go to the other side of the world Ă. Right. Q. Viet-Nam Ă. Right. Q. The President suggested last week that there might be circumstances under which the United States would approve of the neutralization of both North and South Viet-Nam. He did not at that time spell this out. Could you tell us what is the policy of the United States in that respect? A. Well, let's start from the most elementary aspects of that problem. When the Geneva Conference on Laos convened in 1961-1962, I made a statement at that time that the only problem of peace in Southeast Asia arose from the north; that there was no threat to the peace of Southeast Asia from the south or from across the Pacific; that if those in the north would leave their neighbors alone, there could be peace; if the agreements which have already been reached and which have been signed by those in the north would be fulfilled, there could be peace in Southeast Asia. Now, we know that the other side has no present intention of talking about the neutralization of North Korea-of North Viet-Nam. Were they to make any such proposal, that at least would inject something new into the situation. But what we can't accept is the idea that, while they disregard their solemn commitments and move to under 1 Department of State Bulletin, Feb. 24, 1964, pp. 278-280. mine the Geneva accords of 1954, as well as of 1962, somehow we neutralize South Viet-Nam-meaning presumably by that withdrawing American forces and pulling out support so that South Viet-Nam would be even more exposed to the kinds of penetration which have been aimed at Southeast Asia from the north for these past few years. That is simply a device for the communization of all of Southeast Asia, and that we cannot accept. So I think we ought to go back to the basic point-that existing agreements ought to be observed, and if they would be observed, then the way is open for peace in Southeast A sia. Q. In that connection, Mr. Secretary, what do you regard as being the consequences then of the proposals set forth by President de Gaulle? Are they severely damaging or not? A. Well, there is some uncertainty about just what those proposals are, because there have been some statements made but no detailed proposals of which I am aware. It was indicated at one point some months ago that the reference to a neutralized Southeast Asia was intended to be a reference to a very long-term solution, that it did not have operational impact upon the immediate situation because of the attitude of the Communist world, and I don't know of any other proposals or any more precise proposals that have been made. Q. Mr. Secretary, in that connection, has there been any talk, specifically, of a treaty for the neutralization of Southeast Asia? There has been talk about the neutralization of Cambodia, in which a certain number of nations would participate to guarantee it. But is that what De Gaulle has in mind? A. I don't know what they might have in mind in Paris. My own thought on that would be that if these existing agreements were to be lived up to, if they were to be performed, this question wouldn't even arise, because these states of Southeast Asia would then be independent, secure, and free to pursue their own policy. And there would be no problem of disengagement from an alliance on the part of, say, a country like Laos or Cambodia or South VietNam, who are not allies and who would have to themselves invoke the protocol of SEATO before SEATO would become applicable. So that what they need is a chance to pursue their own policy as independent countries. And that is what they do not have so long as they are under this pressure from the north. Q. Mr. Secretary, just to set the record straight, sir A. Yes? Q. When you use the term "north," are you speaking of the government in Hanoi, the government in Peiping, the government in Moscow, or A. I'm thinking of all three of them. But in what relative weights, I could not-I would not want to be mathematical. Certainly Hanoi and Peiping are fully behind these aggressive pressures that are going on in Southeast Asia. We would be glad to see the Soviet Union more active in itself, throwing its full weight behind the performance on the existing accords. But I think all three of them carry heavy respon (On January 30, 1964, a military coup by Gen. Nguyen Khanh ousted the government of Maj. Gen. Duong Van Minh. After a visit by Defense Secretary McNamara and General Taylor to Saigon in March and by Secretary of State Rusk in April, the following four statements were made.) 40. TV INTERVIEW WITH PRESIDENT JOHNSON, MARCH 15, 1964 (Excerpt)1 Mr. BRINKLEY. You have had reports in the last day or two from the Ambassador to France [Charles E. Bohlen] and from Secretary [of Defense Robert S.] McNamara. Can you tell us anything of what he reported to you from Viet-Nam? The PRESIDENT. Yes, he made a very lengthy report and I think a responsible and constructive one. We are going to consider it in the Security Council further the early part of the week. We have problems in Viet-Nam, as we have had for 10 years. Secretary McNamara has been out there-this is his fourth trip. We are very anxious to do what we can to