42. U.S. POLICY IN VIET-NAM: Address by Secretary of Defense McNamara, March 26, 1964 (Excerpt)1

I turn now to a consideration of United States objectives in South Viet-Nam. The United States has no designs whatever on the resources or territory of the area. Our national interests do not require that South Viet-Nam serve as a Western base or as a member of a Western alliance. Our concern is threefold.

First, and most important, is the simple fact that South Viet-Nam, a member of the free-world family, is striving to preserve its independence from Communist attack. The Vietnamese have asked our help. We have given it. We shall continue to give it.

We do so in their interest; and we do so in our own clear self-interest. For basic to the principles of freedom and self-determination which have sustained our country for almost two centuries is the right of peoples everywhere to live and develop in peace. Our own security is strengthened by the determination of others to remain free, and by our commitment to assist them. We will not let this member of our family down, regardless of its distance from our shores.

The ultimate goal of the United States in Southeast Asia, as in the rest of the world, is to help maintain free and independent nations which can develop politically, economically, and socially and which can be responsible members of the world community. In this region and elsewhere many peoples share our sense of the value of such freedom and independence. They have taken the risks and made the sacrifices linked to the commitment to membership in the family of the free world. They have done this in the belief that we would back up our pledges to help defend them. It is not right or even expedientnor is it in our nature-to abandon them when the going is difficult. Second, Southeast Asia has great strategic significance in the forward defense of the United States. Its location across east-west air and sea lanes flanks the Indian subcontinent on one side and Australia, New Zealand, and the Philippines on the other and dominates the gateway between the Pacific and Indian Oceans. In Communist hands this area would pose a most serious threat to the security of the United States and to the family of free-world nations to which we belong. To defend Southeast Asia, we must meet the challenge in South VietNam.

And third, South Viet-Nam is a test case for the new Communist strategy. Let me examine for a moment the nature of this strategy. Just as the Kennedy administration was coming into office in January 1961, Chairman Khrushchev made one of the most important speeches on Communist strategy of recent decades. In his report on a party conference entitled "For New Victories of the World Communist Movement," Khrushchev stated: "In modern conditions, the following categories of wars should be distinguished: world wars, local wars, liberation wars and popular uprisings." He ruled out what he called "world wars" and "local wars" as being too dangerous for profitable indulgence in a world of nuclear weapons. But with regard to what he called "liberation wars," he referred specifically to VietNam. He said, "It is a sacred war. We recognize such wars.

I have pointed out on other occasions the enormous strategic nuclear power which the United States has developed to cope with the first of Mr. Khrushchev's types of wars; deterrence of deliberate, calculated nuclear attack seems as assured as it can be. With respect to our general-purpose forces designed especially for local wars, within the past 3 years we have increase the number of our combat-ready Army divisions by about 45 percent, tactical air squadrons by 30 percent, airlift capabilities by 75 percent, with a 100-percent increase in ship construction and conversion. In conjunction with the forces of our allies our global posture for deterrence and defense is still not all that it should be, but it is good.

President Kennedy and President Johnson have recognized, however, that our forces for the first two types of wars might not be applicable or effective against what the Communists call "wars of liberation," or what is properly called covert aggression or insurgency. We have therefore undertaken and continue to press a variety of programs to develop skilled specialists, equipment, and techniques to enable us to help our allies counter the threat of insurgency.

Communist interest in insurgency techniques did not begin with Khrushchev, nor for that matter with Stalin. Lenin's works are full of tactical instructions, which were adapted very successfully by Mao Tse-tung, whose many writings on guerrilla warfare have become classic references. Indeed, Mao claims to be the true heir of Lenin's original prescriptions for the worldwide victory of communism. The North Vietnamese have taken a leaf or two from Mao's book—as well as Moscow's-and added some of their own.

Thus today in Viet-Nam we are not dealing with factional disputes or the remnants of a colonial struggle against the French but rather with a major test case of communism's new strategy. That strategy has so far been pursued in Cuba, may be beginning in Africa, and failed in Malaya and the Philippines only because of a long and arduous struggle by the people of these countries with assistance provided by the British and the United States.

In Southeast Asia the Communists have taken full advantage of geography-the proximity to the Communist base of operations and the rugged, remote, and heavily foliated character of the border regions. They have utilized the diverse ethnic, religious, and tribal groupings and exploited factionalism and legitimate aspirations wherever possible. And, as I said earlier, they have resorted to sabotage, terrorism, and assassination on an unprecedented scale.

Who is the responsible party-the prime aggressor? First and foremost, without doubt, the prime aggressor is North Viet-Nam, whose leadership has explicitly undertaken to destroy the independence of the South. To be sure, Hanoi is encouraged on its aggressive course by Communist China. But Peiping's interest is hardly the same as that of Hanoi.

For Hanoi, the immediate objective is limited: conquest of the South and national unification, perhaps coupled with control of Laos. For Peiping, however, Hanoi's victory would be only a first step toward eventual Chinese hegemony over the two Viet-Nams and Southeast Asia and toward exploitation of the new strategy in other parts of the

Communist China's interests are clear: It has publicly castigated Moscow for betraying the revolutionary cause whenever the Soviets have sounded a cautionary note. It has characterized the United States as a paper tiger and has insisted that the revolutionary struggle for "liberation and unification" of Viet-Nam could be conducted without risks by, in effect, crawling under the nuclear and the conventional defense of the free world. Peiping thus appears to feel that it has a large stake in demonstrating the new strategy, using Viet-Nam as a test case. Success in Viet-Nam would be regarded by Peiping as vindication for China's views in the worldwide ideological struggle.

Taking into account the relationship of Viet-Nam to Indochinaand of both to Southeast Asia, the Far East, and the free world as a whole-five U.S. Presidents have acted to preserve free-world strategic interests in the area. President Roosevelt opposed Japanese penetration in Indochina; President Truman resisted Communist aggression in Korea; President Eisenhower backed Diem's efforts to save South Viet-Nam and undertook to defend Taiwan; President Kennedy stepped up our counter-insurgency effort in Viet-Nam; and President Johnson, in addition to reaffirming last week that the United States will furnish assistance and support to South Viet-Nam for as long as it is required to bring Communist aggression and terrorism under control, has approved the program that I shall describe in a few minutes. The U.S. role in South Viet-Nam, then, is: first, to answer the call of the South Vietnamese, a member nation of our free-world family, to help them save their country for themselves; second, to help prevent the strategic danger which would exist if communism absorbed Southeast Asia's people and resources; and third, to prove in the Vietnamese test case that the free world can cope with Communist "wars of liberation" as we have coped successfully with Communist aggression at other levels.

I referred earlier to the progress in South Viet-Nam during 1954– 1959. In our concern over the seriousness of the Viet Cong insurgency, we sometimes overlook the fact that a favorable comparison still exists between progress in the South-notwithstanding nearly 15 years of bitter warfare-and the relative stagnation in North VietNam.

The so-called "Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam," with a greater population that the South and only a marginally smaller area, appears to be beset by a variety of weaknesses, the most prominent of which is its agricultural failure. Mismanagement, some poor weather, and a lack of fertilizers and insecticides have led to a serious rice shortage. The 1963 per capita output of rice was about 20 percent lower than 1960. Before the June 1964 harvests, living standards will probably decline further in the cities, and critical food shortages may appear in some of the villages. Furthermore, prospects for the June rice crops are not bright.

The internal transportation system remains primitive, and Hanoi has not met the quotas established for heavy industry. As for the people, they appear to be generally apathetic to what the party considers the needs of the state, and the peasantry has shown considerable

I have pointed out on other occasio power which the United States has Mr. Khrushchev's types of wars; nuclear attack seems as assured general-purpose forces designed past 3 years we have increase t divisions by about 45 percer * airlift capabilities by 75 pe construction and conversion allies our global posture f it should be, but it is good. President Kennedy ever, that our forces applicable or effecti liberation," or what We have therefore. grams to develo enable us to hel Communisti Khrushchev, 1 of tactical i Tse-tung,

classic re original North V as Mose

Thus or the

with has fa:

ar

despite Communist atthe domestic economy, -Nam was once more Add to this the pre-1960 ncreases in rice, rubber, ercent rise in per capita restoration of the transPade that, given stability and et-Nam would dramatically old become a peaceful and

of the Far East as a whole. -because South Viet-Nam is ht prospects.