help those people preserve their own freedom. We cherish ours, and we would like to see them preserve theirs. We have furnished them with counsel and advice, and men and materiel, to help them in their attempts to defend themselves. If people quit attacking them, we'd have no problem, but for 10 years this problem has been going on. I was reading a letter only today that General Eisenhower wrote the late President Diem 10 years ago, and it is a letter that I could have well written to President Khanh and sent out by Mr. McNamara. Now, we have had that problem for a long time. We are going to have it for some time in the future, we can see, but we are patient people, and we love freedom, and we want to help others preserve it, and we are going to try to evolve the most effective and efficient plans we can to continue to help them. Mr. SEVAREID. Mr. Kennedy said, on the subject of Viet-Nam, I think, that he did believe in the "falling domino" theory, that if Viet-Nam were lost that other countries in the area would soon be lost. The PRESIDENT. I think it would be a very dangerous thing, and I share President Kennedy's view, and I think the whole of Southeast Asia would be involved and that would involve hundreds of millions of people, and I think it's-it cannot be ignored, we must do everything that we can, we must be responsible, we must stay there and help them, and that is what we are going to do. 41. UNITED STATES TO INCREASE ECONOMIC AND MILITARY AID TO VIET-NAM: Statement by the White House, March 17, 1964 2 Secretary McNamara and General Taylor, following their initial oral report of Friday, today reported fully to President Johnson and the members of the National Security Council. The report covered the situation in South Viet-Nam, the measures being taken by General 1 Department of State Bulletin, Apr. 6, 1964, pp. 525-526. Khanh and his government, and the need for United States assistance to supplement and support these measures. There was also discussion of the continuing support and direction of the Viet Cong insurgency from North Viet-Nam. At the close of the meeting the President accepted the report and its principal recommendations, which had the support of the National Security Council and Ambassador Lodge. Comparing the situation to last October, when Secretary McNamara and General Taylor last reported fully on it, there have unquestionably been setbacks. The Viet Cong have taken maximum advantage of two changes of government, and of more longstanding difficulties, including a serious weakness and overextension which had developed in the basically sound hamlet program. The supply of arms and cadres from the north has continued; careful and sophisticated control of Viet Cong operations has been apparent; and evidence that such control is centered in Hanoi is clear and unmistakable. To meet the situation, General Khanh and his government are acting vigorously and effectively. They have produced a sound central plan for for the prosecution of the war, recognizing to a far greater degree than before the crucial role of economic and social, as well as military, action to insure that areas cleared of the Viet Cong survive and prosper in freedom. To carry out this plan, General Khanh requires the full enlistment of the people of South Viet-Nam, partly to augment the strength of his antiguerrilla forces, but particularly to provide the administrators, health workers, teachers, and others who must follow up in cleared areas. To meet this need, and to provide a more equitable and common basis of service, General Khanh has informed us that he proposes in the near future to put into effect a National Moblization Plan that will provide conditions and terms of service in appropriate jobs for all able bodied South Vietnamese between certain ages. In addition, steps are required to bring up to required levels the pay and status of the paramilitary forces and to create a highly trained guerrilla force that can beat the Viet Cong on its own ground. Finally, limited but significant additional equipment is proposed for the air forces, the river navy, and the mobile forces. In short, where the South Vietnamese Government now has the power to clear any part of its territory, General Khanh's new program is designed to clear and to hold, step by step and province by province. This program will involve substantial increases in cost to the South Vietnamese economy, which in turn depends heavily on United States economic aid. Additional, though less substantial, military assistance funds are also needed, and increased United States training activity both on the civil and military side. The policy should continue of withdrawing United States personnel where their roles can be assumed by South Vietnamese and of sending additional men if they are needed. It will remain the policy of the United States to furnish assistance and support to South Viet-Nam for as long as it is required to bring Communist aggression and terrorism under control Secretary McNamara and General Taylor reported their overall conclusion that with continued vigorous leadership from General Khanh and his government, and the carrying out of these steps, the |