the signing of the 1954 Geneva Viet-Nam gave first priority to an those of any other Southeast tablish iron control over their own base for subversion in South VietNam, instead of withdrawing fully, Solding guerrilla operation, and they arge caches of weapons for later use. ave seen, the Communists realised that and intensified their subversive attack. on Viet-Nam was issued by the Interna

unit created by the Geneva conference an, and Indian, and a Pole. Though it the time, this report presented evidence of es in South Viet-Nam and specifically found the Geneva accords.

campaign of terror, violence, and subversion Cong and directed and supported from the anded. Military men, specialists, and secret Strate into South Viet-Nam both directly from Laos and Cambodia. The flow of CommunistSarticularly those of large caliber, has increased. es 75 mm. recoilless rifles and heavy machineguns. producing chemicals smuggled in for use by the ven intercepted along with many munitions manuhina and, to a lesser extent, elsewhere in the ComDecember 1963 a Government force attacked a Viet in Dinh Tuong Province and seized a large cache some of which was of Chinese Communist manufacture. equipment included a 90 mm. rocket launcher, 60 mm. arbines, TNT, and hundreds of thousands of rounds of nds of ammunition. Some of the ammunition was manuas recently as 1962.

esident Diem appealed to President Kennedy at the end of e South Vietnamese were quite plainly losing their fight against Semunists, and we promptly agreed to increase our assistance. arteen months later, in early 1963, President Kennedy was able est to the nation that "The spearpoint of aggression has been

had seized the initiative in most areas from the insurgents. But this progress was interrupted in 1963 by the political crises arising from troubles between the Government and the Buddhists, students, and other non-Communist oppositionists. President Diem lost the confidence and loyalty of his people; there were accusations of maladministration and injustice. There were two changes of government within 3 months. The fabric of government was torn. The political control structure extending from Saigon down into the hamlets virtually disappeared. Of the 41 incumbent province chiefs on November 1 of last year, 35 were replaced. Nine provinces had three chiefs in 3 months; one province had four. Scores of lesser officials were replaced. Almost all major military commands changed hands twice. The confidence of the peasants was inevitably shaken by the disruptions in leadership and the loss of physical security. Army and paramilitary desertion rates increased, and the morale of the hamlet militia-the "Minutemen"-fell. In many areas power vacuums developed causing confusion among the people and a rising rate of rural disorders.

The Viet Cong fully exploited the resultant organizational turmoil and regained the initiative in the struggle. For example, in the second week following the November coup, Viet Cong incidents more than tripled from 316, peaking at 1,021 per week, while Government casualties rose from 367 to 928. Many overextended hamlets have been overrun or severely damaged. The January change in government produced a similar reaction.

In short, the situation in South Viet-Nam has unquestionably worsened, at least since last fall.

The picture is admittedly not an easy one to evaluate and, given the kind of terrain and the kind of war, information is not always available or reliable. The areas under Communist control vary from davtime to nighttime, from one week to another, according to seasonal and weather factors. And, of course, in various areas the degree and importance of control differ. Although we estimate that in South Viet-Nam's 14 million population there are only 20,000 to 25,000 "hard core" Viet Cong guerrillas, they have been able to recruit from among the South Vietnamese an irregular force of from 60,000 to 80,000-mainly by coercion and "bandwagon" effect, but also by promising material and political rewards. The loyalties of the hard core have been cemented by years of fighting, first against the Japanese, then against the French, and, since 1954, against the fledgling government of South Viet-Nam. The young men joining them have been attracted by the excitement of the guerrilla life and then held by bonds of loyalty to their new comrades-in-arms, in a nation where loyalty is only beginning to extend beyond the family or the clan. These loyalties are reinforced both by systematic indoctrination and by the example of what happens to informers and deserters.

Clearly, the disciplined leadership, direction, and support from North Viet-Nam is a critical factor in the strength of the Viet Cong movement. But the large indigenous support that the Viet Cong receives means that solutions must be as political and economic as military. Indeed, there can be no such thing as a purely "military”